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Virginia Commonwealth University, 2010 
 
 
Major Director: William W. Newmann, Ph.D., Professor of Political Science, L. Douglas 
Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs 
 
This study aims to identify tactics used by the Turkish Hezbollah to recruit 
college students into joining their terrorist organization. This study based on the 
assumptions that social networks and institutional structures are two main tools that are 
used effectively by the Turkish Hezbollah to recruit college educated students. In this 
sense, the researcher claims that Social Learning theory and Social Control Theories can 
be used to provide theoretical explanation to the Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategy. 
Parallel to these theories assumptions, while having militants within social networks 
increases the likelihood of being recruited through social learning theory assumptions, 
college students who are away from their families are more likely to be recruited through 
social control theory assumptions.  
 The researcher uses individual level secondary data related to members of the 
Turkish Hezbollah. The data comprised of self reports that each member submitted to the 
Turkish Hezbollah as part of their recruitment process. The data are derived from the 
xii 
 
Turkish National Police‟s database. Initially, frequency table is used to determine which 
structure and which theory best explain the Turkish Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategies. 
Then, to decide which demographic factors increase or decrease the likelihood of being 
recruited through social networks (social learning theory) or institutional structures 
(social control theory), logistic regression is used. Eight independent variables are used to 
identify those factors such as having Hezbollah militants within social networks, pursuing 
college education while being away from family, family‟s religious ideology, having 
online or campus education, family size, income level, college student‟s religiosity level, 
and reason for attending Hezbollah.  
 The findings indicated that social networks and institutional structures are two 
important tools that are used by the Turkish Hezbollah. Social networks are more 
effectively used structures comparing to institutional structures. According to the results, 
there are two important variables have more weight on dependent variable comparing to 
other variables. While having militants within the social networks increases the 
likelihood of being recruited through social learning theory assumptions, being away 
from families during college education increases the likelihood of being recruited through 
social control theory assumptions.   
 
  
1 
 
1 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the past three decades, countries throughout the world have struggled to 
fight against terrorism due to the thousands of lives that have been lost in addition to the 
billions of dollars shed to disrupt terrorist activities. Considering these tremendous losses, 
terrorism obviously has a devastating effect on any given country‟s efforts to protect their 
citizens as well as their economic and political interests.  
1.1 Purpose of the Study 
According to Crenshaw (2000), an individual‟s motivation for joining a terrorist 
organization can be classified into theoretical models that generally include an 
individual‟s perception of injustice, search for identity, need for belonging, and ideology, 
among others. Taking these motivations into account in my study, the tactics used by the 
Turkish Hezbollah to recruit college students into becoming members of their terrorist 
organization are identified based on the following research questions: 
1. What methods are used to recruit college students into the Turkish Hezbollah, 
a religiously motivated terrorist organization? 
2. What are the demographic profiles of the individuals who are recruited by the 
institutional structures and social networks?  
3. Does social control theory or social learning theory best explain the Turkish 
Hezbollah‟s most successful method of recruiting? 
In the first question, recruitment methods that are used by the Turkish Hezbollah 
militants were examined. To answer the second question and help to identify the 
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significance of each variable, eight hypotheses were developed. Each variable‟s weight 
used for recruitment purposes were then assessed pertaining to two structures: (a) 
institutional structure and (b) social networks. For the third research question, I strived to 
develop a better theory that would provide a better explanation concerning the Turkish 
Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategies. To answer this question, I examined the factors that 
influence and make college students more vulnerable to be recruited from the standpoint 
of two criminological theories: (a) social control and (b) social learning theories. First, 
however, the target population needed to be identified according to these two important 
criminological theories. College students who had the following characteristics were 
excluded from this segment of my study because it was difficult to determine whether 
they were recruited through social control or social learning theory perspectives: (a) those 
who were with their family during their college education and stated that they were 
recruited in college and had militants within the social structure; and (b) those who were 
away from their family during their college education and stated that they were recruited 
while away from the family and had militants within their social networks. 
Briefly, social control theory states that an individual who leaves his or her native 
habitat lacks the traditional social forces that could act to restrain his or her involvement 
in criminal activity (Vold, Bernard, & Snipes, 2002). Earlier, Gibbs (1989) maintained 
that social control theory helps to understand the conception of deviance counteraction 
and the suppression of terrorism through decreasing extreme behaviors.  
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On the other hand, social learning theory implies that an individual is more 
inclined to learn behavior through interaction with others who may serve as the stimuli 
for committing crime (Akers, Lanza, & Radosevic, 1979). 
In my study, I expected that social networks in the area where a person grew up 
would have a significant effect on the decision as to whether or not to commit crime(s). 
Parallel to this expectancy, Ross (1993) further claimed that shared attitudes, beliefs, 
values, opinions, habits, customs, traditions, and myths permit the development of 
fanaticism, violence, nationalism, and terrorism in a population‟s subgroup. Ross added 
that group perceptions shared by a person may diminish the risks of committing terrorist 
actions, and its inspirational effect may increase a member‟s commitment to the group.  
Considering the strong social network within the geographical area in which the 
Turkish Hezbollah effectively operates, I postulated that the Turkish Hezbollah would be 
more likely to use social networks in recruiting new militants who held college degrees.  
To determine the Turkish Hezbollah‟s most effective recruiting method, 
descriptive statistics were used for the first research question, and for the second and 
third research questions, logistic regression was applied in order to reveal the 
demographic details concerning the Turkish Hezbollah militants. This method helped to 
identify the variables that lead college students to be recruited. In other words, the 
independent variables (IVs) were tested over the dependent variable (DV) to observe 
each IV‟s weight that increased the likelihood of being recruited. In addition, for the 
second and third research questions, descriptive analyses were applied to determine the 
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most successful method and to decide which theory best explained the Turkish 
Hezbollah‟s recruitment methods.   
In 2000, reports were seized by the Turkish National Police during an operation 
against Hezbollah‟s leader. According to Nachmias and Nachmias (2000), these personal 
reports were believed to accurately represent a view of one‟s life, and they were not 
contaminated by another person‟s analysis. In addition, rather than providing subjective 
information, the Turkish Hezbollah members revealed only actual self-reported 
information concerning when and how they were recruited, their family structure, and 
about themselves. Further, because the reports were never intended to become the 
property of the Turkish National Police, there was no reason for the militants to falsify 
their backgrounds. Besides, the Turkish Hezbollah is a religiously motivated terrorist 
group and lying is considered to be one of the greatest sins within the seven that are 
mentioned in the Qur‟an. For example, if a person lies about his or her background, it is 
highly possible that he or she may be considered as an intruder within the Turkish 
Hezbollah. Finally, unbiased reporting was believed to exist given that militants are 
expected to provide reliable information that the Turkish Hezbollah has the power to 
validate.   
Turkey was selected for this research because, first, there are few academic 
studies that specifically address the Turkish Hezbollah. In the modern world, government 
policies should rely on academic studies because a lack of them may give incorrect policy 
implications. Thus, to support the operational solutions, the Turkish government clearly 
needs well-addressed policy changes in an effort to minimize terrorist activities. Second, 
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social factors play important roles in Turkey. For example, in comparison to the United 
States and other Western countries, an eastern culture increases the effectiveness of one‟s 
social environment, wherein being from the same city, social background, and ethnicity 
plays a significant role (Cakir, 2007).  
Consistent to the expected findings of my study, by employing social networks to 
recruit new members as opposed to institutional structures, the Turkish Hezbollah would 
be more effective. As a policy implication, I implied that Turkish government officials 
need policy changes such as providing better human rights, democracy, and religious 
freedom against Turkish Hezbollah‟s strategies and propaganda. Thus far, it has been 
shown that the current policy of responding harshly to terrorists does not solve the 
problem but rather assists the Turkish Hezbollah in recruiting more militants through its 
use of propaganda aimed against the Turkish government. Thus, new tactics and 
strategies are needed to fight the Turkish Hezbollah. Parallel to the Turkish government‟s 
efforts in becoming a member of the European Union, it must expand on social and 
religious rights. Farr (2008) argued that the source of social identity is constituted by 
religion, and suppressing religion creates high tension within a society. This possible 
negativity over religion may, perhaps, be an effective tool used by the Turkish Hezbollah 
to recruit more militants through social networks. On the other hand, providing social and 
religious freedom may decrease the recruitment of new militants through social networks. 
This issue will be further discussed in-depth in the section related to policy 
recommendations. 
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1.2 Recruitment Effectiveness 
By examining the motivational factors of joining a terrorist organization, I 
focused on the effectiveness of the Turkish Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategies. In order to 
provide a better perspective of each strategy, effectiveness was defined in terms of the 
organization‟s successful achievement in recruiting more militants. Based on different 
perspectives, effectiveness can be defined in various ways. For example, in the field of 
economics, the term describes “the extent to which the desired level of output is 
achieved” (Scheerens, Glas, & Thomas, 2003). On the other hand, from a human resource 
perspective, Miller (2009) stated that the basic step for all types of recruitment 
effectiveness is good profiling and selection. In my study, effectiveness is defined as the 
Turkish Hezbollah‟s successful achievement based on the quantity of members recruited. 
The number of militants recruited was each separately converted to percentages in order 
to make a comparison between those who were recruited using social networks versus 
those who were recruited through institutional structures. Depending on the results, I 
expected my study to reveal the following.  
 
1.2.1 Using social networks to recruit more militants  
Social learning theory asserts (Vold et al., 2002) that behaviors and ideas can be 
learned, and they may be supportive of criminal behavior within particular groups. 
Parallel to this statement, if social networks are responsible for recruiting a larger 
percentage of Turkish Hezbollah militants, considering the eastern part of Turkey‟s social 
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structure, my study is expected to demonstrate that family members and relatives have a 
great influence over a person‟s decision to make right or wrong choices.  
 
1.2.2 Using institutional structures to recruit more militants 
Contrary to other criminal theories‟ assumption that people naturally obey the law 
if they are left to their own devices, control theory takes the opposite approach and 
assumes that all people are inclined to commit crimes if they are left to their own devices. 
According to control theorists, controlling forces restrain persons from committing 
crimes, and weakness of these forces drives them to do so (Vold et al., 2002). Similar to 
other terrorist organizations, the Turkish Hezbollah takes advantage of this environment 
through its institutional structures.  
If institutional structures were found to be responsible for recruiting a larger 
percentage of militants, I demonstrated that the Turkish Hezbollah has very strong 
institutional structures within colleges that influence other students to join the 
organization.  
Given that the Turkish Hezbollah members provided detailed information in their 
personal reports regarding when and who recruited them, this information assisted me in 
identifying the effectiveness of both strategies. 
 
1.3 Significance of Terrorism as a Problem 
Woolsey (2002) contended that many of the ideological, political, and national 
hostility that motivates terrorists will remain unresolved in the 21
st
 century. Accordingly, 
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it is safe to assume that terrorists will continue to instigate violence in order to achieve 
political, economic, and social changes. Clearly, finding the reasons for terrorist activities 
is the core element to successfully combat terrorism. According to Gerwehr and Daly 
(2006), fighting against terrorism should not only include responding to attacks and 
threats but also should include proactive steps in order to diminish terrorist activities.  
In my study, I strived to determine the Turkish Hezbollah‟s effective recruitment 
methods as well as the underlying reasons for Hezbollah‟s support in Turkey‟s eastern 
part. In the following discussion, continuing causes of terrorism are suggested. 
 
1.3.1 Unnoticed reasons behind terrorism   
According to Yayla (2005), most of the problems related to terrorism remain 
unsolved, and further, most have never been researched. One main drawback in today‟s 
governments and agencies concerning current terrorist threats focuses on short-term 
policy resolutions. Yayla argued that a majority of the strategies designed to fight 
terrorism lack long-term solutions, for example, making attempts to identify the main 
causes and pursuing them in an effort to eliminate the justifications behind terrorist 
organizations.  
 
1.3.2 Determination of the terrorists  
 My study was designed to determine if Turkish Hezbollah militants were 
recruited through either institutional structures or social networks. By doing so, perhaps 
new policies for combating terrorism will be established. For example, the Turkish 
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Hezbollah provides shelter or food free of charge to college students, the target 
population in my study. By taking into consideration the lower income level in Turkey‟s 
eastern part, these types of activities help the terrorist organization to create a sense of 
sympathy for college students. In addition, the organization‟s legal structures become 
extremely effective in recruiting more militants. Thus, universities may play an important 
role in decreasing the number of newly recruited militants by providing lower-cost 
campus housing and controlling those areas as a means of steering college students away 
from terrorist organizations. Thus, I expected to find that students who came from lower 
income family members would be more likely to be recruited by institutional structures 
through the organization‟s provision of complimentary housing or other necessary 
college commodities.   
Moghaddam (2005) suggested that the more an individual becomes involved in a 
terrorist organization, the more likely he or she will adhere to the organization‟s 
ideologies. For the sake of their illegal organizations, many terrorists do not hesitate to 
kill not only themselves but also as many civilians and innocent people as they possibly 
can. For example, Al-Qaeda, one of the ruthless terrorist organizations, killed over 3,000 
innocent people simultaneously on September 11
th
, 2001. When planning a terrorist 
attack that is not suspected, this determination becomes one of the most dangerous 
weapons in the world.  
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1.4 Approaches to Terrorism Analysis 
Although I aimed to reveal the best recruitment strategy of the Turkish Hezbollah, 
I also examined the motivational factors that drive college students to join terrorist 
organizations. The Turkish Hezbollah‟s militants‟ self-reports provided detailed 
information concerning how and why they chose to join Hezbollah. My study was 
designed to reveal the best working argument of the Turkish Hezbollah for recruiting new 
militants. Considering the eastern part of Turkey, the area is more conservative when 
compared to the western part. Although there may be some criticism regarding Turkey‟s 
religious policies, the country‟s secular and democratic regime guarantees each 
individual‟s religious life. In this regard, I provided a general assessment of the terrorist 
mind and mindset. 
Hudson (1999) discussed that identifying terrorist methods and tactics may 
improve counterterrorist policies. He stated that there are five basic approaches to 
analyzing terrorism. The following brief discussion of Hudson‟s basic approaches was 
found to be beneficial in understanding the general insights in my study that explain why 
people join terrorist organizations.  
  
1.4.1 The Multicausal Approach 
Hudson (1999) stated that terrorism usually results from multiple causal factors. 
Accordingly, those factors may psychological as well as religious, economic, political, 
and sociological factors. Since terrorism is a multicausal phenomenon, it would be 
11 
 
erroneous and simplistic to explain an act of terrorism by a single cause such as the 
psychological need of the terrorist to perpetrate an act of violence. 
The causes of revolution and political violence in general may also compose the 
causes of terrorism that include:  (a) religious, (b) ethnic and ideological conflicts, (c) 
modernization stresses, (d) poverty, (e) political inequities, (f) traditions of violence, (g) 
lack of peaceful communications channels, (h) the existence of a revolutionary group, (i) 
erosions of confidence in a regime, (j) governmental weakness and incompetence, and (k) 
deep divisions within governing elites and leadership groups (Wilkinson, 1993). 
Throughout history, terrorist groups have used not only Islam but also other 
religions as a justification for their vicious activities (George, 2006). However the Qur‟an 
does not advocate killing innocents nor does the Torah or the Bible. Contrary to 
religiously motivated terrorist groups, all religions harshly condemn terrorist activities. 
Thus, I will reveal how the Turkish Hezbollah uses religion as a tool to entice college 
students.  
 
1.4.2 Political Approach 
According to this approach, political environmental factors play an important role 
for terrorism. Preconditions─subnational, national and international environments─may 
give some justifications for terrorists to start violence (Hudson, 1999). Preconditions, also 
known as permissive causes, can be attractive to political dissidents who may be 
motivators of terrorists. According to Crenshaw (1981), permissive causes consist of (a) 
urbanization, (b) the transportation system that may allow a terrorist to quickly escape to 
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another country, (c) communications media, (d) weapons availability, and the absence of 
security measures (Crenshaw, 1981). 
Although most Turkish Hezbollah militants originated from the Kurds, they do 
not aspire to racial segregation that is harshly criticized by the Qur‟an. Because claiming 
ethnic supremacy is not tolerated by Islam, I revealed that the Turkish Hezbollah does not 
use political argument to recruit new militants  
  
1.4.3 Organizational Approach 
 According to the organizational approach, terrorism is seen as a rational strategic 
course of action that is decided by a group (Crenshaw, 1990). In other words, terrorism is 
not committed by an individual. Although the level of individual commitment to the 
group and its beliefs varies, acts of terrorism are committed by groups who reach 
collective decisions based on commonly held beliefs (Hudson, 1999). 
 Because the Turkish Hezbollah is a religiously motivated terrorist organization, 
unless someone insults Islam through the media, it does not kill people to create 
propaganda (Cakir, 2007).  For example, Hezbollah kills its target but does not reveal the 
target, a policy that has resulted in many unknown killings especially from 1989 to 2000. 
However, after the Turkish Hezbollah‟s archives were obtained in 2000, the public 
learned that most of the unknown killings were perpetrated by the Turkish Hezbollah. In 
my study, I did not discuss the organizational approach. 
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1.4.4 Psychological Approach 
 According to Hudson (1999), the relatively few psychologists who study 
terrorism are primarily interested in the individual terrorist or the terrorist group‟s micro-
level.  In essence, the psychological approach is concerned with the study of terrorists 
themselves that includes their recruitment and induction into terrorist groups and their 
personalities, beliefs, attitudes, motivations, and careers as terrorists (Hudson, 1999). In 
my study, however, I did not assess the college student through this approach.  
 
1.4.5 The Physiological Approach 
 The physiological approach suggests that in any discussion of the causes of 
terrorism, the media‟s role in promoting the spread of terrorism cannot be ignored. 
Through media coverage, for example, the methods, demands, and goals are quickly 
made known to potential terrorists. Oots and Wiegele (1985) proposed that a model of 
terrorist contagion is based on physiology in which the psychological state of the 
potential terrorist has important implications for society‟s stability. In their analysis, 
because potential terrorists become aroused in the violence─accepting the media‟s way of 
presenting terrorism─by the nature of their actions, terrorists must have an attitude that 
leads them to commit violence. Oots and Wiegele added that in order to become 
aggressively aroused, the potential terrorist only needs to see that terrorism has worked 
for others. Accordingly, an individual moves from being a potential terrorist to being an 
actual terrorist through a process that is psychological, physiological, and political. 
14 
 
 In my study, I did not examine the media part of terrorism for the following 
reasons. Considering the low income of people who live in the area, they may not be able 
to afford media sources. Therefore, I expected that very few people would be affected 
through the Turkish Hezbollah‟s media propaganda. 
 
1.5 Statement of the Problem 
 
Turkey‟s struggle against all kinds of terrorist activities for more than four 
decades set the country as a good place to develop a case study. The reasons behind 
Turkey‟s varied terrorist activities lie in its geographical and historical background. 
Turkey‟s unique geographical location situated between Europe and Asia causes Turkish 
social life to be affected by many cultures that provide a diversified society─a hallmark 
of modern Turkey (Ozeren, 2004). Although democracy and civil society are welcomed 
by Turkish citizens for the most part, fundamentalist ideas may also find ground within 
the society. According to Ozeren, being in the more problematic geographical location 
causes Turkey to be more open to fundamentalist terrorist activities. In addition, 
supported by Iranian fundamentalist groups, the Turkish Hezbollah has sympathy for the 
Kurdish population who reside within the eastern part of the country (Cakir, 2007). 
Especially during the cold war era when Turkey represented the only Islamic 
nation in NATO, the country faced a significant threat from the Soviet Union. For 
example, fundamentalist left wing groups supported by the Soviet Union murdered many 
people including politicians and high ranking officers (Olcay, 1991). Turkey not only has 
extremist left terror organizations within its border but also has extremist religiously 
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motivated terror groups which were mostly affected by the Iran revolution in 1979 
(Yavuz & Ozcan, 2006). 
Beginning especially in the 1960s, Turkey suffered too much from terrorist 
activities of the leftist Revolutionary People‟s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C), the 
separatist Kurdistan Workers‟ Party (PKK), and religiously motivated Turkish Hezbollah. 
These terrorist organization activities that peaked particularly from 1990 to 1995 not only 
weakened Turkey‟s political center but also challenged Turkish democracy. These 
terrorist activities often destabilized political life, and some political parties were accused 
of supporting extremist groups. During this period, none of the political parties gained a 
majority in the Turkish Assembly to run the country and make necessary social and 
economical reforms. 
Following this period, beginning in 1996, Turkey has made significant 
constitutional changes in terms of improving human rights and restructuring democratic 
institutions for accession to the European Union. However, Onis (2003) recommended 
that Turkey still needs to make important reforms by stating that decentralization, 
political demilitarization, and state control over religion are some essential issues. 
However, to make these changes, a parliamentary system in Turkey requires a strong 
government. Nevertheless, during the 1990s, most of the governments were based on 
weak and short-lived coalitions. At the same time, rapid economic and social 
transformation over the past 15 years has worsened the critical problems (Kramer, 1999).  
Candarli (1999) argued that the social transformation and new demographic 
structure has made great changes in the Turkish political center. Unfortunately, the old 
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system and its official ideology have been unable to respond to this change. In particular, 
the secular elite did not want to give up their political, social, and economic privileges, 
and they considered a threat to these privileges as a threat to the republic itself. Rather 
than enlarging the scope and framework of democracy, these secular elite called in the 
military. In addition, conflict between the left and right groups created high tension 
within the country, and thousands of lives were lost throughout 48 years. As a result, 
destabilization within the political life resulted in the Turkish army becoming involved 
and establishing three military coups.  
The 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution opened new horizons for Turkish Islamist 
ideology and its movements (Cakir, 2007). Because the 1980 military coup intended to 
weaken the radical left and radical nationalist movements, the Turkish Hezbollah was 
given the opportunity to take advantage of the process and thus became stronger.  
Cakir (2007) stated that being surrounded by Iranians and Arabs, the Kurds had 
significant exposure to Persian and Arabic languages resulting in madrasa (seminary) 
education becoming widespread in the Kurdish populated region. Additionally, Islamic 
identity helped the development of a strong clergy class with titles including mele, 
sheikh, and sayyed.  
 
1.6 The Current Gap in the Literature 
For implementing attacks and sustaining operations, manpower is a crucial 
resource for terrorist organizations. Hence, hindering recruitment of terrorist 
organizations will disable their ability to function (RAND, 2006). To obstruct the Turkish 
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Hezbollah‟s recruitment, it is therefore necessary to understand how recruitment works, 
where the Turkish Hezbollah recruits, and what tool it uses, whom it targets and the 
selection reasons. Thus, having a clearer picture of these recruitment strategies could help 
the Turkish government to enact better policies to combat against terrorism.  
Although there is much research regarding the recruitment strategies of terrorist 
organizations throughout the world, unfortunately there is no scientific research relating 
to the recruitment strategies of Turkey‟s terrorist groups. Parallel to Width and Fahoum‟s 
(2006) “Future Research Recommendations,” I provided demographic details concerning 
the recruited militants. Nichiporuk (2003) stated that high fertility rates, unregulated and 
unchecked migration flows, and volatile religious and ethnic rivalries can increase 
terrorist activities. He claimed that the link between demography and the causes of 
extremism should be broken in order to enhance the victory against terrorism. According 
to Nichiporuk, fertility rates, ethnic/religious composition, internal/international 
migration, and level of human capital and population/environment interactions are very 
important variables for terrorist activities. In my study, I also provided economic and 
demographic details to determine the underlying reasons for joining with the Turkish 
Hezbollah.  
  
1.7 Criminological Theories and Terrorism 
To clarify the Turkish Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategies, it is important to 
address social control and social learning theories given that they represent two major 
sociological theories of crime and delinquency. Thus, I used these theories to discuss the 
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traditional and post-traditional criminological perspectives in explaining terrorism. First, 
however, the definition of terrorism as used in my study provides general insights 
regarding the relationship between crime and terrorism.   
1.7.1 Definition of terrorism 
 Although terrorism has existed since the beginning of recorded history, defining 
the term is problematic (Ferracuti, 1982). Depending on whose point of view is being 
represented, terrorism has been described in various and controversial ways. For 
example, terrorism may be referred to by some as a crime and a holy duty, a tactic and a 
strategy, a justification of reaction against oppression, or an inexcusable abomination 
(International Terrorism and Security Research, 2009). This creates a major dilemma in a 
concise definition and therefore affects future studies and development of policies. 
According to Victoroff (2005), there are numerous analyses of terrorism that may include 
political, social, ideological, and economic aspects, many of which are typically given 
less emphasis when compared to security factors in policy formation.   
Thus, because there is no single, universally accepted definition of terrorism, the 
terms used are generally inadequate as well as frequently neglected by terrorism 
researchers who prefer to cite the basic U.S. Department of State definition (Hudson, 
1999):  “Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant 
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an 
audience.”  
Traditional approaches claim that the major difference between terrorism and 
crime is: Opinions are divided from both a theoretical and policy making perspective. For 
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instance, scholars who consider terrorism as a form of crime are controversial due to the 
differences in motivational factors. Terrorists and criminals have diverse motivations 
such as political, ideological, ethnic, or religious goals. Contrary to criminals who may be 
motivated to perpetrate crime for its own sake, terrorists commit violence for specific 
reasons, namely causing self-destructive reactions in a society (Asal & Wilkenfeld, 
2005). Spencer (2006) asserted that terrorism that is used as a politically motivated tactic 
involves the threat or use of force or violence.     
Contrary to the traditional approach, Asal and Wilkenfeld (2005) maintained that 
there is no motivational difference between terrorists and criminals. They claimed that 
although the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was formerly a 
politically motivated terrorist organization, it currently profits from drug trafficking, and 
its members have always acted criminally to gain financial freedom. This is also the case 
of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) which remains active in the eastern part of Turkey 
(Candarli, 1999). Especially over the last decades, political rebels have become criminals 
while still pretending to be rebels in an effort to recruit new militants by maintaining their 
legitimate public image. Clearly, most terrorist organizations, including Lebanese 
Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda, PKK and Hamas, operate sophisticated fund-raising networks 
throughout the world (Asal & Wilkenfeld, 2005).  
 
1.8 Similarities and Differences of Crime and Terrorism 
Ferracuti (1982) claimed that although terrorists use terror, their goals and 
motivations remain criminal. In addition, their actions begin with legal and accepted 
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forms of dissent such as individual oral protests or petitions that easily progress to illegal 
but often tolerated acts, for example, violent demonstrations, vandalism, or seizures of 
property. Eventually, these actions escalate to unacceptable and illegal behavior where 
sabotage, personal assaults, bombings, and kidnappings occur. Considering their final 
actions, according to Ferracuti, terrorists should be approached as criminals. 
In discussing the issue that terrorism often involves various kinds of crime 
including kidnapping, arson, murder, and conspiracy, it is very difficult to make a 
distinction between terrorism and crime (Ferracuti, 1982). Besides being involved in the 
same illegal activities, other similarities between terrorists and criminals include the 
actions and tactics employed by both groups (Koseli, 2008).  
On the other hand, traditional scholars have declared that separate motivations 
and goals create the differences between crime and terrorism. While terrorism uses 
violence as a strategy to achieve political goals, it may also be used by those who oppose 
existing governments (Crenshaw, 2001).  
 
1.9 Social Learning and Social Control Theories 
Although there are differences of opinion as to how terrorism and criminality are 
related, both social learning and social control theories can be applied to research 
concerning why individuals join terrorist groups since each theory explains why certain 
individuals may be prone to engage in crime.  
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1.9.1 Social learning theory 
While developing his general sociological theory of crime and delinquency, 
Edwin H. Sutherland relied heavily upon the work of Shaw and McKay, Chicago school 
theorists (Akers, 2004). Ecological and cultural transmission theory, symbolic 
interactionism, and culture had an impact on the formulation of Sutherland‟s theory. 
Sutherland revised the final version of his theory in 1947, based on nine 
postulates: 
1. Criminal behavior is learned. 
2. Criminal behavior is learned through interaction with other persons in a process 
of communication. 
3. The principal part of the learning of criminal behavior occurs within intimate 
personal groups. 
4. When criminal behavior is learned, the learning includes: (a) techniques of 
committing the crime that are sometimes very complicated, sometimes simple; and (b) 
the specific direction of motives, drives, rationalizations, and attitudes. 
5. The specific direction of motives and drives is learned from definitions of the 
legal codes as favorable or unfavorable. 
6. A person becomes delinquent because of an excess of definitions favorable to 
violation of the law over definitions unfavorable to violation of the law. 
7. Differential associations may vary in frequency, duration, priority, and 
intensity. 
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8. The process of learning criminal behavior by association with criminal and 
anticriminal patterns involves all of the mechanisms that are involved in any other 
learning. 
9. While criminal behavior is an expression of general needs and values, it is not 
explained by those general needs and values since noncriminal behavior is an expression 
of the same needs and values. 
Social learning theory suggests that behavior is learned not only through direct 
experience but also through observation of one‟s environment. In this theory, aggression 
is viewed as a learned behavior, and through observation one may learn the consequences 
of the behavior. Oots and Wiegele (1985) contended that if aggression is viewed as 
learned behavior, then terrorism─a specific type of aggressive behavior─can also be 
learned.  
Social learning theory is a modified and clarified version of Sutherland‟s 
differential association theory that consists of two basic elements. First, to commit a 
crime, specific techniques are needed to be learned from criminals. Second, interaction 
with others provides appropriate drives, motives, attitudes, and rationalization for law 
violations (Vold et al., 2002). According to Akers (2004), in the eighth principle of 
Sutherland‟s theory, he asserted that criminal behavior involves all the mechanisms of 
learning; however, Akers failed to identify them. To create the social learning theory, 
Burgess and Akers (1966) retained all the principles of Sutherland‟s differential 
association theory and combined them with differential reinforcement and other 
principles of behavioral acquisition, continuation, and cessation in addition to adding 
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more concepts taken from behavioral learning theory (e.g., differential reinforcement, 
discriminative stimuli and internal stimuli, and schedules of reinforcement). They 
contended that criminal behavior is learned in the same way that any other behavior is 
learned and may be explained through the rewards or punishment a person receives from 
his or her environment (Orcutt, 2002).  Parallel to Orcutt‟s perspective on social learning 
theory, I also argue that any individual‟s perception of crime may change depending on 
the social network where the person grew up. In other words, having criminals in the 
social networks increases the likelihood of an individual‟s involvement in criminal 
activity.  
Akers (2004) pointed out that social learning theory is not competitive with 
differential association theory but rather represents a broader version. Evidence in 
research that supports Sutherland‟s differential association theory supports social learning 
theory as well. Furthermore, Akers maintained that social learning theory explains 
criminal and delinquent behavior more thoroughly than does Sutherland‟s differential 
association theory. According to Akers‟ theory, a great deal of learning between humans 
occurs in nonsocial situations and social interactions by observing the consequences of 
people‟s behavior from others. Akers‟ social learning theory focused on the following 
four major concepts (Vold et al., 2002).  
1.  Differential association refers to direct and indirect association and interaction 
with others who engage in certain kinds of behavior or express values, norms, and 
attitudes. These patterns of interactions with others may result in either unfavorable or 
favorable reactions to violating the law (Akers & Jensen, 2005).  
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2.  According to Akers (2004), definitions reflect the meanings of one‟s own 
behavior. They may be more right or wrong, desirable or undesirable, appropriate or 
inappropriate, good or bad (Vold et al., 2002).  
3.  Differential reinforcement refers to the balance of actual or anticipated rewards 
and punishments that may be consequences of the behavior (Akers & Jensen, 2005).  
4.  Imitation is the act that comes after observation. The individual observes a 
behavior from others and then engages in a similar behavior. According to Akers (2004), 
the imitated behavior is influenced by the characteristics of the model, the observed 
behavior, and the observed consequences of the behavior. 
Through social learning theory, I endeavored to answer the question, “How strong 
is the family structure in the recruitment of more militants?”   
1.9.2 Social Control Theory  
Similar to other terrorist organizations in Turkey, Hezbollah effectively uses its 
broad social structure. For example, Muslim associations, mosques, publications, and 
foundations are some of the tools that Hezbollah employ (Kardon, 1998). As earlier 
discussed by Karmon (1997), Hezbollah supports its effectiveness within universities to 
recruit and indoctrinate militants through its radical publications. More especially, 
students who are living far away from their families may be easily manipulated to take 
part in the organization. In this regard, Hezbollah‟s ability to recruit militants in 
universities may be best tested by social control theory. 
By definition, control theory emphasizes the role of control in terms of 
counteracting delinquency and states that strong social bonds hinder delinquency (Booth, 
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Farrell, & Varano, 2008). Britt and Gottfredson (2003) contended that in order to better 
understand terrorism, it should rightfully be studied within criminology. They further 
stated that to achieve political ends, terrorism is related to certain elements of low social 
control.  
Vold et al. (2002) asserted that many theories of crime and delinquency assume 
that people generally obey the rules if they are left to their own will, and there are various 
special forces─biological, psychological or social─that drive them to commit crime. 
Control theories, however, take the opposite side by stating that all individuals are natural 
animals and if left to their own devices, they are prone to commit crime. Thus, the key 
question for control theorists becomes: “Why do people not commit crime?” To answer, 
they focus primarily on special forces that intercept persons from committing crime. 
Therefore, the main hidden point behind not committing crime is the weakness of forces 
that restrain people from doing so. Parallel to this statement, being away from social 
networks increases the likelihood of being recruited by terrorist organizations.  
Hirschi (1969) assumed that everyone has the potential to become delinquent and 
criminal, and social controls─not moral values─maintain law and order. Thus, with a 
lack of social control, one is free to commit either terrorist or criminal acts. There are 
four aspects of social control discussed in the literature: 
1.9.2.1 Attachment 
By attachment, Hirschi (1969) referred to the extent to which a person is attached 
to others. For example, as the individual becomes more attached to others, he is far less 
likely to become delinquent.  
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1.9.2.2 Commitment  
The concept of commitment assumes that the interests and benefits of persons 
living in a society are at risk if they are engaged in criminal acts, because most people 
acquire their reputation and prosperity from the society in which they live. In 1957, 
Jackson Toby introduced the concept of “stakes at conformity” and argued that all youths 
are tempted to break the law but some risk much more than others when they give in to 
those temptations. Youths who do well in the school not only risk being punished for 
breaking the law, but they also jeopardize their future careers. In other words, they have 
high “stakes at conformity.” 
1.9.2.3 Involvement 
The component of involvement proposes that if a person is engaged in 
conventional activities, he or she is less likely to commit crime. The assumption is that a 
person may be simply too busy doing conventional things to find time to engage in 
deviant behavior.  
1.9.2.4 Belief 
Matza (1964) argued that people have some conventional moral beliefs but they 
neutralize them to commit crime. In the first stage, Hirschi (1969) tested his theory 
against social strain (the motivation aspect) and Sutherland‟s or Miller‟s theory (cultural 
or group influence). Hirschi reported that contrary to strain theory [when individuals 
cannot successfully reach their goals, they experience pressure which may cause them to 
commit crime] (Cullen & Agnew, 2003), there was, in general, no relationship between 
the delinquent acts and social class. In addition, racial differences did not play a 
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significant role in self-reported delinquency (Vold et al., 2002). In Hirschi‟s analysis of 
attachment to parents compared to students‟ schools and peers, scoring low on parental 
bonds revealed the possibility of scoring high for crime (Leiber, 2007). Although 
Hirschi‟s findings supported control theory, they were inconsistent with cultural theories. 
He also found that youths who were not successful in school were more likely to commit 
crime that also supported control theory.  
Contrary to the findings of strain theory, Hirschi (1969) analyzed the effects of 
attachment to parents, schools, and peers on reported delinquents. Regardless of race or 
class, and regardless of the delinquency of their friends, Hirschi found that boys who 
were more closely attached to their parents were less likely to report committing 
delinquent acts than those who had less close parental attachments (Vold et al., 2002). 
According to Hirschi, peers do not play important roles for committing and hindering 
crime (Leiber, 2007).  
According to social control theorists, terrorism emerges from a social response to 
perceived deviance that stems from underspecific, observable structural conditions 
(Messner & Rosenfeld, 2004). McCord (2004) further stated that lack of cultural norms 
and values decreases an individual‟s responsibility. Simply put, individuals who display 
ineffective or weak social ties are easy targets for terrorist groups. 
The Turkish Hezbollah movement is located mainly in the southeastern part of 
Turkey by Kurdish citizens. To gain a better understanding of why the Turkish Hezbollah 
has a broad support in this area, it is necessary to provide background information about 
the Kurdish people‟s political and social life.  
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1.10 Ethnic Origins of the Kurds 
Barkey and Fuller (1998) argued that divisions among the Kurds along 
geographical, linguistic, and political lines have played an important role. The Kurdish 
population is divided territorially and linguistically among four regional states─Iran, Iraq, 
Syria, and Turkey. 
The Sevres Treaty (1920) “envisaged interim autonomy for the predominantly 
Kurdish areas of Turkey with a view to full independence if the inhabitants of these areas 
wanted this” (Barkey & Fuller, 1998). However, the Kurdish population was not 
mentioned in the Lozan Treaty (1924) although the provisions of the Sevres Treaty were 
reviewed.  
According to Bruinessen‟s (1999), definition, Kurds include “all native speakers 
of Kurmanji or Zaza, as well as those Turkish-speaking persons who claim descent from 
Kurmanji or Zaza speakers who still (or again) consider themselves as Kurds.” Earlier, 
Barkey and Fuller (1998) considered Kurds to be those who have “willingly been 
assimilated and are . . . Turkish, and Christians who have embraced Islam (such as the 
many Armenians who have assumed Kurdish Alevi identity over the centuries).” 
However, during the Ottoman Empire, Islamic law recognized only non-Muslims as 
minorities; hence, because Kurdish people were Muslims, they were never considered to 
be members of a minority group.   
Regarding Turkey‟s number of Kurds, the most widely accepted figure represents 
20% of the population (Barkey & Fuller, 1998). According to the 1965 census, 2.2 
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million Turkish inhabitants claimed Kurdish as their mother tongue, and 1.2 million 
claimed Kurdish as their second language. The number of Zaza speakers was estimated to 
be approximately 150,000 (Barkey & Fuller, 1998).  
In discussing the possible factors that have played an important role on Kurdish 
identity, Barkey and Fuller (1998) listed geography as one given that the people primarily 
inhabited mountainous regions that were scattered and isolated from each other without 
having a central state structure. Accordingly, their nomadic lifestyle also contributed to 
the divergence of several Kurdish dialects. In addition, the Kurdish people generally lived 
in the more isolated regions of larger empires, namely the Persian, Arab, or Ottoman, 
which affected the development of their identity (Barkey & Fuller, 1998). 
 
1.11 Ideology of the Turkish Islamic Movement 
According to Karmon (1998), most scholars agree that although Turkish Islam has 
many features common to other Muslim countries in the region, its uniqueness lies in the 
different political and social environments. Turkish ideology is occupied with Turkish 
nationalism that includes the secularist components and European identification of 
Kemalism.  
Contrary to other religiously motivated terror organizations in other countries, 
terrorist groups in Turkey have never attacked military or security personnel, although 
they lost many members in the antiterrorist campaigns that were led by the state. In 
addition, they have never attacked Western targets or acted abroad even though they have 
some infrastructure in Europe. 
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Turkish security authorities outlined the objectives of the radical religious 
movements through three stages: (a) First is the message to call people for an effort to 
adopt the Islamic religion to social life and establish an Islamic state and administration 
through the radicals in order to persuade the community; (b) second is for the community 
to restructure in accordance with the requirements of the first stage; and (c) third is the 
struggle to safeguard the Islamic way of life.  
Interestingly, although religious motivated groups have struggled for the 
constitution of an Islamic State, they have used leftist slogans in their publications and 
they accept ex-Marxists in their ranks.  
In the early 1990s, the PKK attempted to gain religious communities of Turkey‟s 
southeast region. To achieve this goal, they established organizations such as the 
Kurdistan Imamlar Birligi─Association of Imams of Kurdistan─(imam = the official 
person assigned to each mosque). Ozeren and Van De Voorde (2006) argued that PKK 
attempted to become the major power in the region by gaining those communities 
through causing a fight between Turkish Hezbollah and the PKK. 
 
1.12 The Turkish Hezbollah 
As a religiously motivated terrorist organization, the major goal of the Turkish 
Hezbollah is to establish a state based on Islamic laws (seriat). As a model, Iran is the 
only country that has seriat. Thus, the Hezbollah foresaw three different stages to reach 
their goal: propaganda (teblig), organizing (cemaat), and armed struggle (jihad). 
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Beginning in the 1980s and peaking especially during the 1990s, some extremist 
religious groups located in Diyarbakir, the largest city in southeast Turkey, became more 
active and began to address larger populations in order to succeed in their ideological 
goals. Additionally, they published numerous books and magazines in an effort to gain 
more supporters. For example, publishing centers played a central role in that extremist 
religious groups were able to reveal their ideology to more people as well as the 
opportunity to inform, organize, and even give orders to their supporters. 
Regarding the leadership and strategy of the organization, a critical problem arose 
in 1993 between two groups of the Turkish Hezbollah─Ilim and Menzil. A year later, the 
leader of the Menzil Group was kidnapped and murdered, and furthermore, 50 members 
from both sides lost their lives in this internal fight during the second half of the 1990s 
(Aras & Bacik, 2002). Between 1991 and 2003, Turkish security forces arrested 14,622 
people and cleared 1,648 terror incidents (Ozeren & Van De Voorde, 2006).  
Between 2000 and 2001, the Turkish National Police conducted two successful 
operations against the Turkish Hezbollah which pushed the organization to underground 
for a long period of time. In 2000, Huseyin Velioglu, the leader of Turkish Hezbollah, 
was killed by security forces, the organization‟s archives were seized, and 61 high level 
members were arrested. In total, 4,679 suspects were arrested in 2000 and 2001, and the 
bodies of 67 people who were kidnapped and murdered by the organization were located.  
Each new arrest and interrogation of the Turkish Hezbollah militants helped the 
Turkish Intelligence Group to become more familiar with the organization. In addition, 
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several more discoveries and arrests were made through these operations and the Turkish 
Hezbollah systematically dismantled (Nugent, 2004). 
In terms of how the Turkish Hezbollah view Iran, some facts may be helpful in 
understanding the situation. For example, high level leadership, including Velioglu, 
received military, political, and religious training in Iran. Karmon (1998) further 
confirmed that members of the Turkish Hezbollah also receive training in Iran. Although 
the organization‟s members are in favor of the methods used by Iran‟s revolution, they do 
not want to be controlled by Iran. Further, although they do not accept the Islamic sect 
(shic) of the Iranian people for themselves, they do not consider that it is a good idea to 
discuss the differences. Despite the many problems, however, they stayed in touch with 
Iranian intelligence units between 1992 and 1999.  
Ozeren and Van De Voorde (2006) stated that the Turkish Hezbollah is also 
known as the Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah (Hisbullahi Kurdi Shorishger) among 
Iraqi Kurds because its members are predominantly made up of Sunni Muslim Kurds. 
In terms of the recent situation of the Turkish Hezbollah, they have been 
attempting to reestablish their high level management and regain their support groups, 
and they remain active in prisons and abroad as well. As a new strategy, they avoid 
armed struggles until the right time comes. As a different approach from that of the past, 
the organization has been seeking peace with other religious groups and organizations in 
addition to publishing books and periodicals in an effort to regain support from their 
communities. 
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1.12.1 Religious motivated terror organizations and the Turkish Hezbollah  
Although there are demographic similarities between the Turkish Hezbollah and 
the PKK, there are also serious ideological differences between them. While the Turkish 
Hezbollah is a religiously motivated terrorist organization, PKK is a Marxist Leninist 
Kurdish separatist terrorist organization. Until 1996, when Irfan Cagirici, one of the 
Turkish Hezbollah leaders was captured, Turkish authorities had underestimated 
Hezbollah by focusing primarily on PKK.  
Being a more popular issue throughout the world, it is useful to first briefly 
address religious motivated terrorist organizations. Because each terrorist organization‟s 
goals and strategies are different when establishing an Islamic state and society, defining 
the Islamic movement is a complex task (Karmon, 1998). Sayari (1996) distinguished 
terrorist groups as traditionalists and radicals as those minority groups who were inspired 
by the Iranian revolution in 1979.  
Additionally, Imset (1993) divided Turkey into two parts─western and 
southeastern Turkey. According to Imset, while there is a resistance to the Islamic state in 
the western part of the country, the southeastern part is dominated chiefly by the Kurdish 
population which represents sympathy toward Islamic movements. Hezbollah, also 
known as Hezbol-contra, first began to spread in southeastern Turkey.   
Religious-oriented terrorist activity in Turkey began in the 1960s, and between 
1967 and 1973, the leaders of Hizb ut Tahrir, the Islamic Liberation Party, were 
imprisoned for attempting to change Turkey‟s constitutional structure through armed 
activities (Karmon, 1998). By 1979, the Islamic revolution in Iran had an enormous effect 
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over the religious motivated terrorist organizations and opened new horizons for them. 
As a result, hundreds of young Islamists visited Iran in search of ways to transform 
Turkey into Iran (Cakir, 2007).  
Similar to other terrorist organizations, the Turkish Islamic movements were 
heavily affected by the military coup in 1980. However, with its beginnings in 1983, the 
democratic regime encouraged the general Islamic trend, and Marxists and nationalists 
lost their influence although free political space helped them to strengthen their position. 
This ample space also aided the Islamic Jihad to play a noticeable role as a real terrorist 
threat that committed a series of assassinations. By 1984, the Turkish Hezbollah publicly 
appeared for the first time and showed support for the Iranian revolution (Karmon, 1997).  
According to Karmon (1997), beginning in the middle 1980s with the conversion 
of some members of the right wing nationalist movement to Islam, a significant 
development occurred. Unlike their origin, they believed that their movement should not 
tolerate nationalism, and contrary to PKK‟s ideology to be separated from the Turkish 
Republic, Hezbollah aimed to change the laic regime to the Islamic Sharia Regime. 
These militants were professionals in the field of terrorism and represented significant 
operational support for the Islamic movement. They organized more especially in poor 
towns and villages with a large Kurdish population among the young and unemployed. In 
addition, they often structured themselves around extremist Islamic publications such as 
Objektif, Tevhid, and Yeryuzu and followed the teachings of sheiks and Muslim scholars.  
Karmon (1998) later discussed that the starting point of terrorist activities for 
religious organizations occurred in 1990 against the Turkish secular establishment. After 
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this date, a professor, journalist, political scientist, and writer were assassinated by the 
Islamic Jihad and Islamic Operation.  
The Turkish government, security authorities, press, and public became extremely 
aware and shocked when Ugur Mumcu, one of the top prominent investigative reporters, 
was killed by a car bomb in January 1993. The series of terrorist events emerged a sharp 
reaction from Turkish public opinion and massive demonstrations were held. In addition, 
a strong press campaign led the Turkish security forces to take swift action against both 
the perpetrators and their sponsors.   
For the first time, the arrests and interrogations unveiled the story behind the 
killings of some Turkish secular intellectuals, and the relationship between the Islamic 
Action or Movement and Iran were directly involved in acts of terrorism against the 
Turkish Republic. 
Due to its ethnic structure based on Kurdish minority, one of the most 
controversial activities of the Turkish Hezbollah in southeastern Turkey was the killing of 
PKK members whose aim was separatist ideology in the area. Between 1991 and 1993, 
thousands of people were killed from each side. However, the conflict ended when an 
agreement was reached between the two terror organizations to not interfere with each 
other‟s activities.  
A turning point toward religious oriented terrorist organizations occurred in 
March 1996. Until that time, Turkish authorities underestimated these groups and thus 
made no attempt to hinder their activities. In that month, the arrest of Irfan Cagirici, one 
36 
 
of the leaders of Islamic action, changed this period (Karmon, 1998) whereas Turkish 
security forces increased operations every year.  
On January 17, 2000, the Turkish police raided a house located in the Beykoz 
district of Istanbul and killed the head of Hezbollah, Huseyin Velioglu, and captured two 
other key lieutenant leaders as well. Many documents were seized that unveiled 
Hezbollah‟s secret relationships. Approximately one year after the Beykoz operation, 
Hezbollah assassinated Diyarbakir‟s chief of police, Gaffar Okkan, as revenge for their 
leader‟s death.  
This incident led to the second crackdown against Hezbollah when nearly all of 
its top leadership were either imprisoned or killed. As a result, these operations limited 
Turkey‟s religious motivated terror groups for a long period of time. At least temporarily, 
they ceased their armed attacks and entered into a phase of serious internal confrontation.  
According to Cakir (2007), the Hezbollah were trying to recover, but 
nevertheless, it is possible that in the near future, they may regain the power they once 
had. Clearly, the decrease in terrorist activities of radical religious motivated groups was 
primarily the consequence of determined counteraction taken by Turkish officials 
(Karmon, 1998). 
  
1.13 Other terrorist organizations in Turkey 
Turkey does not only experience religiously motivated terrorist organizations, but 
also experiences ethnic and extremist leftist terrorism. It is therefore necessary to learn 
their strategies and ideologies in order to gain general insight concerning the terrorist 
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activities in Turkey. Also, revealing their recruitment strategies will help to obtain an 
overall perspective regarding the terrorist activities in Turkey.  
 
1.13.1 The PKK 
The PKK was created during a term of anarchy and turmoil during the 1970s 
(Barkey & Fuller, 1998). The anarchy and turmoil in this era resulted in three military 
coups that resulted in harsh policies against any opposing movement. The Kurdish 
movement was one of them.  
The primary goal of the PKK is the creation of a unified, independent Kurdish 
state. According to Barkey and Fuller (1998), the PKK sought not only independence, but 
also a political and social revolution among the Kurds in order to transform Kurdish 
society‟s‟ feudal structure. The PKK adopted a Marxist- Leninist left-wing antiimperialist 
approach at first; however, this approach was abandoned in the new post-cold war era. 
Some of the more important decisions that were taken in PKK‟s first manifesto 
included:  
• The structure of the evolution will be a national democratic revolution.  
• The minimum objective will be to establish an independent non-aligned 
Kurdistan State in the region.  
• The maximum objective will be to establish a state based on Marxist-Leninist 
principles.  
• The proletariat will be the pioneering force of the revolution.  
• The peasants will be the major force of the revolution.  
38 
 
• The main alliance for the revolution will be the alliance between workers, 
peasants and intellectual youth.  
• Propaganda activities will be supported by armed violence (Ankara Papers, 
2004). 
Barkey and Fuller (1998) claimed that PKK moved away from an earlier 
condemnation of Islam and now speaks of political settlement within the borders of 
Turkey.  They further emphasized that the PKK‟s abandonment of an independent 
Kurdistan is false and not convincing.  
In terms of tactics, the PKK combined violence and terror with political 
organizations. According to Barkey and Fuller (1998), the village guards were the top 
priority target of the PKK for many years. As a result, many school teachers and civil 
servants were killed, and schools and other public institutions were burned to reduce the 
existence of a Turkish state in southeast Turkey. Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, once 
stated that “the violence alternative may be difficult and painful, but it provides results” 
(Balli, 1991, 204).  
The poorer classes of peasants and workers are mainly targeted as possible new 
members by PKK since these working classes generally live in the standard apartment 
ghettos located on the surroundings of Turkey‟s industrial cities. The Turkish government 
claims that the PKK recruits its guerrillas forcibly and then subjects them to 
“brainwashing” sessions at training camps in Lebanon. In a survey conducted by Ergil 
(1996) in southeast Turkey, 42% of the respondents claimed to have a family member in 
the organization.  
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The CIA pointed out that the PKK has made international terrorism a key weapon 
in its fight for an independent homeland in Kurdish-inhabited southeastern Turkey. The 
CIA viewed the PKK as a threat to U.S. facilities and interests abroad. The CIA also 
noted that because the PKK has been especially active in Europe, they feared that its 
tactics might become a model for other ethnic and separatist movements being spawned 
in the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union. 
Criss (1995) claimed that Turkey was exposed to PKK attacks from Iranian soil 
between 1993 and 1995; however, in 1995 Iran agreed to help Turkey eliminate PKK 
camps in her territories. Criss emphasized three reasons for this policy change: (a) First 
was the fear that the PKK could set an example for Iranian Kurds; (b) second was the 
implications of Kurdish separatism on the balance of power in the Middle East; and (c) 
the third reason was because the leadership in Azerbaijan was changed from Elcibey to 
Aliyev. For example, Elcibey was ultranationalist and supported by Turkey but after this 
change, Iran felt more secure and changed her attitude on the Kurdish issue. 
In another article, Uslu (2007) pointed out the divisions in Turkey‟s Kurdish 
community by arguing that the leadership in the Kurdish movement is not centralized as 
it was intended.  Although Zubeyir Aydar who resides in Europe is the head of the 
political wing, but he cannot give direct orders to Murat Karayilan who is headquartered 
in the mountains of northern Iraq.  
Pedahzur (2005) scrutinized the recruitment strategies of the Kurdish Diaspora in 
Europe and concluded that many PKK fighters were initially approached by enlistment 
officers in Kurdish cultural centers where numerous young Kurdish spend their time. 
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Young Kurds went through a process of indoctrination to build up their Kurdish identity 
and introduce these identities to PKK. Children were also approached in their schools by 
representatives of the PKK and invited to PKK‟s cultural camps where they are 
brainwashed against Turkey.  
  
1.13.2 DHKP/C (Revolutionary People‟s Liberation Party/Front) 
The Federation of Revolutionist Youth Association was established in 1966 by 
Turkish college students who shared communist ideas and who wanted a Turkish socialist 
revolution. Later, this association was divided due to the opposing views on the method 
used to achieve the revolution. 
 After the split, one group chose the violent and armed method or urban guerilla 
tactics similar to Latin American groups. They referred to themselves as the THKP-C 
(Turkey Public Liberation Party-Front) and Mahir Cayan became their leader. This group 
carried out numerous terrorist acts between 1968 and 1972. In 1972, Mahir Cayan was 
killed in an operation and numerous other important members of the group were arrested 
by security forces. 
 In 1974, the government released many convicted terrorists due to a general 
amnesty. After being released from prison, members of the THKP-C attempted to 
reorganize the organization‟s structure. In 1976, the Revolutionist Youth Association was 
established for this purpose. Before implementing their reorganization process, the 
THKP-C was once again divided. The Istanbul group named themselves Dev-Genc 
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(Revolutionary Youth), and Dursun Karatas became the new leader  (Sol Teror Orgutleri, 
1994). 
 In the pursuit of  violent purposes, the Dev-Genc established FTKME (Fighting 
Teams against Fascist Terror) to carry out armed attacks. In a couple of years, 35 security 
officers, 23 soldiers, and more than 200 civilians were killed by this armed group. The 
murder of former Prime Minister Nihat Erim became one of the most well known attacks 
carried out by this terrorist group. 
Dursun Karatas and most of the members of Dev-Genc were arrested and 
convicted after the military coup in 1980. Dursun Karatas took this opportunity to use the 
prison as a propaganda and education place. Karatas and his friends reorganized the 
organization while they were in prison. To reveal the new tactics, Karatas wrote a book 
(Hakliyiz Kazanacagiz = We are right and we are going to win) while imprisoned in 
which he explained the organization‟s purpose and its future plans, including a list of 
enemies who were comprised mainly of  government officials, law enforcement agents, 
ranking soldiers, and judges.  
In 1989, Karatas and some of his friends managed to escape from prison. 
Following the release of other members, the organization regained its power and began to 
renew its bloody attacks. In the early 1990s, the organization succeeded to murder many 
of its targets listed in Hakliyiz Kazanacagiz. 
In 1991, TNP carried out successful nationwide operations against Dev-Sol; some 
high level members were killed and many members of the organization were arrested 
other than Karatas who managed to escape to Europe. After holding a congress in 
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Damascus in 1994, Karatas declared the establishment of a new organization─DHKP-C 
(Revolutionary People‟s Liberation Party-Front)─which has been active in Turkey and 
Europe since that time. More especially in recent years, however, its function and 
effectiveness have decreased due to the security forces operations.  
DHKP-C attempted to have a simultaneous revolution in the urban and rural 
areas. In this sense, they differed from other revolutionary terrorist organizations. The 
DHKP-C foresaw five phases of revolution that included: (a) Vanguard war, (b) 
increasing vanguard struggle and starting a guerilla fight, (c) expanding and spreading 
guerilla war beyond the country, (d) becoming connected with local units, and (e) 
realization of a communist revolution. 
The primary goal of DHKP-C is to change the current regime in Turkey and 
replace it with a new one based on Marxist and Leninist ideology. DHKP-C considers 
itself to play the leading role in enlightening the mass population and creating a 
revolution in Turkey. 
 Parallel to PKK‟s recruitment strategy, DHKP/C generally recruits new militants 
through its legal structures.  According to Alkan (2003), university student associations 
are actively used by DHKP/C for recruitment purposes. For example, new university 
students are invited join social activities that are held by DHKP/C where they are 
approached by leaders of the association.  
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1.14 Recruitment Strategies of Other Terrorist Organizations in the World 
Gerwehr and Daly‟s (2006) study regarding Al-Qaeda revealed that potential 
recruits are generally persuaded through media channels, local networks (i.e., peer groups 
and relatives), or institutional structures (e.g., mosques or legally established college 
associations). According to Gerwehr and Daly, Al-Qaeda looks for people who are 
dissatisfied with their jobs or resentful of the police or military organizations. Media 
channels are used for organizing meetings and other activities to reach larger groups. 
Contrary to Al-Qaeda, media channels are less likely to be used by the Turkish Hezbollah 
considering the technological improvement of the region.  
A recent study conducted in 2009 by the International Crisis Group revealed that 
the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN)─a separatist movement active in northern 
Malaysia─(Wikipedia, 2009) recruits young Malay Muslims especially from private 
Islamic schools. Contrary to my expectations, the Turkish Hezbollah recruits more 
militants from state colleges versus private colleges, whereas BRN recruitment efforts are 
more effective in private colleges. According to the International Crisis Group, this 
difference stems from BRN‟s ideology that represents an ethno-nationalist insurgency 
which aims to reclaim the Patani Sultanate‟s independence. Since BRN is nationalist 
terrorist organization, local private schools provide the organization with tremendous 
support.   
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1.15 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Although there are no scientific methods that can explain how the Turkish 
Hezbollah recruits more militants, two general methods have been used according to 
official Turkish records (Van Police Department, 2009):  
1.  Institutional structures play one of the important roles to persuade an 
individual to join the Turkish Hezbollah. For example, institutional structures organize 
movie times, concerts, and other social activities. During these activities, possible 
candidates are linked to experienced Turkish Hezbollah militants.  
2.  Social networks include another tool that the Turkish Hezbollah uses to 
effectively recruit new militants. Typically, Turkish Hezbollah members meet with their 
younger relatives in mosques where they attempt to convince the youngest to follow the 
philosophy of the Turkish Hezbollah in order to attract new members and thereby 
enhance their social standing within the organization. In other words, an individual is 
brainwashed and motivated through this strategy of sharing values and ideologies related 
to the Turkish Hezbollah.  
In regard to these two effective recruitment methods, the following research 
questions are answered in my study: 
1. What methods are used to recruit college students into the Turkish Hezbollah, 
a religiously motivated terrorist organization? 
2. What are the demographic profiles of the individuals who are recruited by the 
institutional structures and social networks?  
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3. Does social control theory or social learning theory best explain the Turkish 
Hezbollah‟s most successful method of recruiting? 
I focused on Turkish Hezbollah militants who already had or were working on 
obtaining a college degree. They were either educated in their home town or out of their 
home town. Students who were educated away from their home towns and were 
subsequently recruited by institutional structures of Hezbollah were considered to have 
weak social bonding ties that support the assumptions of social control theory. On the 
other hand, college students who were educated in their home town and recruited through 
their social networks revealed that social networking is an effective tool for Hezbollah to 
recruit new militants and supports the assumptions of social learning theory. In relation to 
social control and social learning, two major criminal justice theories, I tested the 
following hypotheses and then provided information related to their expected results:  
H1:  Social networks and institutional structures are two general methods used 
extensively by the Turkish Hezbollah for recruiting new college student militants 
within universities.  
H2:  Institutional structures have been used more effectively by the Turkish Hezbollah 
than social networks for recruiting new militants holding college degrees. 
H3:  Social networks have been used more effectively than institutional structures of 
the Turkish Hezbollah for recruiting new militants holding college degrees.   
H4:  Social learning theory is more likely to explain how Turkish Hezbollah militants 
holding college degrees engage in the Turkish Hezbollah.  
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H5:  Social control theory is more likely to explain how Turkish Hezbollah militants 
holding college degree engage in the Turkish Hezbollah.  
 
1.16 Methods 
In my study, I used secondary data to measure the probability of a college student 
joining the Turkish Hezbollah religiously motivated terrorist organization dependent 
upon whether he or she was affected by social networks or the organization‟s institutional 
structures.  
Because I compared cases involving the probability of college students engaging 
in the Turkish Hezbollah through social network or institutional structures of the terrorist 
organization on different variables, quantitative methods were used to answer three 
research questions. The logic of using quantitative analysis is simple in that both 
dependent and independent variables can be measured through its data collection method. 
In my study, I further explained the factors that determine why Turkish Hezbollah 
members choose to join the terrorist organization. Five hypotheses were tested through 
the following dependent and independent variables. 
 
1.16.1  Dependent and Independent Variables 
1.16.1.1 Dependent variable (DV). 
The dependent variable (DV) consisted of recruitment type (social network = 1 or 
institutional structure = 0). College educated Turkish Hezbollah members were divided 
into two groups: (a) those recruited through the social network (social learning theory) 
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and (b) those recruited through the Turkish Hezbollah‟s institutional structures (social 
control theory or absence of social networks). 
 
1.16.1.2 Independent variables (IV).  
In regard to gender (IV1), males (0) are more likely than females (1) to become 
members of the Hezbollah as revealed by the organization‟s personal reports which 
indicated that females represent very few members (only 3%). Since the number of 
female militants is not significant, gender was omitted from the discussion contained in 
the data analysis section. According to Nachmias and Nachmias (2000) an inadequate 
sample size for the classified variables may not reflect the true values of a parameter. In 
my study, therefore, conclusions regarding gender were difficult to make due to the small 
sample size of females in comparison to males.  
Location of college, the second independent variable (IV2), refers to students 
attending colleges in their same home town (0) or in a different city (1). Therefore, the 
question posed in my study was: “In pursuing a college education, does being away from 
social networking affect the likelihood of being recruited by the Turkish Hezbollah?”  
Location of college represents one of the important parameters in my study. 
College students who received their education in their own home towns were grouped to 
determine the effectiveness of recruitment methods through social networks, and those 
students who received their college education out of their home town and had no relatives 
within the Turkish Hezbollah were grouped to determine the effectiveness of the terrorist 
organization‟s institutional structures. Since all Hezbollah militants provided detailed 
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information in self-reports concerning how they were recruited, the data provided clear 
information about the Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategies.   
If social control proves to be more accurate, the impact of this variable is 
expected to show that college students who are away from their families are more likely 
to be recruited by the Turkish Hezbollah‟s institutional structures when compared to 
college students who remain with their family while pursuing a college education. In this 
case, my study revealed that the Turkish Hezbollah established an effective institutional 
structure within colleges. 
On the other hand, if social learning theory proves to be more accurate, the 
variable is expected to show that college students who are either with or away from their 
families are more likely to be recruited by social networks. As previously discussed in the 
literature review, the region has strong social networks that affect an individual to join 
the terrorist organization.  
College type (IV3) includes private (0) and state (1) colleges. In my study, I 
expected that private college students would be less likely to be recruited by the Turkish 
Hezbollah, given that they are comprised of wealthier students who are typically less 
likely to be recruited when compared to state college students. In addition, private 
schools are equipped with more resources that allow for closer follow-up relating to a 
student‟s progress, and relations with students‟ parents are generally stronger in 
comparison to state colleges. These advantages provide more opportunities for parents to 
keep sound family ties. Because my study did not have a large enough sample size of 
private colleges, this variable was excluded from the equation. Because nearly 99% of the 
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college educated militants received their education from state colleges is another reason 
that the variable was eliminated from the model.   
Regarding online education (IV4), there are two types of college education 
available in Turkey. One is online education (0) while the other is campus education (1). 
Online education does not require that a student relocate to another city and therefore 
keeps the social network strong. It is believed that if a person has no relatives within the 
Turkish Hezbollah and holds an online education, the chances of being recruited by the 
Hezbollah are significantly lower (social control theory). However, if a person has 
relatives within the Hezbollah as well as an online education, the chances of becoming 
recruited by the Hezbollah are significantly higher.  
In the event that social control theory proves to be more accurate, my study is 
expected to show that college students who obtained an online education are less likely to 
be recruited by the institutional structures. However, if social learning theory proves to be 
more accurate, my study is expected to show that college students who have Turkish 
Hezbollah members within their family are more likely to be recruited through the 
Turkish Hezbollah‟s social network.  
The fifth independent variable, family size (ratio) (IV5), is based on the number of 
children. Most of the families in the eastern part of Turkey have large families. For 
example, those who have less than four children are considered to be a small family size, 
those having between 4 to 6 children are considered to be a normal family size, and 
families with more than six children are considered to represent a large family size. 
According to Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990), the larger the number of children in a 
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family, the greater is the likelihood that they will be delinquent. In my opinion, if a 
family does not have any relatives within the Turkish Hezbollah, a smaller family size 
may decrease the likelihood of being recruited by Hezbollah.  
If social control theory proves to be more accurate, college students who are 
reared in small families are less likely to be recruited by the Turkish Hezbollah when 
compared to those reared in a large family. However, if social learning theory proves to 
be more accurate, there will be no significant difference between college students who 
are reared in either large or small families.  
The sixth independent variable, family income (IV6), represents college students 
who come from either poor, normal, or rich families. As the well-being of the family of 
origin improves, it is believed that the probability of joining the Turkish Hezbollah will 
decrease. In considering the average Turkish family monthly income, earnings will be 
divided into the following three levels as identified by Erdogan (2002): (a) poor ($1,200 
or less); (b) average ($1,201 to $3,500); and (c) rich ($3,501 and above).  
If social control theory proves to be more accurate, college students who come 
from families with rich income level backgrounds are less likely to be recruited by the 
institutional structures. Because rich college students are generally expected to prefer 
private schools, having monetary independence will most likely increase the likelihood of 
taking part in social activities which, in turn, decreases the likelihood of being contacted 
by the Turkish Hezbollah. In this case, college students will be more likely to share 
common social norms and ideas that denounce terrorist activities. On the other hand, if 
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social learning theory proves to be more accurate, my study is more likely to reveal that 
there is no significant difference between the rich and poor college students.  
 The seventh independent variable focused on the ideological background (IV7) of 
recruited Hezbollah militants. This variable was identified as religious versus 
nonreligious. In my study, I expected that religious college students would be more prone 
to propaganda and be influenced by the organization‟s institutional structures, even if 
there were no Hezbollah militants within their social networks.  
If social control theory proves to be more accurate, religious college students who 
are away from their families are likely to be recruited through institutional structures.  
However, if social learning theory proves to be more accurate, religious college 
students, either with their family or away from family, are more likely to be recruited by 
their social networks.  
The eighth (IV8) independent variable is the ideology of the family. As mentioned 
above, family has a great influence over the Kurdish originated individuals. In addition, 
college students who come from a religious family background are considered to be more 
supportive to religious ideologies. Although terrorism literature does not support the idea 
that religious individuals are more prone to commit terrorist acts (Ozeren, 2004), the 
results of this variable are interesting. If social control theory proves to be more accurate, 
college students who come from religious families are more likely to be recruited by the 
institutional structures. However, if social learning theory proves to be more accurate, 
college students who come from religious families, either with their family or away from 
family, are more likely to be recruited by their social networks.  
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The ninth (IV9) independent variable is whether or not militants exist within the 
social network of college students. This is one of the important variables in my study 
since its value increases the effectiveness of the assumptions held by social learning and 
social network theories. If social control theory proves to be more accurate, college 
students who have militants in their social networks and receive their education away 
from their family are more likely to be recruited through institutional structures. 
However, if social learning theory proves to be more accurate, college students who 
come from religious families, either with their family or away from family, are more 
likely to be recruited by their social networks.  
The tenth and final independent variable includes reasons for attending Hezbollah 
(IV10) is represented by the following explanations:   
1 = Religion: People who believe there is no religious freedom; the Turkish State 
is against Islam. 
0 = Other reasons: People who join the Turkish Hezbollah due to other reasons 
than religion. 
Each of the college students had different reasons for attending the Turkish 
Hezbollah. Therefore, either social networks or institutional structures may play 
significant roles in a terrorist organization‟s use of the above arguments to recruit more 
militants. 
If social control theory is more accurate, institutional structures of the Hezbollah 
are used to recruit more militants by using the above arguments. However, if social 
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learning theory is more accurate, social networks of the Hezbollah are used to recruit 
more militants by using the above arguments.  
 
1.16.2 Regression Equation  
The regression consisted of one dependent variable (DV) and eight independent 
variables (IV). To weight the likelihood of each IV‟s effectiveness, logistic regression 
was used. Since my study was designed to determine the likelihood that the Turkish 
Hezbollah uses a particular type of recruitment, logistic regression best fits the model. 
According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), logistic regression can be used in the 
following four ways: (a) to predict a DV on the basis of continuous and/or categorical 
IVs; (b) to determine the percent of variance in the DV explained by the IVs; (c) to rank 
the relative importance of IVs; and (d) to assess the interaction effects and to understand 
the impact of covariate control variable.  
        The following equation was used to calculate the probability of the Turkish 
Hezbollah employing a particular recruitment type: 
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Ŷ shows the likely predicted value. Regarding the dependent variable, there are 
two probabilities in the equation that militant college students are recruited by either 
social networking (1) or through the institutional structures (0). Because “social 
networks” are represented by (1), the calculated likelihood shows the likelihood of social 
networks being used to recruit militants.  
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To determine the power of each variable on the dependent variable─predicting the 
dependent variable from the independent variables─I used: 
 U = a+b1X1+b2X2+b3X3+…. 
The probability of a college educated militant being recruited by social networks is 
represented by U. These estimates reveal the relationship between the IV and the DV where 
the DV is on the logit scale. In addition, the amount of increase (or decrease, if the coefficient 
sign is negative) is revealed in the predicted logs of being recruited by social networks. 
Holding all other predictors constant, it shows that one unit will either increase (or decrease) 
in the IV.  
1.16.3 Population and Sample 
Nachmias and Nachmias (2000) stated that population, the aggregate of all cases, 
confirms the designated set of specifications.  O‟Sullivan, Rassel, and Berner (2003) 
further stated that for large groups, it is impossible to contact every member in order to 
collect data besides requiring a tremendous commitment of both financial resources and 
time. The main purpose for sampling is to provide the conceptual basis to make accurate 
estimates of the entire population‟s values. Sampling allows the researcher to gather 
information on a targeted group in a much shorter amount of time when the sample of the 
entire set is accurately represented (Nachmias &Nachmias, 2000).  
In my study, the population consists of college students with Kurdish descent who 
were recruited by the Turkish Hezbollah. In 2000, the Turkish National Police captured 
the Turkish Hezbollah‟s database which included 7,000 self reports. Out of these 7,000, 
there were 339 college educated militants of which I have obtained all of their self 
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reports. Since it is compulsory for every member to submit their self reports after being 
recruited, I dealt with the entire target population which represents the sample of my 
study. The research question focused on how these educated militants are recruited 
through either the institutional structures of the Turkish Hezbollah or through social 
networks. 
Considering the strong family ties that are prevalent in the southeastern part of 
Turkey which is highly populated by Kurdish-origin citizens, Hezbollah recruits more 
militants through social ties that are best explained by the social learning theory. On the 
other hand, Hezbollah uses its legal structures effectively to recruit college students who 
are pursuing an education away from their home towns. For this group, which is 
explained in the data collection and instrument section, students who have Hezbollah 
militants in their social networks are excluded from my study. Rather, I attempted to 
discover whether or not Hezbollah really does, in fact, use its legal structures to 
effectively recruit militants. For this group, I will test the social control theory to 
determine if Hezbollah‟s recruitment methods support or do not support the theory.  
1.16.4 Data Collection and Instrument 
In my study, I will use secondary data or data that are collected for a specific 
purpose. According to O‟ Sullivan et al. (2003), this method offers a researcher the 
following advantages: (a) reduces cost, (b) enables studies to be conducted that are 
otherwise impractical, is helpful for comparative and longitudinal studies, and secondary 
analysis is a necessary element for an open science. 
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The Turkish Hezbollah collected data from its members as a means of gaining 
more insight about the organization and its members. Without these data, it would have 
been practically impossible to gain knowledge concerning Hezbollah‟s recruitment 
tactics. Thus, conducting a survey with Hezbollah members was not feasible. Therefore, I 
obtained the necessary data from Hezbollah database records retained by the Turkish 
National Police Intelligence Department.  
  
1.16.5 Limitations 
As with other data collection methods, secondary data analysis has certain 
limitations as summarized by Nachmias and Nachmias (2000) in the following manner: 
(a) The data may not include all of the instruments that the researcher hopes to find; (b) 
researchers may have difficulty in obtaining access to reach the data that contain 
variables of interest since the original investigator may not release the information; and  
(c) if the researcher does not have sufficient information concerning how the data were 
collected, he or she may encounter difficulties with internal and external validity when 
determining potential sources of bias, errors, or problems.  
Although it is not clear how many Turkish Hezbollah militants actually exist in 
Turkey, after the 2000 police raid against the Turkish Hezbollah leader, 7,000 militants‟ 
self-reports were seized along with other important information regarding the 
organization. Since the Turkish National Police (TNP) used that information to eliminate 
Hezbollah‟s power, the terrorist organization has subsequently taken more effective 
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cautions in unveiling its activities. Thus, beginning from that time to the present, the TNP 
does not have access to the most up-to-date information concerning the organization. 
  
1.16.6 Data Analysis 
Initially, I used a frequency table to identify the Turkish Hezbollah‟s most 
commonly used structure to recruit militants. Then, I analyzed the data by using logistic 
regression analysis. The dependent variable was measured by the probability of becoming 
a member of the Turkish Hezbollah either through institutional structures or by social 
networks. Depending on this assumption, each independent variable was included in the 
equation to appraise their effectiveness over the dependent variable. The type of college 
attended─whether located in or outside an individual‟s home town─provided valuable 
information regarding Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategy. Therefore, I compared the 
percentage between the number of recruited individuals by social networks and the 
number of recruited individuals by institutional structures. In addition to the influence of 
remaining in or leaving home towns to attend college over the dependent variable, I 
attempted to locate other independent variables in order to calculate each IV‟s influence 
over the dependent variable.  
 
1.16.7 Reliability and Validity 
Babbie (2007) stated that reliability is a matter of using a particular technique that 
yields the same results each time when applied to the same object. My dataset included 
most of the Turkish Hezbollah militants‟ self reports which were designed as a form to 
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obtain information concerning the militants‟ families, backgrounds, and how they were 
recruited. I believe that the data are reliable, because since the form contained clear and 
easy to understand questions for every militant. In addition, these reports were prepared 
for the terror organization itself and not for the police. Since the Turkish Hezbollah is a 
religiously motivated organization, it is believed that every member provided correct 
information about themselves.  
Nachmias and Nachmias (2000) stated that validity refers to the question “Am I 
measuring what I intend to measure?” (p. 149). In my study, I searched for the answer to 
how the Turkish Hezbollah recruits its militants. Because every militant provided detailed 
information in their self reports concerning their recruitment, I am confident that these 
reports will help to identify how militants are recruited by the Turkish Hezbollah. 
 
1.17 Conclusion  
 My study provides detailed and accurate information regarding the strategies used 
by the Turkish Hezbollah to recruit college students. According to Candarlil (1999), 
having a false secularist policy such as pressuring religious people, increases the tension 
of conservative people against the state especially in the Kurdish populated area. Like 
other terrorist organizations, the Turkish Hezbollah exaggerated all of these policy issues 
and used them as propaganda to create a group of people who view the state as the enemy 
of Islam as well as help them recruit more people either through social networks or 
through the organization‟s institutional structures.   
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Similar to other terrorist organizations in Turkey, the Turkish Hezbollah has 
strong and effective institutional structures within colleges located especially in the 
metropolis cities of Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir where they can recruit militants through 
these institutional establishments. Parallel to social control theory‟s argument that being 
absent from social bonds cause individuals to become more inclined to commit crime, if 
this theory proves to be more accurate, the data will reveal the following.  
College students who remain with their social structure while pursuing their 
education are less likely to be recruited by the Turkish Hezbollah. Additionally, it is 
expected that college students who are distanced from their social networks during their 
educational pursuit are more likely to be recruited by the Hezbollah.   
On the other hand, the Turkish Hezbollah also uses local structures to recruit 
militants. For example, especially through mosques and Imams, Hezbollah gains 
sympathy and is thus able to recruit more militants. Besides considering family ties in the 
area, I expected that the Turkish Hezbollah is more likely to use family ties to recruit new 
militants. In other words, young Kurdish people are more apt to accept or follow the 
Turkish Hezbollah‟s propaganda if their elders support this message. For example, in the 
traditional rural Kurdish society, it is expected that the views of elders are respected by 
the younger generation.  
If social learning theory proves to be more accurate, the data will reveal that 
college students who remain with their social structure while pursuing their education and 
have relatives who are part of the Turkish Hezbollah are more likely to be recruited by 
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the social networks. This reveals that family ties are strong enough to recruit new 
militants.  
Whichever the case, the findings of my study provide valuable information 
regarding the most effective recruitment strategy used by the Turkish Hezbollah. Most 
importantly, my study provides a more in-depth analysis in understanding and resolving 
some of the negative issues that are used by the Turkish Hezbollah as a propaganda tool 
to recruit more militants. By revealing these findings, the Turkish government may, 
perhaps, be led to establish policy changes in the region. Considering the ethnic and 
religious structure of the area, Turkey clearly needs additional reforms in order to reap 
better human rights, democracy, and religious freedom. I believe that my study divulges 
Turkey‟s need to make dramatic changes concerning the following topics. 
  
1.17.1 Religion. 
Because Islam does not recognize any priesthood, this can exercise authority or 
interpret the laws of Allah (the God) (Choudry, 1993). However, other than Arabs, as 
diverse ethnic groups such as the Persians and Turks embraced Islam, they created their 
unique versions by blending religion in with their previous cultural practices and social 
arrangements. Along the way, they devised a group of clergymen that enabled the state to 
control the education and socialization of believers (Koker, 1995). However, under the 
influence of a positivist argument, the founders of the Turkish Republic claimed that 
religion in general, and Islam specifically, prevented modernization and sustained 
backwardness. They perceived religion as the basic reason for the disintegration of the 
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Ottoman Empire as well as a main threat to the stability and longevity of the new regime, 
an idea that is not accepted by many. Thus, they followed the example of the Ottomans in 
controlling religion under government hierarchy (Kologlu, 1999) by instituting the 
Directory of Religious Affairs.   
On the other hand and parallel to Selcuk‟s (1999) argument, I believe that 
promoting pluralism and multiculturalism is the key to broaden and deepen the practice 
of democracy in Turkey. Differences of opinions, beliefs, cultures, and lifestyles neither 
threaten the regime‟s stability nor create chaos; on the contrary, recognizing them is the 
best way to secure Turkish democracy and secularism. Instead, it is argued that the ideal 
situation exists when government control over religion is decreased and religious 
activities are organized by civil societal organizations.  
 
1.17.2 Economy. 
             Although economic theory does not provide a very convincing answer as to 
whether poverty is one of the important root causes of terrorism (Krueger & Maleckova, 
2003), Hamm (1998) claimed that economic poverty is, in fact, connected to terrorism. 
Considering the economic background of the eastern part of Turkey, there is an 
unbalanced share of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). For example, when compared to 
the eastern part of Turkey, the western part is industrialized and more developed (State 
Institute of Statistics, 2003). Clearly, fighting against terrorism should be supported by 
economic developments in the eastern area. 
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1.17.3 Unemployment. 
Unemployment is another economic variable that has an effect on terrorism. For 
example, Bloch (1957) argued that loss of a job increases social inhibition which, in turn, 
drives individuals to become more prone to criminal activities. In support, Ellis (1991) 
stated that having a high proportion of unemployment increases the crime rate. 
Accordingly, I expect that the higher unemployment rate in the eastern area is another 
reason for terrorism and creating new jobs will assist in eliminating the Turkish 
Hezbollah.
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2 CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This literature review provides information regarding the recruitment strategies of 
terrorist organizations through the perspectives of social control and social learning 
theories. In this section, the following four major points are addressed that relate to my 
study.  
  In the first section, the way in which scholars have observed terrorism and 
criminology are examined. In addition, I will provide justification as to why 
criminological theories are used to analyze terrorism. As Ferracuti (1982) argued, 
because terrorists‟ goals and motivations remain criminal, terrorism may be studied 
through criminal theories.   
In the second section, social control and social learning theories are explained and 
some studies pertaining to these theories are summarized. I have also provided details 
concerning how these theories are used to analyze the Turkish Hezbollah. It is my belief 
that having terrorists within social networks increases the likelihood of being recruited 
through these networks. On the other hand, my study is expected to reveal that 
institutional structures are another effective recruitment tool used by the Turkish 
Hezbollah. I hypothesized that college students who obtain their degrees away from their 
families are most likely to be recruited through the Turkish Hezbollah‟s institutional 
structures due to the students‟ weak social bonds.  
In the third section, theories associated with terrorist recruitment are summarized 
and then related back to social control and social learning theories. Like other terrorist 
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organizations in the world, the Turkish Hezbollah also uses the same recruitment patterns 
found to be important variables in differential recruitment theory (personal ties, 
organizational ties, and social networks), the net model (institutional structural weekend 
activities), and the funnel model (identity building and commitment validation). It is my 
belief that low self-control and social control help the Turkish Hezbollah to recruit more 
militants through its institutional structures. On the other hand, a crime or terror-praised 
society increases the likelihood of individuals being recruited into terror or crime 
organizations through social networks.       
Finally, I will identify whether or not there is a relationship between religion and 
terrorism as well as discuss theories related to religion and terrorism. Rapoport (1999) 
stated that there are four types of modern terrorism and each have different ideologies. 
For example, the anarchist wave attempted to commit political assassinations in order to 
ignite a popular uprising, the anticolonial wave attempted to obtain independent states, 
the new-left wave stemmed from a political climate (especially the cold war), and finally, 
the religious wave used religion as a justification for terrorism.  
How religion as a factor in terrorism relates to social control and social learning 
theories will also be examined in this section. Theoretical literature has suggested that 
having more ideology in the political system minimizes terrorist activities, and religious 
ideology, whether fundamentalist or not, should take part in the legal political system. 
From the social control theory perspective, college students who have weak bonds and 
religious ideology are more likely to be recruited through the Turkish Hezbollah‟s 
institutional structures. Parallel to the findings of social learning theory, I believe that 
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having militants within relatives is expected to increase the likelihood of being recruited 
by social networks. 
  
2.2 Criminological Theories and Terrorism 
In this section, I will first examine the way in which scholars have traditionally 
observed terrorism. After providing their traditional perspectives on terrorism and 
criminology, the various definitions of terrorism and the ways in which I examined other 
scholars‟ views are discussed.  
There are many conditions that may provoke terrorism. For example, not only 
deprived and uneducated people may be terrorists, but the affluent and well-educated 
people may be terrorists as well. While it is not difficult to find terrorists among 
psychopathic and normal healthy people in addition to both sexes and of all ages, the list 
is easy to extend. While explaining terrorism, however, the main point that any academic 
researcher should consider is the wide diversity of conditions and the target population. 
Conversely, this variability of the conditions and the heterogeneity of the target 
population create difficulty in oversimplifying terrorism (Katja & Brynjar, 2000). 
Another drawback for the close study of terrorism is the unavailability of target 
populations.  
Diverse types and complex forms of terrorism have greatly complicated the task 
of determining the causes of terrorism. For example, most academic studies written after 
1968 focused on the causes of terrorism within different levels of explanations (e.g., 
individual, group, environmental, and international). By the groundbreaking analytical 
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frameworks of Martha Crenshaw, Jerrold Post, John Horgan, and Andrew Silke, the best 
understood include the individual and group levels (SNDC, 2006). Their research 
provided a new outlook for discovering how and why militants join terrorist 
organizations, which group dynamics work within terrorist organizations, and what 
obligatory factors influence disengagement from terrorism.   
Crenshaw (1981) stated that the direct causes of terrorism should be scrutinized 
on background conditions that positively encourage resistance against the state. These 
conditions may not only create an environment in which terrorism is possible, but they 
also provide direction and motivation for the terrorist movement. According to 
Crenshaw, the existence of concrete grievances among an identifiable minority is one 
reason that causes terrorism. Some theoretical researchers have suggested that the idea of 
justice or fairness may also be related to attitudes toward violence. The second condition 
that relates to terrorist activities is the lack of opportunity for political participation. 
Finally, government use of unusual and unexpected force in response to reform attempts 
or protests often lead to terrorist retaliation. These background conditions for terrorism 
are largely used as propaganda tools to recruit new militants who view terrorism as a 
morally acceptable way to overcome the government (Crenshaw, 1981).    
Yilmaz (2009) stated that, depending on their point of interest, terrorism theories 
may be assessed within four categories:  
• Strategic theories: Terrorism is used as an instrument to achieve certain goals 
by rational actors. 
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• Structural theories: Internal dynamics of political organizations may cause 
terrorism.  
• Psychological theories: Emphasize the influence of personality, gender, age, 
education, political affiliation, etc. on an individual level.  
• Sociological theories: Like psychological theories, they emphasize the 
influence of individual factors. 
While strategic and structural theories focus on decision to act determinants, 
psychological and sociological theories focus on individual characteristics and their likely 
responses to different kinds of terrorism.  
Although many researchers have stated that focusing on underlying causes, 
motivational factors, and grievances imply a kind of justification for violence, it is clear 
that terrorism studies and their future potential will help to devise balanced and effective 
long term measures (Katja & Brynjar, 2004).  
In consideration of terrorism research related to Turkey, there have been few 
academic studies conducted until only the last couple of years. However, by sending 
students to the United States for the purpose of earning higher academic degrees has 
provided Turkey with reliable and important research. On the other hand, Turkey must 
still identify the recruitment strategies used by terror groups. Although there are 
numerous studies regarding the recruitment strategies of terrorist organizations 
throughout the world, unfortunately, there are no scientific studies regarding terrorist 
group recruitment strategies in Turkey.  
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Therefore, to identify and formulate an in-depth analysis concerning the Turkish 
Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategies, I will use social control and social learning theories 
that I believe are the most applicable theories that can reveal their recruitment methods. 
For example, strong relative relations and the Turkish culture of showing respect for the 
ideas of their elders make young Kurdish originated citizens easy targets for the Turkish 
Hezbollah. Considering this social phenomenon, I anticipate that the Turkish Hezbollah 
uses social networks to recruit most of its militants.  
On the other hand, the Turkish Hezbollah‟s legal structures are extremely 
effective and well-organized especially within state colleges. For example, the Hezbollah 
provides either free or very low prices for food and shelter to college newcomers. 
Although, the newcomers may not have any militants within their families, they are 
brainwashed into the Turkish Hezbollah‟s house and thus may possibly be recruited. 
Besides and as discussed by Hirschi (1969), an individual who has a lack of social control 
is free to commit either terrorist or criminal acts.  
To determine the effectiveness of the Turkish Hezbollah‟s legal structures, I will 
seek out Turkish Hezbollah members who were away from their families, had no 
Hezbollah militants among their relatives, and were recruited by the legal structure of the 
Hezbollah when they were in college. My study is expected to reveal that those groups of 
students are more likely to be recruited through institutional structures.   
Crenshaw (1983) stated that each terrorist group is unique and any study related 
to them should be researched in the context of their own natural history and culture. 
Parallel to Crenshaw‟s argument, Turkey‟s geographical location as well as its historical 
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background provides a diversified society (Ozeren, 2004). Therefore, the Turkish 
Hezbollah should be evaluated within Turkey‟s strategic structure. Contrary to global 
Islamist terror groups, the Turkish Hezbollah targets only the Turkish Republic and 
attempts to change the current regime to Shari‟a. 
As stated by Karmon (1997), Turkish Hezbollah‟s members are primarily of 
Kurdish origin. Here, it is initially important to establish why this group prefers to be part 
of the terrorist organization and how they are recruited. Although I do not intend to look 
directly into why this group prefers to be part of the Turkish Hezbollah, it is, however, 
important to provide demographic information about college students who chose to take 
part in the terror organization.  
According to a study conducted by RAND (2006), manpower is a crucial resource 
for terrorist organizations in carrying out attacks and sustaining operations. 
Consequently, hindering the recruitment tactics of terrorist organizations will disable 
their ability to function. To obstruct the Turkish Hezbollah‟s recruitment, it is therefore 
necessary to understand how recruitment works, where recruitment takes place, what are 
the demographic profiles of recruited students, and discovering the underlying reasons 
behind why students select to join the Turkish Hezbollah. Obviously, having a clear 
picture of these recruitment strategies could assist the Turkish government in developing 
better policies to combat against terrorism.  
Parallel to Width and Fahoum‟s (2006) future research recommendations, I will 
provide demographic details gathered through the recruited militants themselves. For 
example, the Turkish Hezbollah members provided detailed information in their self 
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reports that included their family size, ideology of their relatives, and the process of their 
families‟ migrations from one place to another, among other pertinent personal data.  
Nichiporuk (2003) stated that high fertility rates, unregulated and unchecked 
migration flows, and volatile religious and ethnic rivalries can increase terrorist activities. 
He claimed that the link between demography and the causes of extremism should be 
broken in order to enhance the victory against terrorism. To Nichiporuk, fertility rates, 
ethnic/religious composition, internal/international migration, level of capital, and 
population/environment interactions are very important variables relevant to terrorist 
activities. My study also provides economic and demographic details to determine what 
specific motivational factors and underlying reasons lead college students to join the 
Turkish Hezbollah.  
My study is based on the real personal reports which were given to the Turkish 
Hezbollah by its members. It is my belief that the data are reliable and accurate because 
the form had clear and easy to understand questions asked of every militant.  Importantly, 
these reports were prepared for the terror organization itself and not meant for the police. 
In addition to these features, it is believed that every member provided truthful 
information about themselves given that the Turkish Hezbollah is a religiously motivated 
organization. Otherwise, their reputation within the terror organization would be 
diminished. These features increase both the reliability and validity of my data. As 
mentioned earlier, the unavailability of direct sources related to the militants is one 
important drawback to any study on terrorism. However, the availability of personal 
reports in my study is expected to eliminate this criticism.  
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In my study, I expect to discover effective recruitment strategies that the Turkish 
Hezbollah uses to recruit college students. In addition, I expect to establish the 
underlying reasons why the militants chose to participate in the terrorist organization. 
Considering the ideological background of southeastern Turkey, an individual‟s religious 
reasons are anticipated to be the most important issue for joining terrorist activities. 
Parallel to Crenshaw‟s (1981) argument, the lack of opportunity for some ideologies may 
cause terrorist activities.   
 
2.2.1 Definitions of terrorism 
Mueller (1979) acknowledged that throughout history, most nations have 
experienced the phenomenon that is known today as terrorism. According to Crenshaw 
(1981), the study of terrorism can be structured into three questions: (a) Why does 
terrorism occur? (b) How does the process of terrorism work? and (c) What are the social 
and political effects of terrorism? 
In the traditional literature, terrorism was categorized into two variations:  
traditional and revolutionary. Jaspal (2008) argued that while the traditional view 
considers terrorism to be state originated, the revolutionary view identifies terrorism as a 
developed protest against political and social injustice and is used as a tool to win 
freedom and to bring about social and political changes. According to Jaspal, current 
academic studies characterize terrorism widely as the “weapon of the weak,” “violence 
for effect,” and “violence for political purposes.” 
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Although research related to terrorism has a critical and important function to 
educate the broader public, politicians, and counter terrorism units, these studies have 
generally failed in their predictive capacity of terrorist events according to the Swedish 
National Defense College (SNDC) (2006).  
While terrorism has existed since the beginning of recorded history, defining the 
term is problematic (Ferracuti, 1982). Szabo (1979) implied that “terrorism is one of 
those terms that is difficult to define but easy to use” (p. 5). Depending upon whose point 
of view is being represented, terrorism has been described in various and controversial 
ways.  For example, terrorism may be referred to by some as a crime and a holy duty, a 
tactic and a strategy, a justification of reaction against oppression, or an inexcusable 
abomination (International Terrorism and Security Research, 2009). Thus, the lacking of 
a common consensus in defining terrorism has created a major dilemma in academic 
research and has therefore affected future studies and policy development.  
According to Victoroff (2005), there are numerous analyses of terrorism that may 
include political, social, ideological, and economic aspects. Unfortunately, many are 
typically given less emphasis when compared to security factors in policy formation.   
Thus, because there is no single and universally accepted definition of terrorism, 
the terms used are generally inadequate as well as frequently neglected by terrorism 
researchers who prefer to cite the basic U.S. Department of State definition (Hudson, 
1999) that includes the “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against 
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to 
influence an audience.” 
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To make an analysis about the Turkish Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategies, I chose 
social control and social learning theories that represent two major sociological theories 
of crime and delinquency. Because terrorist organizations had difficulty in determining 
their political and monetary support from other countries after September 11, this 
conjuncture caused terrorist groups to change the types of crimes they committed. For 
example, to fund their organization, they chose to commit criminal behaviors (e.g., drug 
trafficking, property crimes, gambling, etc.) that would help them raise funds rather than 
committing terrorist crimes. Since the types of crimes committed by terrorist groups are 
generally criminal, I believe that criminological theories can be used to explain terrorism. 
To support this argument, I will discuss the traditional and post-traditional criminological 
perspectives in relation to terrorism. 
 
2.2.1.1 Traditional approach 
In the traditional approach, divided opinions from both a theoretical and policy 
making perspective creates the major difference between terrorism and crime. Due to the 
difference in motivational factors, for instance, some scholars have objections in 
considering terrorism as a form of crime.  
Although terrorists may have diverse motivations such as political, ideological, 
ethnic, or religious goals, criminals generally look for personal gains. Contrary to 
criminals who may be motivated to perpetrate crime for its own sake, terrorists commit 
violence for specific reasons, namely to create self-destructive reactions in a society 
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(Asal & Wilkenfeld, 2005). Spencer (2006) asserted that when terrorism is used as a 
politically motivated tactic, the threat or use of force or violence is involved. 
By summarizing the differences between criminals and terrorists, Gadek (2008) 
claimed that there are basic criteria and components that distinguish crime from terrorism 
that include the following: 
• While the terrorist is generally often well trained and state supported, 
criminals has little backing. Therefore, the violence and level of destruction 
are much greater in terrorism when compared to criminals. Criminals always 
seek opportunistic targets. On the other hand, terrorists have a specific goal in 
mind that is generally more symbolic than opportunistic. 
• Contrary to terrorists, criminals run for cover when they are pursued by the 
police. For example, terrorists generally commit crimes for terrorist 
propaganda, and they want to be recognized as perpetrators of the crime, and 
they often enjoy taking credit.  
On the other hand, traditional scholars have declared that separate motivations 
and goals create the differences between crime and terrorism. While terrorism uses 
violence as a strategy to achieve political goals, it may also be used by those who oppose 
existing governments (Crenshaw, 2001).  
     
2.2.1.2 Post Traditional Approach 
Contrary to the traditional approach, Asal and Wilkenfeld (2005) maintained that 
there is no motivational difference between terrorists and criminals. As an example, they 
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claimed that although the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was 
formerly a politically motivated terrorist organization, it currently profits from drug 
trafficking, and its members have always acted criminally to gain financial freedom. This 
situation is also the case in the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) that remains highly active 
in the eastern part of Turkey (Candarli, 1999).  
Especially over the last decades, political rebels have become criminals while still 
pretending to be rebels in an effort to recruit new militants by maintaining their legitimate 
public image. Clearly, most terrorist organizations, including the Lebanese Hezbollah, 
Al-Qaeda, PKK, and Hamas operate sophisticated fund-raising networks throughout the 
world (Asal & Wilkenfeld, 2005).  
Hamm (2005) revealed that some terrorist groups have traditional sources for 
funding their activities. However, when those sources dry up, terrorists utilize organized 
crime to make up the difference. According to Hamm (2005), terrorist groups will 
increasingly participate in drug trafficking and other illegal activities that will help them 
to gain money and material, especially with the decline of state-sponsored terrorism.  
The Irish Republican Army (IRA) represents one such organization. For example, 
IRA fund raising efforts were cracked down by the U.S. law enforcement in the early 
1970s that caused the organization to search for new sources of revenue. In doing so, the 
IRA asked its own members to commit crimes with ethnic mobs such as smuggling cars 
and weapons, running protection, managing underground brothels, et cetera (Dishman, 
2001).   
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Ferracuti (1982) claimed that although terrorists use terror, their goals and 
motivations remain criminal. Accordingly, their actions begin with legal and accepted 
forms of dissent such as individual oral protests or petitions that easily progress into 
illegal but often tolerated acts (e.g., violent demonstrations, vandalism, or property 
seizures). Eventually, these actions escalate to unacceptable and illegal behavior where 
sabotage, personal assaults, bombings, and kidnappings occur. Considering their final 
actions, Ferracuti stated that because most of the terrorists‟ actions are criminal, they 
should be approached as criminals. 
In discussing the issue that terrorism often involves various kinds of crime 
including kidnappings, arson, murder, and conspiracy, Ferracuti (1982) further claimed 
that it is very difficult to make a distinction between terrorism and crime. Koseli (2008) 
further stated that besides being involved in the same illegal activities, other similarities 
between terrorists and criminals include the actions and tactics employed by both groups.  
In the field, I believe that terrorism is an evolving phenomenon that requires 
developing technology, a common understanding to prevent terrorism, motivations, 
financing, and support mechanisms, especially after the September 11 attacks proved that 
a global effort is crucial in minimizing terrorism. Today, most countries have realized 
that those which underestimate terrorism or have sympathy toward particular terrorist 
groups can be the starting point of a devastating attack to those countries. Because all 
terrorist groups think that the only way to reveal their ideology to the public is to kill 
more people, this understanding may be overturned in countries that create safe havens to 
terrorist groups. Especially when terrorist groups have no other chance to commit crimes 
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inside other countries, this will be the case. Therefore, minimizing terrorism requires 
maximum cooperation and serious information-sharing with other countries. Each 
terrorist organization should be researched and supported from a reliable and objective 
academic perspective.  
Willis, Evans, and LaGrange (1999) argued that most current criminological 
theories are applied to specific cases, and any generalization may be nil given that they 
are attributed to different geographic locations. According to Willis et al., however, there 
are always exceptions and alternative theories may better explain the phenomena.  
The Handbook on Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism prepared by the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2007) suggested that a strong 
criminal justice element is crucial to an effective and prevention-focused response to 
terrorism that should consist of a broad range of short- and long-term plans that address 
the underlying conditions that help to spread terrorism. As mentioned earlier, the war 
against terrorism should include global efforts and cooperation. Considering the 
campaign‟s broad experience in promoting and facilitating international cooperation, its 
operational capacity and field expertise point to the criminal justice system as one of the 
most effective academic areas to combat terrorism.  
From this perspective, I believe that social control and social learning theories are 
two important criminological theories that should help to identify whether social 
networks or institutional structures best explain the Turkish Hezbollah‟s recruitment 
method.  
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As discussed earlier, treating terrorists as problematic personalities does not solve 
the terrorism problem. Rather, their behaviors should be studied through societal 
influences that may lead researchers to scrutinize the militant‟s social network. In my 
study, social learning theory is expected to provide an in-depth analysis related to the 
Turkish Hezbollah militant‟s recruitment patterns and strategies. 
On the other hand, social control theory in my study is hypothesized to explain 
the Turkish Hezbollah‟s process involved in the recruitment of college students. Parallel 
to the arguments of social control theory, my study includes college students who are 
away from their families and have weak social bonds. From this perspective, I anticipate 
that social control theory will be the best criminological theory to clarify the recruitment 
pattern of college students.       
 
2.3 Social Learning and Social Control Theories 
Although there are differences of opinion as to how terrorism and criminality are 
related, both social learning and social control theories can be applied to research 
concerning why individuals join terrorist groups because each theory explains the reasons 
that certain individuals may be prone to engage in crime. As mentioned above, both 
theories are expected to reveal important tactics and methods relating to recruitment 
strategies of the Turkish Hezbollah.  
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2.3.1 Social learning theory 
There are several criminological theories that offer an explanation as to why 
individuals engage in criminal behavior (Akers, 1977; Hirschi, 1969). Social learning is 
one theory that has important tools which describe criminal behaviors. According to 
Akers (1979), the modeling and imitation research conducted by Bandura and Barab 
(1973) provides important contributions to this theory.  
Social learning theory suggests that behavior is learned not only through direct 
experience but also through observation of one‟s environment. In other words, people 
learn by observing other people‟s behavior, outcomes, and attitudes. Akers et al. (1979) 
pointed out that the more individuals delineate criminal behavior as good (positive 
definition) or at least justify or neutralize the behavior as unwanted (negative definition), 
the more likely they are to engage in crime. Bandura (1973) claimed that most human 
behavior is learned by observation through modeling. For example, while people are 
learning others‟ behavior, they have interaction with significant groups wherein they 
evaluate their norms, attitudes, and orientations as good or bad. These behaviors are 
generally verbal and cognitive which can be directly reinforced or they may be stimuli for 
other behavior. Bandura (2005) schematized the social learning theory as shown in 
Figure 1. 
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Figure 1.  Social learning theory as schematized by Bandura (2005) 
 
While developing his general sociological theory of crime and delinquency, 
Edwin H. Sutherland relied heavily upon the work of Shaw and McKay, Chicago school 
theorists (Akers, 2004). Ecological and cultural transmission theory, symbolic 
interactionism, and culture had an impact on the formulation of Sutherland‟s theory. 
In 1947, Sutherland revised the final version of his theory based on nine postulates: 
1. Criminal behavior is learned. 
2. Criminal behavior is learned through interaction with other persons in a process 
of communication. 
3. The principal part of the learning of criminal behavior occurs within intimate 
personal groups. 
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4. When criminal behavior is learned, the learning includes: (a) techniques of 
committing the crime that are sometimes very complicated, sometimes simple; and (b) 
the specific direction of motives, drives, rationalizations, and attitudes. 
5. The specific direction of motives and drives is learned from definitions of the 
legal codes as favorable or unfavorable. 
6. A person becomes delinquent because of an excess of definitions favorable to 
violation of the law over definitions unfavorable to violation of the law. 
7. Differential associations may vary in frequency, duration, priority, and 
intensity. 
8. The process of learning criminal behavior by association with criminal and 
anticriminal patterns involves all of the mechanisms that are involved in any other 
learning. 
9. While criminal behavior is an expression of general needs and values, it is not 
explained by those general needs and values since noncriminal behavior is an expression 
of the same needs and values. 
Social learning theory is a modified and clarified version of Sutherland‟s 
differential association theory that consists of two basic elements. First, to commit a 
crime, specific techniques are needed to be learned from criminals. Second, interaction 
with others provides appropriate drives, motives, attitudes, and rationalization for law 
violations (Vold et al., 2002).  
According to Akers (2004), Sutherland‟s eighth principle asserts that criminal 
behavior involves all mechanisms of learning; however, Akers failed to identify them. To 
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create the social learning theory, Burgess and Akers (1966) retained all the principles of 
Sutherland‟s differential association theory and combined them with differential 
reinforcement and other principles of behavioral acquisition, continuation, and cessation 
in addition to adding more concepts taken from behavioral learning theory (e.g., 
differential reinforcement, discriminative stimuli and internal stimuli, and schedules of 
reinforcement). They contended that criminal behavior is learned in the same way that 
any other behavior is learned and may be explained through the rewards or punishment a 
person receives from his or her environment (Orcutt, 2002).  
According to research conducted by Jessor, Graves, Hanson, & Jessor (1968), 
individuals who are tolerant or show positive attitudes toward illegal substance usage are 
much more likely to use illegal drugs than are those who have negative attitudes toward 
substance use. Peer and parental influences were also two important variables found to 
have either a positive or negative effect on teenage drug behaviors. In addition, Jessor et 
al.‟s research revealed that teenagers who have a relationship with peers who are users 
initially learn the definition and jargon that is favorable to use of illegal substances and, 
in turn, they begin to use them.  
Akers (2004) pointed out that social learning theory is not competitive with 
differential association theory but rather represents a broader version. Research evidence 
that supports Sutherland‟s differential association theory also supports social learning 
theory.  Akers further maintained that social learning theory explains criminal and 
delinquent behavior more thoroughly than Sutherland‟s differential association theory. 
According to Akers‟ theory, much learning between humans occurs in nonsocial 
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situations and social interactions by observing the consequences of people‟s behavior 
from others. Akers‟ social learning theory focused on the following four major concepts 
(Vold et al., 2002):  
1.  Differential association refers to direct and indirect association and interaction 
with others who engage in certain kinds of behavior or express values, norms, and 
attitudes. These patterns of interactions with others may result in either unfavorable or 
favorable reactions to violating the law (Akers & Jensen, 2005).  
2.  According to Akers (2004), definitions reflect the meanings of one‟s own 
behavior. They may be more right or wrong, desirable or undesirable, appropriate or 
inappropriate, good or bad (Vold et al., 2002).  
3.  Differential reinforcement refers to the balance of actual or anticipated rewards 
and punishments that may be consequences of the behavior (Akers & Jensen, 2005).  
4.  Imitation is the act that comes after observation. The individual observes a 
behavior from others and then engages in a similar behavior. According to Akers (2004), 
the imitated behavior is influenced by the characteristics of the model, the observed 
behavior, and the observed consequences of the behavior. 
Hughbank and Hughbank (2009) stated that social learning theory is the 
persuasion that makes people aggressive by observing others behavior to achieve an 
illegal goal or be rewarded as a result of committing violent acts. According to Hughbank 
and Hughbank, social learning theory was initially developed for criminal justice 
practitioners to learn an individual‟s behavior in an environment that encourages violent 
and unstrained conduct. However, when terrorism became a worldwide problem, social 
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learning theory could be further used to explain and examine how terrorist organizations 
recruit new militants. In addition, the theory could help to identify how individuals seek 
personal acceptance within a terrorist organization through union safety, fellowship, and 
solidarity.  
Parallel to Hughbank and Hughbank‟s (2009) argument, Ryan, Vanderlick, and 
Matthews (2009) concurred that terrorism is learned behavior which is taught through 
specific ways. Saper (1988) claimed that because terrorism is a learned behavior, it does 
not result from a dysfunctional or problematic personality but rather is generally a result 
of societal influences and unique learning experiences. In this theory, aggression is 
viewed as a learned behavior, and through observation one may learn the consequences 
of the behavior. Oots and Wiegele (1985) contended that if aggression is viewed as 
learned behavior, then terrorism─a specific type of aggressive behavior─can also be 
learned.  
Ryan et al. (2009) claimed that contrary to the general perception of terrorism, 
while achieving a political goal is the primary objective, harming others is the secondary 
objective. According to Ryan et al., numerous researchers believe that the ultimate goal 
of terrorists is not to terrorize any society but to use terrorism as a tool to legitimize 
political goals when diplomacy fails to meet their needs. Gaynor (2002) concluded that 
whether religious, political, or otherwise, learned ideological values are simply 
antecedents to terrorist behavior which does not prove that terrorists have personality 
defects. Crenshaw (1988) also accepted that terrorism is a rational behavior based on the 
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learned belief that violence to achieve political goals is effective, feasible, and even 
morally justified in the eyes of the perpetrators.  
According to Rabbie (1991), demographic variables such as age, sex, and 
occupation are oversimplified and that many, perhaps most, terrorists are normal people 
who are typically young males from the middle or professional classes. Ferracuti (1982) 
also attempted to make generalizations regarding the Italian Red Brigade terrorists by 
concluding that they are politically and actively controlled with no specific difference in 
their family backgrounds. From the psychological perspective, these two studies revealed 
that there is no notable difference between criminals and terrorists. Similar to Rabbie‟s 
findings, Crenshaw (1988) concluded that terrorist behavior is strategically rational and 
stems from the learned belief that is used to justify terrorism in a feasible, effective, and 
moral way.   
Bandura‟s (1998) social learning theory of aggression states that observation and 
imitation of an aggressive model are followed by violence and this theory helps to 
explain reconstructed moral imperatives. Teenagers who are in the middle of political 
conflict may witness terrorist behaviors and they may imitate them through their culture‟s 
public praise of terrorists. Through this process, religion maybe used to justify terrorist 
behaviors.  
Victoroff (2005) asserted that audiovisual tapes, compact disks, books, and web 
sites are some of the tools that terrorists use to justify their killings, assault, and behavior. 
He infers that the social learning can influence some young students toward terrorism. 
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For example, the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) states the importance of jihad 
through its publication as follows (Alexander, 2002, 57):  
“We must imprint on the minds of generations of Muslims that the Palestinian 
problem is a religious one . . . I indeed wish to go to war for the sake of Allah! I will 
assault and kill, assault and kill, assault and kill.”  
Porta (1990) interviewed 28 imprisoned Marxist terrorists to determine how they 
were recruited and the reasons for joining the terrorist group. The following two points 
summarize her findings: 
• For most of the terrorists, ideological commitment did not play a significant 
role in choosing to join the terrorist organization. 
• Living in the same neighborhood and hanging out in the same places were 
more important for most of the terrorists.    
Most research that has been conducted on social learning theory has revealed 
strong to moderate support between social learning variables and delinquent, criminal, 
and deviant behavior (Akers & Jensen, 2005). Akers et al. stated that in comparison to 
other theories, when social learning theory is tested against other theories by using the 
same data, generally but not always, the dependent variable gives more support in 
explaining deviant behaviors.  
Similar to the perspective held by other social learning theory scholars, I argue 
that any individual‟s perception of crime may change depending on the social network in 
which the person grew up. In short, having criminals in one‟s social network increases 
the likelihood of an individual‟s involvement in criminal activities.  
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Through social learning theory, my study is designed for me to answer the 
following question: “How strong is the Turkish Hezbollah‟s social structure in recruiting 
more militants?” Parallel to Porta‟s (1990) findings, I anticipate that most Turkish 
militants are more likely to be recruited through social networks as opposed to the 
Hezbollah‟s institutional structures. For example, being active in the more conservative 
area of Turkey, the Hezbollah has an advantage over the religious order to respect one‟s 
elders.  
As discussed by Laciner (2007), religion is one of the most important mediators in 
Turkey‟s social life, and the Hezbollah is one of the fundamentalist religious terrorist 
organizations in the country. Thus, religion is used by this terror group to recruit more 
militants. To achieve this goal, the group intends to recruit new militants through its 
social networks by presenting religious talks within mosques or in its nongovernmental 
legal organizations. In addition, one militant within any family is used as a Trojan effect 
in which the remaining family members create an easy target for the Turkish Hezbollah. 
Uslu (2007) inferred that the Turkish Hezbollah urges its militants to pursue younger 
family members to become a part of its organization. 
Parallel to above argument, if social learning theory is more accurate in explaining 
the Turkish Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategies, then my study should reveal that social 
networks rather than institutional structures are the best tools used to recruit more 
militants.  
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2.3.2 Social Control Theory  
Social control theory explains the direct relationship between social bonds and 
crime that can be summarized in one statement: The weaker the social bond, the more 
likely an individual is to commit crime. However, there are many explanations to 
describe the actual meaning of social control theory, and an agreed upon definition differs 
among scholars as summarized below: 
• Social control is the use of power with the goal of influencing the behaviors of 
others (Wood, 1974). 
• Social control involves persuading individuals to believe, do, think, and feel 
as others want them to (Lumbey, 1924). 
• Parsons (1951) referred to institutional means in terms of social control but 
constructed more physical aspects to society‟s power by describing social 
control‟s  mechanism as “a motivational process in one or more individual 
actors which tends to counteract a tendency to deviate” (p. 206). 
• Social control theory emphasizes the role of control in terms of counteracting 
delinquency and states that strong social bonds hinder delinquency (Booth et 
al., 2008).  
Hirschi‟s (1969) social control theory was the first fully developed social bonding 
theory, and because the theory takes a more prosocial approach, it is particularly 
attractive to most scholars (Andriot, 2005). According to Andriot, social control theory 
does not try to explain why individuals commit criminal acts but rather attempts to 
explain why individuals prefer to conform to conventional norms.   
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Vold et al. (2002) asserted that many theories of crime and delinquency assume 
that people generally obey rules if they are left to their own will, and there are various 
biological, psychological, or social special forces that may drive them to commit crime. 
Control theories, however, take the opposite side by stating that all individuals are 
natural animals and if left to their own devices, they are prone to commit crime. Thus, the 
key question for control theorists becomes: “Why do people not commit crime?” In 
answer, control theorists focus mainly on social forces that intercept persons from 
committing crime. Therefore, the main hidden point behind not committing crime is the 
weakness of forces that restrain people from doing so. Similar to this argument, being 
away from social networks increases the likelihood of becoming recruited by terrorist 
organizations.  
Hirschi (1969) assumed that everyone has the potential to become delinquent and 
criminal, and social controls─not moral values─maintain law and order. According to the 
social control assumption, individuals will engage in delinquent behavior when their 
social bond to society is weakened (Alston, Harley, & Lenhoff, 1995). Thus, with a lack 
of social control, it is possible for an individual to commit either terrorist or criminal acts. 
Hirschi‟s social bond concept is comprised of the following four elements: (a) 
attachment, (b) commitment, (c) involvement, and (d) belief.  
2.3.2.1  Attachment 
Attachment refers to the strong ties between individuals and parents and their 
schools and peers. Hirschi (1969) stated that as the individual has stable and strong 
attachments to others within a society, he or she is far less likely to commit delinquent 
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behavior. Conversely, weak attachments and unconcerned behavior about others‟ wishes 
cause individuals to deviate from social expectations. According to Hirschi‟s findings, 
attachment to schools and parents are the most important contributing factors to hinder 
the commitment of crimes (Andriot, 2005).   
 
2.3.2.2  Commitment  
The concept of commitment assumes that in a society, a person‟s interests and 
benefits are at risk if he or she is engaged in criminal acts, because most people acquire 
their reputation and prosperity from the society in which they live. In 1957, Jackson Toby 
introduced the concept of “stakes at conformity” by arguing that all youths are tempted to 
break the law; however, some risk much more than others when they surrender to those 
temptations. For example, youths who do well in school not only risk being punished if 
they break the law but they also jeopardize their future careers. In other words, they have 
high “stakes at conformity.”  
According to Andriot (2005), commitment refers to future aspirations in which 
school grade is a strong measure. For example, an individual who is willing to participate 
in society by becoming educated, creating a positive reputation, and starting a family will 
be less likely to commit delinquent behavior due to the consequences of losing his or her 
positive social role (Hirschi, 1969).  
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2.3.2.3  Involvement 
The involvement element proposes that if a youngster is engaged in conventional 
activities (e.g., school clubs and associations, sports, etc.), he or she is less likely to 
participate in criminal activities (Andriot, 2005). In other words, it is assumed that the 
more an individual is simply too busy being involved in positive activities, the less likely 
he or she will find time to engage in delinquent behavior (Hirschi, 1969). Sutherland also 
shared the same view that joining conventional activities is a major deterrent for 
committing crimes. A Turkish proverb best explains the importance of involvement: 
“The devil tempts all other men, but that idle men tempt the devil.”     
 
2.3.2.4 Belief 
Belief describes individuals who accept the validity of rules and those who 
enforce the rules (Andriot, 2005). School rules and teachers are good examples. The 
theory infers that if individuals agree with societal norms, they are more likely to obey 
them.  
 According to Hirschi (1969), there is variation in an individual‟s perception of 
obeying societal rules. The absence or weakness of intimate relations with 
others─especially parents in most cases─causes the affect of belief to decrease.  
 Andriot (2005) inferred that conformity is achieved when individuals bond to 
society through each of the four elements (attachment, commitment, involvement, and 
belief). He added that the stronger the bond, the more likely are individuals to refrain 
from committing crimes.  
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Hirschi (1969) tested his theory against social strain (the motivation aspect) and 
Sutherland‟s or Miller‟s theory (cultural or group influence). Contrary to strain theory, or 
when individuals cannot successfully reach their goals, they experience pressure which 
may cause them to commit crime (Cullen & Agnew, 2003), Hirschi found no general 
relationship between delinquent acts and social class. Further, racial differences did not 
play a significant role in self reported delinquency (Vold et al., 2002). Hirschi‟s analysis 
of attachment to parents, schools and peers found that scoring low on parental bonds 
showed the possibility of scoring high for crime (Leiber, 2007). Although Hirschi‟s 
findings supported the control theory, they were inconsistent with cultural theories. In 
further support of the control theory, he found that youths who were unsuccessful in 
school were more likely to commit crime.  
Contrary to the findings of strain theory, Hirschi (1969) analyzed the effects of 
attachment to parents, schools, and peers on reported delinquents. Regardless of race or 
class, and regardless of the delinquency of their friends, Hirschi found that boys who 
were more closely attached to their parents were less likely to report committing 
delinquent acts than those who had less close parental attachments (Vold et al., 2002). 
According to Hirschi, peers do not play important roles for committing and hindering 
crime (Leiber, 2007).  
Although there are numerous scholars who support social control theory, some 
have criticized Hirschi‟s theory. For example, Wiatrowski, Griswold, and Roberts (1981) 
argued that there is no simultaneous or direct relationship between attachment, 
commitment, involvement, and belief as Hirschi claimed. Rather, the relationship is more 
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complex and hierarchical. According to Wiatrowski et al., Hirschi did not explain how 
his four elements might work simultaneous to affect the possibility of delinquent 
behavior. They further argued that an in-depth analysis of the social bonding elements 
revealed that there was very little effect of commitment on delinquent behavior. 
However, compared to the other elements, belief was a very strong mediator for 
delinquency, and parental and school attachments decreased the likelihood of committing 
crime.  
Junger and Marshall (1997) conducted a study consisting of Turkish, Surinamese, 
Moroccan, and Dutch male youths to determine whether or not social control theory was 
applicable to cross-ethnic lines. Consistent with social control theory predictions, they 
found that the theory measured family integration, school integration, beliefs, and leisure 
time activities. They concluded that within each of the ethnic groups, a strong bond to 
society is a protector against delinquent behavior whereas a weak bond results in higher 
levels of delinquent behaviors.   
Akers (1994) considered social control theory to be one of the best theories that 
provide explanations regarding juvenile delinquency. Because my study relates to college 
educated students or college newcomers who are between ages of 18 to 30, I predict that 
social control theory may best reveal how Turkish Hezbollah militants are recruited.  
In accordance to social control theory, terrorism emerges from a social response 
to perceived deviance that stems from underspecific and observable structural conditions 
(Messner & Rosenfeld, 2004). McCord (2004) further stated that lack of cultural norms 
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and values decreases an individual‟s responsibility. Simply stated, individuals who 
display ineffective or weak social ties make easy targets for terrorist groups. 
Britt and Gottfredson (2003) contended that in order to better understand 
terrorism, the issue should be rightfully studied within the realm of criminology. They 
further stated that to achieve political ends, terrorism is related to certain elements of low 
social control.  
Similar to other terrorist organizations in Turkey, Hezbollah effectively uses its 
broad social structure. For example, Muslim associations, mosques, propaganda, 
publications, and foundations are only some of the tools employed (Kardon, 1998). 
Earlier, Karmon (1997) found that the Turkish Hezbollah supports its effective 
recruitment strategies within universities by indoctrinating militants through its radical 
publications. Typically, students who are living a far distance from their families are 
especially vulnerable and thus easily manipulated into participating in the organization.  
In this regard, if social control theory is more accurate in explaining Turkish Hezbollah‟s 
recruitment process, then my study should expect to show that when compared to social 
networks, institutional structures are the best tools that the Turkish Hezbollah employ to 
successfully recruit more militants. 
As discussed earlier, the Turkish Hezbollah is located primarily in the eastern part 
of Turkey that is dominated by the Kurdish people. Because the area is surrounded by 
Iranians and Arabs, the Kurds have significant exposure to the Persian and Arabic 
language resulting in madrasa (seminary) education being widespread in the region 
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(Cakir, 2007). In addition, an Islamic identity helps in the development of a strong clergy 
class with titles including mele, sheikh, and sayyed.  
When individuals‟ bonds to society are central, social control theories hold that 
marginalization of certain individuals is increased while social bonds are more structural 
and weak. Considering all the world religions, Islamic countries have stronger religious 
institutions. According to Willis et al. (1999) individuals who have weak bonds to society 
may also be prone to greater deviance and criminality. Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) 
also found that ineffective parenting can be the result of an individual‟s low self-control.  
If social control theory is more accurate, I expect to find that Turkish Kurds who 
have weak bonds and weak religious ideologies will be the most likely college students to 
be recruited by the Hezbollah through institutional structures.  
 
2.4 Recruitment Theories and Recruitment Patterns of Terror Organizations 
A clear understanding of the Turkish Hezbollah‟s recruitment process and tactics 
used that are revealed in my study may assist governments in developing effective 
strategies that will hinder the efforts of terrorist organizations to enlist more militants. 
Importantly, a combination of theories and overall patterns related to the recruitment 
tactics are also provided. 
According to Gerwehr and Daly (2006), terrorist organizations must use specific 
recruitment tactics given that there is little room for error and failure in the process that 
may lead to severe consequences for the terrorists. Because there is no single method that 
fits all terrorist organizations, their tactics may differ accordingly. As suggested by 
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Gerwehr and Daly, the following theoretical literature related to recruitment reveals a few 
common structures. 
 
2.4.1 The Political Process Model 
McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, (1996) stated that the political process model 
proposes three factors that scrutinize social movement: (a) the framing process, (b) 
mobilizing structures, and (c) the political process model.  
The framing process can create the perception of injustice toward a situation and 
the possibility of changing injustice through group work that may motivate people to 
participate in illegal movements. According to Qi (2005), mobilizing structures may 
facilitate the recruitment movement. Finally, political opportunity relates to the shifting 
power between challengers or participants of a social movement and the government. 
Thus, the stability problem may create power changes between these groups. 
  
2.4.2 Differential Recruitment Theory 
According to Snow, Zurcher, and Eklandolson (1983, the differential recruitment 
theory attempts to determine why one individual becomes involved in terrorist activities 
while another remains inactive. Qi (2005) inferred that micro structural factors such as 
personal and organizational ties and social networks are the most significant variables 
related to an individual‟s participation in social movements, and a personal connection 
between potential recruits, movement activists, and personal ties are the most common 
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predictors. According to this theory, the following process between recruiters and recruits 
includes:  
(1) Define the objectives for movement organizations or activities;  
(2) Define recruitment needs based on these objectives: whom and how many does  
the organization or the activity need to recruit to achieve the defined 
objectives?  
(3) Define the means of reaching the target population and solicit application;  
(4) Reach the target population and solicit applications with defined and 
undefined means;  
(5) The screening process;  
(6) Admission;   
(7) Applicants accept or reject admission; and   
(8) Evaluate the recruitment result and adjust recruitment strategies for the next 
round of recruitment (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987). 
Although there are some differences according to the society‟s cultural and 
sociological background, it is possible to observe that most of the tactics used by terrorist 
groups are similar. 
Gerwehr and Daly (2006) claimed that effective recruitment strategies should be 
based on the target and its social, historical, and cultural context. This is especially 
necessary for illegal and marginal groups given the consequences that getting caught may 
create severe results for the terror groups; thus, the possibility of making an error should 
be minimized.  Consequently, while terrorist groups maintain access to the target 
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population, nearly all groups must disguise their activities by changing their dress, 
meeting places, use of language, types of activities, and names to avoid any interference 
from official authorities. Although there are a vast variety of recruitment tactics, a review 
of empirical literature on terrorist groups reveals some basic structures.  
 
2.4.3 The Net Method 
In this pattern, the target population is equitably engaged. Some of the used 
recruitment strategies have included sending videotapes to every student or inviting them 
to weekend activities. This approach is often used when there is minor opposition in the 
target population to the terrorist organization. The net model is widely used by Al-Qaeda 
and has been proven more effective in Pakistan. My study is expected to find that the net 
model is also widely used by the Turkish Hezbollah through its legal structures. Similar 
to Al-Qaeda, the Turkish Hezbollah generally uses mosques to gather large populations.   
 
2.4.4 The Funnel Method 
The funnel model is used when a recruiter believes that a target population is ready 
for motivation and propaganda. Through this approach, identity building and validation 
of commitment are structured by the terrorist organization. This technique is effective 
within radically polarized groups.  
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2.4.5 The Infection Method 
Generally, a target population is isolated or may be very difficult for the terror 
organization to reach. To infiltrate within the target population, a trusted agent may be 
inserted into the group in order to have a direct and personal connection. This method is 
more likely to be successful in recruiting targets such as the military and police. For 
example, an infiltrator may covert selected targets who are dissatisfied with their jobs. 
The infection method is more successful in an environment such as Tanzania or Kenya. 
 
2.4.6 The Seed Crystal 
The target population may be so inaccessible that the trusted agent may not be put 
into this situation. In this case, recruiters may look forward to provide a context for self 
recruitment. If this method is successful in recruiting new militants, they often follow the 
infection pattern.  
Hamilton (2000) inferred that a low level of self-control and social control may 
combine to influence individuals to commit crime. According to Hamilton, inner (self 
components) and external (social structure) pressures and seductions lead to a path of 
deviant behavior. Parallel to the discussions on differential recruitment theory, 
Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) asserted that motivation towards crime is constant for 
every individual and his or her low social bonds compel these impulses. In my study, I 
infer that low self-control and social control change an individual‟s perception of social 
movements, and the change may cause the individual to be an easy target for terrorist 
organizations. Pinkley (2004) stated that poor, naïve single men who are desperate 
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individuals with low social bonds are vulnerable to brainwashing and recruitment into 
terror.  
In the social learning perspective, changes in rates of crime are largely dependent 
upon early learning experiences. This theory assumes that any individual who lives in a 
crime or terror-praised society is more likely to be recruited by criminal or terror groups. 
According to social learning theory, social structure plays a significant role in one‟s 
decision as to whether or not commit crime. As discussed by Vold et al. (2002), ideas and 
behaviors may be learned and those behaviors may be supportive of delinquency within a 
particular group. In my research, I expect that social networks will prove to have a very 
important influence on college students who live in the south eastern part of Turkey.  
 
2.5 Recruitment Strategies of Other Terrorist Organizations in the World 
In Gerwehr and Daly‟s (2006) study, how Al-Qaeda recruits its militants revealed 
that potential participants are generally persuaded through media channels, local 
networks (peer groups and relatives), or institutional structures (such as mosques and 
legally established college associations). According to Gerwehr and Daly, Al-Qaeda 
searches out people who are dissatisfied with their jobs or resentful toward police or 
military organizations. Media channels are used for organizing meetings and other 
activities to reach larger groups. Contrary to Al-Qaeda, media channels are less likely to 
be used by the Turkish Hezbollah considering the technological improvement of the 
region. Besides, Turkey has very strict rules that forbid media terrorism propaganda .   
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A recent study conducted in 2009 by the International Crisis Group revealed that 
the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), a separatist movement active in northern Malaysia 
(Wikipedia, 2009), recruits young Malay Muslims primarily from private Islamic 
schools. Contrary to my expectations, the Turkish Hezbollah recruits more militants from 
state colleges than from private ones, whereas BRN recruitment efforts are more effective 
in private colleges. According to the International Crisis Group, this difference stems 
from BRN‟s ideology that represents an ethno-nationalist insurgency which aims to 
reclaim independence of Patani Sultanate. Because BRN is nationalist terrorist 
organization, local private schools provide the organization with tremendous support.   
Similar to Al-Qaeda and BRN, the Turkish Hezbollah effectively uses social 
networks and institutional structures to recruit militants. When comparing BRN and Al-
Qaeda to the Turkish Hezbollah, Northern Malaysian inhabitants provide a great amount 
of support to BRN activities, and terrorism is praised within the society. Although the 
Turkish Hezbollah does not enjoy such strong support in the southeastern part of Turkey, 
having militants within any family has the Trojan effect for the Turkish Hezbollah. For 
example, after having militant(s) within any social group, other members become easy 
targets for the Turkish Hezbollah to recruit new militants. The religious role to respect 
elders is especially used as a tool to create effective propaganda within that group(s).   
Al-Qaeda‟s strategy to recruit new militants also has common similarities with the 
Turkish Hezbollah. Like Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah has well-organized legal structures that 
allows the organization to hold meetings and other social activities to create a chance to 
spread propaganda over crowded populations.   
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2.6 Religion and Terrorism 
The ideology of religious warfare not only gives individuals the illusion of 
empowerment, but also provides public attention and importance to the religious 
organizations and ideas. Although each of the terrorist groups has its own distinctive 
history and culture, they have three common ideologies (Juergensmeyer, 2002). First, 
they reject the idea of compromising with liberal values and secular institutions. Second, 
radical religious movements refuse secular society‟s boundaries that keep religion private 
rather than intruding into public life. Finally, religious movements attempt to create a 
new form of religiosity that rejects weak modern substitutes for the more vibrant and 
demanding forms of religion. 
Sageman (2004) contended that brotherhood, mutual sharing, and spiritual support 
are the basic tools of religious terrorist groups in recruiting new militants. Sageman 
added that the religious group causes a delineating function for its newly recruited 
militants in ways that are not seen within other rival political movements. Berman and 
Laitin (2008) concluded that contrary to other terrorist groups, a promise of rewards in 
the afterlife is one of the effective motivating forces for possible targets. I believe that 
religiosity level is one of the important variables that increase the likelihood of becoming 
recruited.      
Especially over the last decades, violent radical religious groups have become a 
serious global threat. Ozeren (2004) pointed out that although religious faith itself does 
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not cause violence and terrorist activities, it is, unfortunately, interpreted to justify an 
attack on social structure.  
Ideology and altruism play significant roles for religious terrorist groups. 
Especially during the first phase, commitment to terrorist organization‟s goals and 
spiritual benefits of supporting a good cause are sufficient incentives for many militants 
(Juergensmeyer, 2004).  
Similar to the definition of terrorism, there is no consensus in defining religious 
terrorism. According to Perlmutter (2004), each scholar has his or her own definition. 
Therefore, I prefer to use the Federal Bureau of Investigation and State Department‟s 
definition: 
“Religious terrorism is defined as any act of violence or threatened use of violence 
by a group or individual with the intent of intimidating individuals, citizens or 
governments in the furtherance of religious objectives.” 
Rapoport (1999) identified four waves of modern terrorism where each has its own 
ideological identity. In order to make a comparison between religious and other types of 
terrorism, it is useful to discuss these waves. According to Rapoport (2004) the following 
four waves illustrate the general ideological trends in terrorism over the past 130 years: 
• The wave of anarchist violence was anarchistic in character and is considered 
to be the first global terrorist experience. The main characteristics of this wave 
were political assassinations where terrorist groups were expected to ignite a 
popular uprising by targeting specific political representatives. According to 
the European Research Project (ERP) (2008), this wave was quite effective 
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that caused President Roosevelt to “ask in December 1901 for international 
treaties among all civilized powers to make anarchism a crime against the law 
of nations and to empower the federal government to deal with this crime.” 
According to ERP, this was the first call for an international battle against 
anarchist terrorism, 100 years prior to President George W. Bush‟s call for a 
war on religious terrorism.  
 
• The anticolonial wave emerged in the 1920s that stemmed from the Treaty of 
Versailles which was signed in 1919. After having victory against old 
empires, the European victors did not allow ethnic groups to have independent 
states. As a result, terrorist groups appeared in Palestine. The anticolonial 
wave diminished with the fall of the colonial empires in the 1950s. 
 
• The new-left wave emerged in the 1960s. According to ERP‟s report, the 
Western political climate that was characterized by the Vietnam War and cold 
war was the main reason for this wave. Terrorist groups were active in Latin 
America, the United States, and Europe. Political conflict within states caused 
terror groups to locate state sponsors such as Libya, Iran, and the Soviet 
Union for example. The end of the cold war that resulted in a decrease of state 
sponsored terrorism was the main reason behind the dwindling of this wave.  
 
• Religious wave: Rapport (2004) stated that the Iranian revolution and the 
invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union comprised the root causes of the 
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religious wave. For example, religion was used as an ideological justification 
to sustain terrorist attacks. Although there were other religions used as a tool 
to justify the terrorist attacks, most scholars argued that this wave was 
predominantly characterized by fundamentalist Islamist terrorism. The main 
specification in this wave was the existence of suicide terrorism.  
 
Thompson (2006) briefly schematized the differences between the third wave and 
fourth wave as shown in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2.  Comparing the differences between the third and fourth waves. 
 
Contrary to other terrorist groups, religious terrorist leaders encourage newly 
recruited militants to participate in terrorist violence by holding out the promise of 
heavenly rewards or retribution. Some militants choose to participate in terrorist activities 
because of the fear of being punished an after life. The leaders provide cash payments 
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after successful operations. They also promise to provide money to the families of 
martyrs in return for their deadly attacks (Juergensmeyer, 2004).  
According to Juergensmeyer (2004), when compared to other terrorist groups, 
religious terrorism is more violent and brutal because the leaders legitimize their actions 
as morally and spiritually right. Hoffman (1993) also concurred that approximately a 
quarter of all terrorist groups and half of the most dangerous groups in the world are 
motivated mainly by religious concerns.  
On the other hand, Emerson and Hartman (2006) contended that with 
modernization of the world, the role of religion becomes smaller and smaller while 
secularization becomes more socially acceptable, and religious faith becomes more 
individualized. Social life is regulated according to policies and procedures, 
administrative rules, science, et cetera. Contrary to the viewpoint of secularists, however, 
religion is resurging around the globe, and some religious people endeavor to fortify the 
borders of religion. Emerson and Hartman claimed that as fundamentalist movements can 
be found in the Middle East, Africa, North America, Asia, and Latin America, every 
religion can be used to justify terrorist activities.     
Moghaddam (2008) inferred that violent extremism is one of the leading problems 
in contemporary societies. According to Ozeren (2004), there should be three 
circumstances to motivate believers to shift their behaviors towards violent action: (a) 
perception of threat to believers‟ values; (b) theology should be transformed into a dogma 
produced through textual interpretation; and (c) violence should be embraced as a means 
for preserving faith in believers. 
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Noyon (2003) pointed out that Islam and democracy are compatible, and 
democratic participation encourages moderation. Noyon also maintained that the absence 
of democratic politics and Islamist violence are related.  On the other hand, Dalacoura 
(2006) stated that the casual link between the democratic deficit and Islamist terrorism is 
not proven and needs further research. According to Dalacoura, there is no simple casual 
relationship between democracy and terrorism in the world. In her study, she defined the 
following three types of Islamist terrorism. 
 
2.6.1 Transnational Islamist Terrorism: Al Qaeda  
The lack of political pluralism and opportunity for participation in the political 
system, civil liberties, and repression of the regimes are a few of the reasons for 
transnational terrorism.  
 
2.6.2 Islamist Terrorism and National Liberation: Hezbollah and Hamas 
Unlike transnational Islamist terrorism, Hezbollah and Hamas are complex 
political and social movements. For example, Hezbollah plays an increasingly important 
political and social role in Lebanon, and the organization participates in national elections 
as a political party that caused its leadership to move away from insisting on sharia law. 
Similar to Hezbollah, Hamas is a social and political movement as well as a terrorist 
organization. 
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2.6.3 Terrorism and domestic Islamist insurgencies: the Turkish Hezbollah and the 
Islamic Action Front 
These types of terrorism emerged in the context of domestic insurgencies against 
established governments. The political exclusion and repression of the Islamist 
movement created a casual link between terrorism and democracy. For example, 
excluding an indiscriminate repression of the Islamic Action Front (FIS) from the 
Algerian democratic system led some of its members to join radical Islamist groups.  
Similar to FIS, the Turkish Hezbollah believes that the Islamist movement was 
excluded from the Turkish political system. Velioglu, the founder and previous leader of 
the Turkish Hezbollah who was killed in 2000, stated that Muslims are merely oppressed 
by the current regimes, and if regimes are destroyed by Islamic movements and replaced 
by Islamic states, the problem would be solved to a great extent (Atalar, 2006). Similar to 
FIS leaders, Velioglu tried to participate in the Turkish political system; however, he did 
not get a chance to reveal his religious ideology to the broader public.  
Beginning in the 1980s, the Turkish Hezbollah emerged and attempted to address 
its ideological goals. According to Nugent (2004), the Turkish Hezbollah intended to 
replace the secular and constitutional Turkish state with an Islamic law (seriat) based 
state. To achieve this goal, the Turkish Hezbollah tried to get support from Iran and sent 
most of its leaders to Iran for military, political, and religious training. According to 
Hezbollah‟s ideology, there were three steps to be followed:  
• Propaganda (teblig): People should be persuaded to adopt Islamic rules that 
lead to Islamic state and administration.  
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• Community (cemaat): The community should be restructured according to the 
requirements of the first stage.  
• Armed struggle (jihad): The Islamic way of life should be safeguarded 
through armed struggle.  
Throughout history, terrorist groups have used not only Islam but also other 
religions as a justification for their vicious activities (George, 2006).  Consistent with 
George, I believe that terrorism is not a war for religion but a war for power. For 
example, religion is one of the most important tools used by terrorist organizations to 
obtain more power or to keep what power they have.  
In my study, I will discuss the importance of political participation to minimize 
terrorist activities through various ideologies. To me, the more that ideology takes part in 
the political system, fewer arguments will be used to legitimize terrorist activities appears 
to be a common consensus among scholars.  
 
2.7 Ideology of the Turkish Radical Islamic Movement 
According to Karmon (1998), most scholars agree that although Turkish Islam has 
many features with other Muslim countries in the region, its uniqueness lies in different 
political and social environments. For example, Turkish ideology is tied up with Turkish 
nationalism and includes the secularist components and European identification of 
Kemalism.  
Contrary to other religiously motivated terror organizations in other countries, the 
terrorist groups in Turkey have never attacked military or security personnel; however, 
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they lost numerous members in the antiterrorist campaigns led by the state. In addition, 
they have never attacked Western targets or acted abroad even though they have some 
infrastructure in Europe. 
Turkish security authorities outlined the objectives of the radical religious 
movements through the following three stages: 
First is the message to call people for an effort to adopt the Islamic religion to 
social life and establish an Islamic state and administration through the radicals to 
persuade the community.  
Second is to restructure the communities in accordance with the requirements of 
the first stage.  
Third is the struggle to safeguard the Islamic way of life.  
Interestingly, although religious motivated groups struggle for the constitution of 
an Islamic State, they use leftist slogans in their publications, and they accept ex-Marxists 
in their ranks.  
In the early 1990s, the PKK attempted to gain religious communities of Turkey‟s 
southeast region. To achieve this goal, they established organizations, namely the 
Kurdistan Imamlar Birligi – Association of Imams of Kurdistan – (imam = the official 
person assigned to each mosque). Ozeren and Van De Voorde (2006) argued that the 
PKK‟s attempt to become the major power in the region by gaining those communities 
resulted in a battle between the Turkish Hezbollah and the PKK. 
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2.8 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Although there are no scientific methods that can explain how the Turkish 
Hezbollah recruits more militants, two general methods have been used according to 
official Turkish records (Van Police Department, 2009): 
(a)  Institutional structures play one of the important roles to persuade an 
individual to join the Turkish Hezbollah. For example, institutional 
structures organize movie times, concerts, and other social activities. During 
these activities, possible candidates are linked to experienced Turkish 
Hezbollah militants.  
(b)  Social networks are another tool that the Turkish Hezbollah employ to 
effectively recruit new militants. Typically, Turkish Hezbollah members 
meet with their younger relatives in mosques where they attempt to 
convince the youngest to follow the philosophy of the Turkish Hezbollah in 
order to attract new members and thereby enhance their social standing 
within the organization. In other words, an individual is brainwashed and 
motivated through this strategy of sharing values and ideologies related to 
the Turkish Hezbollah.  
In regard to these two effective methods, I will provide answers to the following 
research questions: 
1. What methods are used to recruit college students into the Turkish 
Hezbollah, a religiously motivated terrorist organization? 
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2 What are the demographic profiles of the individuals who are recruited by 
the institutional structures and social networks?  
3. Does social control theory or social learning theory best explain the Turkish 
Hezbollah‟s most successful method of recruiting? 
My study focuses on Turkish Hezbollah militants who have already or are 
working on earning a college degree. They are either educated in their home towns or out 
of their home towns. To analyze how they were recruited, the total population consists of 
two main subpopulations: (a) those attending college in their home towns and (b) those 
who are away from home. Students who are educated away from their home towns and 
subsequently recruited by institutional structures of Hezbollah are considered to have 
weak social bond ties that support the assumptions of social control theory.  
College students who are educated in their home towns and recruited through 
their social networks will reveal that social networking is an effective tool for Hezbollah 
to recruit new militants and thus support the assumptions of social learning theory. 
Employing two major criminal justice theories─social control and social learning─five 
hypotheses were tested followed by information related to their expected results:  
 
H1:  Social networks and institutional structures are two general methods used 
extensively by the Turkish Hezbollah for recruiting new college student militants 
within universities.  
  I expect that the Turkish Hezbollah commonly recruits its militants through 
social and institutional structures. To test this hypothesis, 339 seized personnel 
records of recruited college students were used. Each Hezbollah member provided 
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accurate information pertaining to how they are recruited. The total population 
was included to determine whether social networks or institutional structures were 
used more frequently by the Hezbollah in recruiting new militants.   
 
H2:  Institutional structures have been used more effectively by the Turkish Hezbollah 
than social networks for recruiting new militants holding college degrees.
 Institutional structures include one of the effective tools used by the Turkish 
Hezbollah to recruit new militants. To test this hypothesis, all recruited college 
students were included in the model.  The results of my study are expected to 
reveal that social networks are a more effective way of recruitment; therefore, I 
anticipate that this hypothesis will be rejected.  
 
H3:  Social networks have been used more effectively than institutional structures of 
the Turkish Hezbollah for recruiting new militants holding college degrees.   
  One of Islam‟s important teachings requires younger individuals to respect 
their elders, a rule that is strictly enforced especially among relatives. The Turkish 
Hezbollah benefits from this teaching, and social networks play an important role 
for recruiting more militants. I believe that social learning theory best explains the 
effectiveness of Hezbollah militants to persuade college students to participate in 
criminal behaviors over their relatives. My study is expected to reveal that when 
compared to institutional structures; social networks are more effectively used by 
the Turkish Hezbollah to recruit new militants.   
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H4:  Social learning theory is more likely to explain how Turkish Hezbollah militants 
holding college degrees engage in the Turkish Hezbollah.  
   College students who have relatives and peer groups involved with the 
Turkish Hezbollah increases the likelihood of being recruited through social 
networks. In addition, society‟s perception of valuing terrorist activities increases 
this possibility.  
  
H5:  Social control theory is more likely to explain how Turkish Hezbollah militants 
holding college degree engage in the Turkish Hezbollah.  
 Although H5 appears to be similar to H2, the target population is different. 
Contrary to H2, I excluded two groups from the model.  
 First group is the college students who were with their families, had 
militants within their social networks, and were recruited through 
institutional structures are excluded from this hypothesis.  
 Second group is the college students who were away from their family, 
recruited in college, and had militants within their social networks  
 I expect that when compared to social control theory, a better explanation for 
Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategy will be social learning theory.  
 To test the hypotheses, the perspectives of social control and social learning 
theories are used. In the next chapter, my study is designed to determine the more 
effective method of recruitment as well as the variables that increase the likelihood of 
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recruitment. The methods section provides detailed information regarding the statistical 
techniques used in my study. 
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3 CHAPTER THREE: METHODS 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to identify tactics used by the Turkish Hezbollah to 
recruit college students into joining their terrorist organization. In this chapter, the 
methods used to examine the various recruitment strategies are described. The first 
section includes the research design, research questions, and hypotheses. In addition, a 
discussion relating to how each variable was operationalized is presented.  
The second section provides an in-depth discussion gathered from a unique 
dataset that describes the Turkish Hezbollah militants, how they were recruited, their 
economic profiles, whether any other militants exist within their social networks, if their 
college education was obtained in their home towns or away from their family, their 
ideology as well as their families, justification for joining the Hezbollah, and personal 
demographic characteristics.   
The third section describes the selected statistical analysis techniques and 
procedures used to examine the data. To reveal the best type of recruitment tactics used 
by the Hezbollah, a frequency table is applied to answer the first research question. Next, 
logistic regression is employed for the second and third research questions to determine 
important independent variables that influence the behavioral characteristics of recruited 
militants.  
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3.2 Research Design and Analyses Techniques 
Silke (2004) pointed out that empirical research on terrorism should be 
maximized and conducted from a broad perspective. According to Silke, fighting 
terrorism from the perspective that it is the work of madmen or the devil is a mistaken 
concept that not only weakens the war on terrorism but also provides propaganda tools 
for terrorist groups. More recently, Plumper and Neumayer (2010) claimed that 
measuring terrorism is notoriously difficult, because there are no precise definitions that 
distinguish terrorism from ordinary crimes or guerrilla warfare. Laqueur (2003) cautioned 
that the causes of terrorism, terrorists, and their motives have changed over time. In other 
words, there is a broad variety of terrorist organizations and groups with each having a 
different motivation, decision making structure, and psychology. Yilmaz (2009) also 
criticized research with methodological problems that have been unable to develop an 
understanding of terrorism, particularly from an exploratory, explanatory, and descriptive 
levels.  
The unavailability of militants is another drawback for scholars to propose 
effective policy recommendation. For example, empirical data on terrorism at both the 
group and individual levels are in short supply due to terrorist networks that are not 
accessible as pointed out by LaFree and Ackerman (2009). Although research related to 
the effectiveness of counterterrorism methods has grown rapidly over the last decade, it is 
still infrequently evaluated with strong empirical studies according to LaFree and 
Ackerman.  
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I believe that the explanatory and descriptive explanations in my study will add to 
the sparse body literature related to militant recruitment. My data contain detailed 
information regarding recruited college militants‟ ideological backgrounds, the ideologies 
of their families, when and where they were enlisted, the type of political motivations, the 
organization‟s structure that played the most important role in persuading them to join, 
and whether or not they were married at the time of recruitment.  
To address the research questions in my study, individual level secondary data 
related to members of the Turkish Hezbollah are used. The data are comprised of self 
reports that each member submitted to the Turkish Hezbollah as part of their recruitment 
process. The data are cross sectional given that each member was required to 
immediately hand in his or her own individual report. In a most generic sense, I utilized a 
quasi-experimental research design to address the research questions. 
Because I compared cases involving the probability that college students joined 
the Turkish Hezbollah through social networks or the terrorist organization‟s institutional 
structures, quantitative logistic regression methods were employed. The logic of using 
quantitative analysis was not difficult given that both dependent and independent 
variables can be measured through this data collection method. Finally, factors and 
certain variables that are expected to increase the likelihood of college students becoming 
recruited by the Turkish Hezbollah are discussed and explained. 
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3.2.1 Research Questions (RQ) and Hypotheses 
1. What methods are used to recruit college students into the Turkish Hezbollah, 
a religiously motivated terrorist organization? 
2. What are the demographic profiles of the individuals who are recruited by the 
institutional structures and social networks?  
3. Does social control theory or social learning theory best explain the Turkish 
Hezbollah‟s most successful method of recruiting? 
The statistical methods applied to each research question are shown in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1 Statistical Methods Used for Each Research Question 
 
Research Question 
1 
Research Question 
2 
Research Question 
3 
Frequency Table X  X 
Logistic 
Regression  X X 
 
    
3.2.1.1 Research Question One  
Research question 1 was designed to determine the methods used by the Turkish 
Hezbollah to recruit militants. In order to answer this question, every recruited student 
was included in the equation. I expect to show that the Turkish Hezbollah uses two 
general methods that may be through either social networks or institutional structures.  
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 The target population includes all students who either completed or attended 
college in their own home towns and those who completed or attended college away from 
their families. In my study, I infer that while the first group is vulnerable to be recruited 
through social networks, the second group is more vulnerable to be recruited through the 
Hezbollah‟s institutional structures.  
H1:  The Turkish Hezbollah uses two general methods to recruit college students: 
institutional structures and social networks. 
H2:  Using social networks is a more effective method in recruiting college 
educated militants when compared to institutional structures.  
In comparison to institutional structure methods, most militants are recruited 
through social networks. On the other hand, the Turkish Hezbollah effectively uses its 
legal structures to recruit college students who are pursuing an education away from their 
home towns. 
 
3.2.1.2 Research Question Two 
Although establishing the most frequently used recruitment methods provides 
valuable insight into ceasing the process, it is important to determine which variables 
increase the likelihood that college students will be recruited through either the Turkish 
Hezbollah‟s institutional structure or social networks. Those variables help to identify the 
demographic profiles of the terrorist organization‟s militants.  
In order to identify the significance of each variable in answering RQ 2, eight 
bivariate hypotheses were developed that propose a relationship between the more 
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frequently used recruitment methods and other factors, namely online or campus type of 
education; having militants within social networks; family‟s religiosity, attendance at a 
private or state university, family size, educated in home town or away from the family, 
and family‟s income.  
The strength of each IV‟s weight over the DV was tested through logistic 
regression in which the odds ratio of each variable was compared with others to 
determine which variables made a difference in recruitment methods. According to 
Garson (2010), the odds ratio can be summarized as the value of the independent variable 
that increases or decreases the log odds of the dependent variable.  
  
3.2.1.3 Research Question Three 
Research question 3 provides a better theory in explaining the various recruitment 
strategies used by the Turkish Hezbollah. To answer this question, the factors that 
influence vulnerable college students into joining the organization are identified 
according to two criminological theories: (a) social control theory and (b) social learning.  
However, students with the following characteristics were excluded from research 
question 3 due to the difficulty in determining from which perspective they were 
recruited: (a) those who stayed with their family during their college education and stated 
that they were recruited in college and had militants within the social structure; and (b) 
those who were away from their family during their college education and stated that they 
were recruited while away from the family but had militants within their social networks. 
 
(a) Social control perspective  
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Social control theory emphasizes the role of control in terms of counteracting 
delinquency and postulates that strong social bonds hinder delinquency whereas weak 
social bonds increase one‟s likelihood of committing crime. Therefore, students who 
displayed weak social bonds by being away from their family during their college 
education and did not have any militants within their social networks were considered to 
be recruited by the Turkish Hezbollah from the perspective of social control theory.  
 
(b) Social learning perspective 
Recruited students who were either with or away from their families during their 
college education and had Turkish Hezbollah militant(s) within their social networks 
were considered to be targeted and recruited from the perspective of social learning 
theory which postulates that people learn criminal behaviors through modeling the 
observations of others. 
H11: Social learning theory provides a better explanation regarding the Turkish 
Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategies when compared to social control theory.  
Initially, a frequency table is used to determine which theory best explains the 
Turkish Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategy, than independent variables are included in the 
equation to get their weight over the DV and develop hypotheses are tested. 
 
3.3 Independent Variables and Sources of Hypotheses 
For each independent variable, two hypotheses were developed. While the first 
developed for RQ 2 relates to the most frequently used recruitment structure (i.e., social 
networks or institutional structures), the second hypothesis developed for RQ 3 appears 
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to be the best theory in providing an explanation for the Turkish Hezbollah‟s recruitment 
strategy.  
 
IV1: Any_milt_wth_SN (having Hezbollah militants within the social network).   
Because terrorists organize themselves as secret networks in order to cover their 
unlawful activities, they use more stable and reliable sources to recruit new militants. 
Sageman (2004) inferred that family relations and peer groups are two important 
components that may lead an individual to join terrorist organizations. In Sageman‟s 
study of 172 militants, their biographical data revealed that other militants within their 
social networks made young Muslims more vulnerable for recruitment by terrorist 
organizations.  
Hypothesis 3 was developed to determine the effectiveness of the recruitment 
process when other militants exist within social networks. Through the level of this 
variable, I examined whether there was any significant difference in terms of being 
recruited through social networks or institutional structures. Logistic regression was 
utilized to describe the strength of association by either social networks or institutional 
structures by interpreting the odds ratio. Related hypotheses within IV1 include: 
H3: Having Hezbollah militants within one‟s social structure increases the 
likelihood of being recruited through social networks when compared to institutional 
structures. (Developed for RQ 2) 
H12: Having Hezbollah militants within peer groups or relatives increases the 
likelihood of being recruited through social learning theory assumptions when compared 
to social control theory assumptions. (Developed for RQ 3) 
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IV2: Wth_or_awy_frm_fmly (Pursuing college education while away from 
family). 
Gibbs (1989) stated that social control is a very important variable that increases 
or decreases the likelihood of being recruited by terrorist organizations. According to 
Gibbs, strong social control is a general deterrence to committing crimes. Given that 
terror groups often seek out easy targets, colleges represent preferred environments. 
Likewise, the Turkish Hezbollah uses a variety of institutional structures to recruit more 
militants within colleges. According to my own experiences, most legal or illegal 
structures of fundamentalist groups are especially active during the first month of each 
semester. These time periods provide a great opportunity to meet newcomers who are 
away from their families and in search of inexpensive shelter and food. The odds ratio 
and significance level of IV2 provides valuable information as to whether it will 
contribute to having a significant effect on the model. 
H4:  Pursuing a college education while away from one‟s family increases the 
likelihood of being recruited through institutional structures when compared to social 
networks. (Developed for RQ 2) 
H13:  Pursuing a college education while away from one‟s family increases the 
likelihood of being recruited through social control theory assumptions when compared 
to social learning theory assumptions. (Developed for RQ 3) 
 
IV3: Family ideology (Family‟s religious ideology). 
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First, it is necessary to mention that four main religions strictly condemn 
terrorism. However, this may be misinterpreted by religious groups to justify their 
activities. For example, Ozeren (2004) inferred that terrorist groups do not distinguish a 
direct relationship between religion and recruitment. Hypothesis 5 measures the 
vulnerability level of religious families compared to nonreligious families by using the 
odds ratio and significance level of logistic regression.  
H5: Being reared in families who have religious ideologies increases the 
likelihood of being recruited through social networks when compared to institutional 
structures. (Developed for RQ 2)  
H14: Being reared in families who have religious ideologies increases the 
likelihood of being recruited through social learning theory assumptions when compared 
to social control theory assumptions. (Developed for RQ 3) 
 
IV4: Online_camp (Having an online education). 
Students who receive online college education are with their families while 
pursuing their degrees.  From the social control perspective, being with families keep 
social bonds strong; thus, these groups of students are less likely to be recruited. Contrary 
to obtaining an online education, campus-educated students may be either with or away 
from their families. Hypothesis 6 compares the vulnerability between college students 
who have online versus campus educations.  
H6: College students who obtain a campus education are more likely to be 
recruited through institutional structures when compared to social networks. (Developed 
for RQ 2) 
126 
 
H15: College students who obtain a campus education are more likely to be 
recruited through social control theory when compared social learning theory 
assumptions. (Developed for RQ 3) 
 
IV5: Family_size (Family size). 
Yayla (2007) stated that family size is directly related to family control over 
siblings. In other words, crowded families have less chance to interact equally with each 
sibling. As a result, having more children in a family is expected to result in weak social 
bonds that are reasons why individuals may be more vulnerable for recruitment. If this 
hypothesis proves to be true, college students who come from large households, are away 
from their social networks, and have no militants within their social networks are more 
likely to be recruited through institutional structures due to weak social bonds.   
H7: The larger the family size, the more likely are college students to be recruited 
through institutional structures. Although they may remain with their families and have 
no militants within their social networks while pursuing their college education, they are 
still more likely to be recruited through institutional structures rather than social 
networks. (Developed for RQ 2) 
H16: The larger the family, the more likely are college students to be recruited 
through social control theory assumptions. Although they may be with their families and 
have no militants within their social networks while pursuing their college education, 
they are still more likely to be recruited through social control assumptions rather than 
social learning theory assumptions. (Developed for RQ 3)  
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IV6: Income_level (Income level). 
The Turkish National Police (TNP) researched 1,077 imprisoned and arrested 
terrorists in order to produce new procedures and tactics to fight and prevent terrorist 
activities. According to their findings, 70% of the respondents originated from lower 
level income groups when compared to the general population (Yayla, 2007). To identify 
the recruitment effectiveness of coming from low income level families, the vulnerability 
of this group in my study is tested by logistic regression. In other words, the odds ratio of 
the lower level family income group is compared to the odds ratio of the higher level 
family income group to determine whether there is a significant difference between 
recruitment through social networks or institutional structures.  
H8: Students who come from higher family income levels are less likely to be 
recruited by institutional structures when compared to social networks. (Developed for 
RQ 2) 
H17: Students who come from higher family income levels are less likely to be 
recruited through social control theory assumptions. (Developed for RQ 3) 
 
IV7: Militants_ideology (College student‟s religiosity level).  
This IV compares the types of „recruited religious students‟ (religious = 1) to 
„recruited nonreligious college students‟ (nonreligious = 0) according to the Hezbollah 
militants‟ self reports that provided detailed information regarding their religious life 
before joining the organization. The probability of college students‟ recruitment type is 
obtained through an odds ratio which is to help making comparison between the religious 
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college students and non religious depending on their religiosity level before joining the 
Turkish Hezbollah.  
H9: The religiosity level of college students is more likely to increase the 
likelihood of being recruited by institutional structures. (Developed for RQ 2) 
H18: The religiosity level of college students is more likely to increase the 
likelihood of being recruited through social control theory assumptions. (Developed for 
RQ 3) 
 
IV8: Pol_motiv (Reason for attending Hezbollah) 
Because the Turkish Hezbollah is a religiously motivated terrorist organization, 
my study will show that there is a significant difference between religion and other 
factors in terms of recruitment. This IV examines the weight of religion on the DV to 
determine whether there is a significant difference between being recruited through 
institutional structures or social networks.  
H10: Religious reasons increase the likelihood of being recruited through social 
networks. (Developed for RQ 2) 
H19: Religious reasons increase the likelihood of being recruited through social 
learning theory assumptions. (Developed RQ 3) 
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3.4 Measurements 
3.4.1 Dependent and Independent Variables  
3.4.1.1 Dependent variable (DV) 
Because RQ 1 reveals the most frequently used structure, only a frequency table 
was applied. In RQ 2, the dependent variable is the type of recruitment method used to 
reveal the effectiveness of the IVs. The findings of my study will show that most college 
students are recruited through social networks or institutional structures in which those 
methods are DVs. Accordingly, students who are recruited through social networks 
(social learning theory = 1) and those who are recruited through the Turkish Hezbollah‟s 
institutional structures (absence of social networks = 0) are expected to be DVs.  
Research question 3 examines the theories that provide a better explanation 
relating to the Turkish Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategies. Accordingly, the type of 
theories (1 = social learning, 0 = social control) that provide a better explanation 
encompasses the third research question‟s DV.  
 
(a) Social networks 
i- Friends   
Individuals satisfy their psychological and social needs within social groups by 
becoming members of reputable organizations, respected adults, being loved or loving, 
and establishing one‟s self (Centre of Excellence, 2008). As discussed earlier, social 
learning theory postulates that peers have a tremendous influence over their fellow 
colleagues, and this relationship can result in unexpected negative behaviors that may 
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lead to the commission crime(s). For example, young people may be influenced by their 
delinquent peer groups and become drug addicts or unconsciously find themselves within 
a terrorist organization. Through institutional structures, a majority of terrorist 
organizations attempt to recruit more militants by taking advantage of workplaces, high 
schools, universities, and neighborhood friendships.    
 
ii- Relatives 
Relative is a term that refers to people who are related to one another through 
blood or marriage and formed through marriage, birth, or adoption. Within these kinship 
ties, a social relationship is established and distinctions are created between them (Centre 
of Excellence, 2008).  
Regardless of whether Turkish people live in large cities or small villages, strong 
ties are connected to relatives. Self reported testimonies of recruited Turkish militants 
reveal that terrorist organizations take best advantage of these strong kinship 
relationships. 
  
(b) Local and regional institutions 
A Turkish person who is from the same part of a village, province, country, et 
cetera is referred to as a fellow countryman, a term that is generally used to create an 
opportunity to begin a friendship. Thus, terrorists use these institutional structures as an 
opportunity to effectively recruit more members. Generally, people who migrate from 
smaller cities to larger metropolis cities such as Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir for either 
immigration or educational purposes initially look for local legal institutions that can 
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provide benefits. Fellow countrymen play a significant role in these institutions by 
acquiring more college students who move to these metropolises. In other words, terrorist 
organizations take advantage of these relationships developed through local institutions 
(Centre of Excellence, 2008). 
Social and cultural activities that include tea parties, picnics, concerts, sporting 
activities, movies, meetings between friends, youth camps, et cetera are other methods 
that create opportunities for getting to know new people. Terrorist organizations prefer to 
recruit members through these kinds of activities that are generally sponsored by 
foundations, cultural centers, bookstores, associations, and political parties.  
 
3.4.1.2 Independent variables (IVs)  
a. Gender (IV1)  
As revealed by the Hezbollah organization‟s personal reports, males (1) are more 
likely than females (0) to become members. As indicated in the reports, females 
represented only 5% or 17 out of 339 college students. Given that the number of female 
militants is not significant, gender is therefore omitted from the discussion contained in 
the data analysis section of my study. According to Nachmias and Nachmias (2000) an 
inadequate sample size for the classified variables may not reflect the true value of a 
parameter. Thus, conclusions in my study would be difficult to make given the small 
female sample size. 
 
b. Location of college (IV2) 
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The second independent variable refers to students who are either attending 
colleges in their home town (1) or in a different city (0). The question to be answered is: 
“In pursuing a college education, does being away from social networks have a 
significant influence that increases the likelihood of being recruited by social 
institutions?”  
Location of college represents an important parameter in my study. Students who 
received a college education in their own home towns are grouped in order to determine 
the effectiveness of recruitment methods through social networks, and students who 
received their college education away from their home towns and have no relatives 
within the Turkish Hezbollah are grouped to determine the effectiveness institutional 
structures within the terrorist organization. Since all Hezbollah college militants provided 
detailed information in their self reports regarding how they were recruited, the data 
provide clear information concerning Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategies.   
If social control proves to be more accurate, the impact of this variable is 
expected to show that college students who were away from their families are more likely 
to be recruited through institutional structures versus those college students who 
remained with their families while pursuing a college education. In this case, my study 
will also reveal that the Turkish Hezbollah has established an effective institutional 
structure within colleges.  
On the other hand, if social learning theory proves to be more accurate, the 
location of college variable is expected to show that college students who are either with 
their families or away from their families are more likely to be recruited by social 
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networks. As discussed in the literature review, Turkey‟s region has strong social 
structures and having militants within social networks affect an individual‟s decision to 
join Hezbollah‟s terrorist organization.  
 
c. College type (IV3) 
College type includes private (0) and state (1) colleges. I anticipate that students 
attending private colleges are less likely to be recruited by the Turkish Hezbollah. In 
contrast to state colleges, private colleges are generally comprised of wealthier students 
who are typically less likely to be recruited. Private colleges are also equipped with more 
resources that allow closer follow-up relating to a student‟s progress, and relationships 
between their parents are generally stronger than students who attend state colleges. 
These advantages provide more opportunities for parents to keep sound family ties. 
However, the data reveal that none of the militants were recruited from private colleges. 
Because the sample size is inadequate, this variable is therefore excluded from my 
equation.  
If social control theory proves to be more accurate, my study is expected to show 
that the Turkish Hezbollah has fewer recruitment opportunities over private versus state 
colleges which also confirms that family members have more control over their children 
who attend private educational institutions. 
Conversely, if social learning theory proves to be more accurate, my study will 
most probably indicate that when recruiting militants, the Turkish Hezbollah is likely to 
prefer state over private colleges. Given that the majority of private colleges are profit-
seeking institutions which provide amenities to their students, they do not wish to tolerate 
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any illegal activities that may negatively affect their retention rate. Because private 
colleges also have strong networks designed to hinder the structured activities of terrorist 
organizations, state colleges versus private colleges represent the most favorable 
recruitment grounds. 
 
d. Online or campus education (IV4)  
There are two types of college education opportunities available in Turkey: (a) 
online (0) and (b) campus (1). Online education does not require a student‟s relocation to 
another city and therefore keeps the familial social networks strong. In other words, if 
there are no militants within the social networks of a student who obtains an online 
education, the chances of being recruited by the Hezbollah are significantly lower (social 
control theory). However, if an online educated student has relatives within the 
Hezbollah, the chances of also becoming recruited are significantly higher.  
In the event that social control theory proves to be more accurate, my study is 
expected to show that college students who have an online education as well as no 
militant relatives are more likely to be recruited by the Turkish Hezbollah through 
institutional structures.  
Conversely, in the event that social learning theory proves to be more accurate, 
my study is expected to show that college students who have relatives that are members 
of the Turkish Hezbollah are more likely to be recruited through the organization‟s social 
network regardless of whether they are with or away from their families.  
 
e. Family size (IV5) 
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 The fifth independent variable, family size, is based on the ratio of households to 
number of children. Within the eastern part of Turkey, families are typically large. For 
example, small families usually consist of less than four children whereas families having 
four to six children are considered to be average, and more than six children represent a 
large family size. According to Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990), the greater the number of 
children in a family, the greater is the likelihood that they will be delinquent. In my 
opinion, a smaller family size may decrease the probability of being recruited through 
institutional structures if a family does not have any relatives within the Turkish 
Hezbollah.  
If social control theory proves to be more accurate, college students who were 
reared in small families are less likely to be recruited by institutional structures than are 
those who were reared in a large family.  
However, if social learning theory proves to be more accurate, there will be no 
significant difference between college students who were reared in either large or small 
families.  
 
f. Family Income (IV6) 
The sixth independent variable, family income, corresponds to college students 
who come from either poor, average, or rich backgrounds. As the family‟s well-being of 
origin improves, it is believed that the probability of joining the Turkish Hezbollah will 
decrease. Likewise, recruited college educated militants who come from wealthy families 
are more likely to be recruited through social networks if they have militants within their 
social networks. I believe that an individual who has enough financial resources to 
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support his or her own needs when away from his or her family is less likely to make 
contact with institutional structures. In other words, the more likelihood recruitment 
scenario is through a militant‟s own social networks. In considering the average Turkish 
family monthly income, earnings are divided into the following three levels as identified 
by Erdogan (2002): (a) poor (< $1,200), (b) average ($1,201 to $3,500), and (c) rich (> 
$3,501)  
If social control theory proves to be more accurate, college students who come 
from rich family income levels are less likely to be recruited by the Turkish Hezbollah 
given that they generally prefer private colleges. Thus, having monetary independence is 
most likely to increase the likelihood of participating in social activities that, in turn, 
decreases the likelihood of being contacted by the Turkish Hezbollah. In this case, 
college students will be more likely to share common social norms and ideas that 
denounce terrorist activities. In my study, I presume that college students who are 
recruited through institutional structures are more likely to be from the low income 
group.  
On the other hand, if social learning theory proves to be more accurate, my study 
will more likely reveal that there is no significant difference between rich and poor 
college students given that crime is praised within social networks. 
  
g. Militants‟ ideological backgrounds (IV7) 
The seventh independent variable focuses on the ideological backgrounds of 
recruited Hezbollah militants who are identified as religious or nonreligious. In their self 
reports, recruited college students identified themselves as religious or non religious 
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depending on their daily religious practices. Hence, ideological level of the college 
students is identified as religious (1) versus non religious (0).  
I assume that religious college students will be more prone to propaganda and 
influenced by Hezbollah‟s institutional structures even if they do not have militants 
within the organization‟s social networks.  
If social control theory proves to be more accurate, religious college students who 
are away from their families while pursuing a college education will be more likely 
recruited through Hezbollah‟s institutional structures.  
However, if social learning theory proves to be more accurate, regardless of 
whether religious college students are with or away from their families, they will be more 
likely recruited through their social networks.  
 
h. Ideology of the family (IV8) 
The eight independent variables (IV8) include the recruited militant‟s family 
ideology. As previously mentioned, family has a tremendous influence over Kurdish 
originated individuals, and college students who were reared in a religious family are 
considered to be more supportive to religious principles. Although the literature does not 
support the idea that religious individuals are more prone to commit terrorist acts 
(Ozeren, 2004), it will be interesting to see the results of this variable. Like their 
religiosity level, college students also discussed their families‟ religious ideology and 
classified them as religious or non religious. Parallel to their religiosity level, recruited 
college students‟ families are identified religious (1) versus non religious (0).   
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If social control theory proves to be more accurate, college educated students who 
come from religious families will be more likely recruited through Hezbollah‟s 
institutional structure. 
 However, if social learning theory proves to be more accurate, college students 
who come from either religious families or nonreligious families will be more likely 
recruited through social networks.  
 
i. Having or not having militants within social 
networks (IV9) 
The ninth important independent variable (IV9) in my study represents whether or 
not militants exist within the social networks of college students that increases the 
effectiveness of social learning theory assumptions and social networks.  
If social control theory proves to be more accurate, college students who have 
militants in their social networks and are educated away from their family will be more 
likely recruited through the Hezbollah‟s institutional structures. 
 However, if social learning theory proves to be more accurate, college students 
who have militants in their social networks, whether with or away from their families, are 
more likely to be recruited through social networks.  
 
j. Political motivation to attend the Turkish 
Hezbollah (IV10) 
The tenth and final independent variable (IV10) includes reasons for joining the 
Turkish Hezbollah that is represented by the following explanations.   
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1 = Religion: People who believe there is no religious freedom; the Turkish State 
is against Islam. 
Religion is a set of beliefs that systematize supernatural powers which are sacred 
and include believing in God and worship. According to Islamic scholars, religion is a 
system of divine laws in which wisdom is conveyed to be a person‟s most beautiful and 
best thought through his or her own free will.  
Whether radical or not, Turkey has various understandings and movements that 
perceive and interpret Islam differently. According to the Centre of Excellence (2008), 
groups who make falsified religious interpretations recruit militants either through their 
institutional or social structures by using people‟s religious feelings (0 = Other reasons 
besides religion that people join the Turkish Hezbollah). 
Each college student militant has different reasons for joining the Turkish 
Hezbollah. However, because the Turkish Hezbollah is a religious organization, my study 
is expected to show that religion as an independent variable increases the likelihood of 
being recruited. Therefore, either social networks or institutional structures use religion 
as a strong variable to recruit more militants.  
If social control theory is more accurate, institutional structures of the Hezbollah 
will be used to recruit more militants by using the above arguments.  
If social learning theory is more accurate, social networks of the Hezbollah will 
be used to recruit more militants by using the above arguments.  
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3.5 Regression Equation  
Regression consists of one DV and eight IVs in which the IVs are applied for both 
the second and third research questions. To weigh the likelihood of each IV, logistic 
regression is used. Since my study is designed to determine the likelihood that the 
Turkish Hezbollah employs a particular type of recruitment, logistic regression best fits 
the model. According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), logistic regression can be used in 
the following four ways:  
(a) To predict a DV on the basis of continuous and/or categorical IVs; (b) To determine 
the percent of variance in the DV explained by the IVs; (c) to rank the relative 
importance of IVs; and (d) to assess the interaction effects and understand the impact of 
covariate control variable.  
        The following equation is used to calculate the IV‟s weight on the DV: 
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The likely predicted value is shown by Ŷ. In the dependent variable, there are two 
probabilities in the equation that militant college students are recruited either by social 
networking (1) or through institutional structures (0). Because “social networks” are 
represented by (1), the calculated likelihood shows the likelihood of social networks 
being used to recruit militants.  
To determine the power of each IV on the DV─predicting the dependent variable 
from the independent variables─I used the following equation: 
 U  =  a + b1X1 + b2X2 + b3X3 +…. 
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Mann-Whitney‟s U statistic is the probability of a college-educated militant 
becoming recruited by social networks. These estimates reveal the relationship between the 
IVs and the DV where the DV is on the logit scale. In addition, the amount of increase (or 
decrease, if the coefficient sign is negative) is revealed in the predicted logs of being 
recruited by social networks which shows that one unit will either increase or decrease in the 
IV, holding all other predictors constant. 
  
3.6 Population and Sample 
Nachmias and Nachmias (2000) stated that population or the aggregate of all 
cases, confirms the designated set of specifications. O‟Sullivan et al. (2003) further stated 
that it is impossible for large groups to contact every member in order to collect data 
besides requiring a tremendous commitment of both financial resources and time. The 
main purpose for sampling is to provide a conceptual basis to make accurate estimates for 
the entire population‟s values. According to Nachmias and Nachmias, sampling allows 
the researcher to gather information on a targeted group in a much shorter amount of time 
when the sample of the entire set is accurately represented.  
In my study, the population consists of 339 college students with Kurdish descent 
who were recruited by the Turkish Hezbollah. In 2000, the TNP confiscated the 
Hezbollah‟s database that consisted of 7,000 self reports submitted by college educated 
militants of which I gained access to 339 of them. Because it is compulsory for every 
member to submit their self reports upon recruitment, I dealt with the entire target 
population which represents my sample. The research questions focus on how these 
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educated militants were recruited through either the Turkish Hezbollah‟s institutional 
structures or the militants‟ own social networks? 
Considering the strong family ties that are prevalent in Turkey‟s southeastern part 
and highly populated by Kurdish-origin citizens, the Hezbollah recruits more militants 
through social networks that are best explained by the social learning theory. On the other 
hand, Hezbollah uses its legal structures to recruit college students who are pursuing an 
education away from their home towns. In my study, I examined whether the Hezbollah 
really, in fact, does use its legal structures effectively to recruit college educated 
militants. Social control theory is tested in this group to determine if Hezbollah‟s 
recruitment methods either support or do not support the theory.  
 
3.7 Data Collection and Instrument 
For my study, I used secondary data collected for a specific purpose. by the 
Turkish Hezbollah According to O‟Sullivan et al. (2003), secondary data offers a 
researcher the following four advantages: (a) reduces costs, (b) enables studies to be 
conducted that are otherwise impractical, (c) is helpful for comparative and longitudinal 
studies, and (d) is a necessary element for an open science. 
The Turkish Hezbollah collected self reported data from its members as a means 
of gaining more insight about the organization and its members. Without these data, it 
would have been practically impossible to gain the necessary knowledge concerning 
Hezbollah‟s recruitment tactics. Thus, conducting a survey with Hezbollah members 
would not be feasible to reveal organization‟s recruitment tactics. I obtained pertinent 
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data from Hezbollah database records retained by the Turkish National Police 
Intelligence Department in 2000.  
  
3.8 Limitations 
As is true with other data collection methods, secondary data analysis has certain 
limitations as summarized by Nachmias and Nachmias (2000):  (a) the data may not 
include all instruments that researchers hope to find;  (b) researchers may have difficulty 
in obtaining access to reach data that contain variables of interest because the original 
investigator may not release information; and (c) if the researcher has insufficient 
information concerning how data are collected, internal and external validity difficulties 
may arise when determining potential sources of bias, errors, or problems.  
Although it is not clear how many Hezbollah militants actually exist in Turkey, 
after the 2000 police raid against the Turkish Hezbollah leader, 7,000 militants‟ self-
reports were seized together with other important information regarding the organization. 
Because the TNP used that information to eliminate Hezbollah‟s power, the terrorist 
organization has subsequently taken more effective cautions to conceal its activities. 
Thus, beginning from 2000 to the present, the TNP does not have access to the latest 
information concerning the organization. 
 
3.9 Data Analysis 
Data were analyzed through frequency tables and logistic regression analysis in 
which three research questions were applied:  
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• Research question 1 was designed to establish the Turkish Hezbollah‟s 
recruitment strategies among college educated Hezbollah militants. The data 
are expected to reveal that the terrorist organization utilizes two main 
recruitment tactics: social networks and institutional structures. To determine 
which recruitment structure is more effective, percentage scale frequency 
tables are used.  
•  In research question 2, to obtain the weight of eight IVs over the DV, eight 
hypotheses were developed and tested by applying logistic regression to the 
equation.   
• Although the same statistical method used for RQ 2 was applied to the third 
research question, the target population was different from RQ 2. For RQ 3, 
college students who had the following specifications were excluded from my 
study because it was not clear as to whether the militant was, in fact, recruited 
through institutional structures.  
Group 1 (N = 4): College students who were with their families when 
pursuing a college education, were recruited in college, and had/have 
militants within their social networks (institutional structure efficiency).   
Group 2 (N = 8): College students who were away from their family when 
pursuing a college education, were recruited in college, and had/have 
militants within their social networks (institutional structure efficiency).  
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Similar to Group one, I had difficulty in identifying the precise 
reasons that lead an individual to participate in Hezbollah‟s terrorist 
organization. 
Through RQ 3, Hezbollah‟s recruitment methods were examined 
to determine whether social control theory or social learning theory best 
explain the process. Similar to RQ 2, the weight of eight independent 
variables were tested through logistic regression and a comparison 
between the first and second model are provided.  
    
3.10 Reliability and Validity 
Babbie (2007) maintained that reliability is the matter of a particular technique 
that yields the same results each time when applied to the same object. My dataset 
includes a self reported form that obtained information concerning Turkish Hezbollah 
militants‟ families, backgrounds, and how they were recruited. I have no reason to 
believe that the data are unreliable given that the form was written in clear and easy to 
understand questions for every militant. Besides, these reports were prepared for the 
terrorist organization itself and not for the police. Since the Turkish Hezbollah is a 
religiously motivated organization, it is believed that every member provided accurate 
information.  
Nachmias and Nachmias (2000) stated that validity refers to the following 
question:  “Am I measuring what I intend to measure?” (p. 149).  In my study, I searched 
for the answer to how the Turkish Hezbollah recruits its militants. Since every militant‟s 
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self reports provided detailed information about how they were recruited, I believe that 
those reports will help to identify the Turkish Hezbollah‟s recruitment techniques that 
may further hinder their operations.
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4 CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
This chapter is comprised of the statistical methods that were run to answer the 
research questions.  
To answer the first research question, a frequency table was used to determine the 
Turkish Hezbollah‟s most commonly used structure to recruit college students:  “What 
methods are used to recruit college students into the Turkish Hezbollah, a religiously 
motivated terrorist organization?”  
To answer the second research question, demographic details of the recruited 
college students were identified through the use of logistic regression: “What are the 
demographic profiles of the individuals who are recruited by the institutional structures 
and social networks?” Eight IVs were included in the model, and their weight over the 
DV was also tested using logistic regression.  
In answer to the third research question which is “Does social control theory or 
social learning theory best explain the Turkish Hezbollah‟s most successful method of 
recruiting?” a frequency table and logistic regression were used. Comparing to RQ 1 and 
RQ 2, the sample size of RQ 3 was different from them. After applying these methods, in 
terms of assess the each IV‟s weights on the DV, I compared the results of independent 
variables that are used in RQ 2 and RQ 3.  
4.1 Research Question One 
What methods are used to recruit college students into the Turkish 
Hezbollah, a religiously motivated terrorist organization? 
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4.1.1 Frequency Table for Research Question One  
Frequency tables provide graphical displays and statistics that are useful for 
describing many types of variables (SPSS, 2007). For the first research question, a 
frequency table was developed to determine the Turkish Hezbollah‟s most frequently 
used method to recruit college students. Using this frequency procedure, 339 college 
students were included in my study as shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2.  Frequency Table for Research Question One 
Institutional Structure (IS) vs. Social Network (SN) Recruitment 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Institutional Structure 
(IS) 
155 45.7 45.7 45.7 
Social Network (SN) 184 54.3 54.3 100.0 
Total 339 100.0 100.0  
 
  
Hypotheses 1 and 2 
H1:  The Turkish Hezbollah uses two general methods to recruit college students: 
institutional structures and social networks. 
H2:  Using social networks is a more effective method in recruiting college 
educated militants when compared to institutional structures.  
Among 339 college educated students, 184 (54.3%) were recruited through social 
networks (SN) and 155 (45.7%) were recruited through institutional structures (IS). The 
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data revealed that none of the students were recruited by any other methods. Parallel to 
my expectations, SN and IS are two of the most important recruitment tools used by the 
Turkish Hezbollah. When the methods of recruitment were compared between the two 
groups of students, social networks rather than institutional structures proved to be the 
most preferred method as depicted in Figure 3. As noted in the literature review, peer 
groups and relatives have a tremendous influence over the younger population in the 
southeastern part of the Turkey. 
 
Figure 3. Frequency of recruitment through institutional structures or social networks. 
 
4.2 Research Question Two  
What are the demographic profiles of the individuals who are recruited by the 
institutional structures and social networks?  
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 Logistic regression was used to obtain the demographic details of college 
educated Hezbollah militants in which eight IVs were included in the equation. Through 
logistic regression, each IV‟s weight on the DV are discussed in addition to their effects 
on the likelihood of being recruited through either IS or SN. The eight variables in the 
equation included: (a) having or not having any militants within social networks 
(any_milt_wth_SN); (b) being away from or with family while pursuing a college 
education (wth_or_awy_frm_fmly); (c) ideology of the family (famly_ideolgy); (d) 
having an online or campus education (online_cam); (e) family size (family_size_grp); 
(f) income level of family (income_level); (g) militants‟ ideologies (militants_ideology); 
and (h) political motivation (pol_motiv). The DV for the equation was the type of tactics 
used by the Hezbollah to recruit college educated militants. 
 
4.2.1 Logistic Regression for Research Question Two 
In order to predict the categorical DV with two or more categories, logistic 
regression helped to test the models. Hypotheses 3 through 10 were tested through binary 
logistic regression in which the effect of each IV over the DV is discussed according to 
their coefficient values (B) and odds ratios (exp[B]). In my study, a dichotomous 
dependent variable included two categories, either institutional structures or social 
networks.  
In order to help determine the percent of variance in the DV explained by the IVs, 
logistic regression was the method used to predict a DV through continuous and/or 
categorical independent variables. Through this statistical model, it was also possible to 
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rank the relative importance of IVs in order to assess the interaction effects and to 
understand the impact of covariate control variables. According to Garson (2010), odds 
ratios help to show the impact of predictor variables.  
In my study, two categorical independent variables were included in the model: 
income_level (income level) and family_size_grp (family size). The „Forced Entry 
Model‟ was used to assess the predictive ability of the IVs while controlling for other 
predictor effects in the model.  
 
4.2.1.1 How well does the model reveal the Turkish Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategies?  
According to outputs derived from SPSS, my study consisted of 339 samples with 
no missing cases in the data as shown in Table 3. Table 4 further reveals that the model 
had a discrete DV containing two original values that were defined according to the type 
of recruitment tactics used by the Hezbollah, either institutional structures or social 
networks.  
 
Table 3.  Case Processing Summary for RQ 2 
Unweighted Cases
a
 N Percent 
Selected Cases Included in Analysis 339 100.0 
Missing Cases 0 .0 
Total 339 100.0 
Unselected Cases 0 .0 
Total 339 100.0 
a
If weight is in effect, see classification Table 6 for the total number of cases. 
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Table 4.  Dependent Variable Encoding for RQ 2 
Original Value Internal Value 
Institutional Structure (IS) 0 
Social Network (SN) 1 
 
After defining the variables that were included in the equation of my study, SPSS 
provided an additional table which revealed two categorical variables in the 
equation─family size and family income level (UCLA, 2010) (see Table 5). According to 
the coding, family size was grouped into three categories: (a) small (N = 25), (b) average 
(N = 141), and large (N = 173).  Family income level also consisted of three categories:  
(a) poor (N = 195), (b) average (N = 119), and rich (N = 25). 
 
Table 5.  Categorical Coding of Variables for RQ 2 
 
Frequency 
Parameter Coding 
(1) (2) 
Family Size Small Family Size  25 1.000   .000 
Average Family Size 141   .000 1.000 
Large Family Size 173   .000   .000 
Income Level Poor 195 1.000   .000 
Average 119   .000 1.000 
Rich  25   .000   .000 
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In terms of classification, Table 6 reveals that 184 out of 339 college students 
were recruited through social networks and 54.3% were recruited through social 
networks.  
 
Table 6. Classification Table
a, b 
for RQ 2 
 
Observed 
                Predicted 
 Institutional Structure or 
Social Network 
Percentage 
Correct 
 Institutional 
Structure 
Social 
Network 
Step 0 Institutional 
Structure (IS) or 
Social Network (SN) 
IS 0 155 .0 
SN 0 184 100.0 
Overall Percentage   54.3 
a
Constant is included in the model; 
b
Cut value = .500 
 
 
Table 7 represents the small model that excludes IVs. Here, p = .116 or a 
significance level that revealed the model was not statistically significant at the .05 level. 
Since IVs were excluded, explaining the model was therefore not feasible.  
 
Table 7.  Variables in the Equation for RQ 2 
 B  SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 0 Constant .172 .109 2.475 1 .116 1.187 
 
 In general, the Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients depicted in Table 8 
explained the model‟s statistical significance in relation to the IVs. As shown, statistics 
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for the step, model, and block were identical because stepwise logistic regression or 
blocking was not utilized. The value given in the Sig. column represents the probability 
of obtaining a chi-square statistic to determine whether or not the null hypothesis was 
true. In the model, chi-square equaled a high of 190.621 which was significant for 10 
degrees of freedom (df) at the .000 significance level.  
 
Table 8.  Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients for RQ 2 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
 
Step 1 
       Step 190.621 10 .000 
Block 190.621 10 .000 
Model 190.621 10 .000 
 
The summary illustrated in Table 9 provides information concerning the model‟s 
usefulness. In other words, the predicted power of the model was explained by the IVs. 
The Cox and Snell R
2 
and Nagelkerke R
2
 values show the amount of variation in the DV 
explained by the model.  Cox and Snell R
2 
had a value of .430, while Nagelkerke R
2
 had 
a value of .575. According to Cox and Snell‟s R
2
, 43% of the variability was explained 
by this set of variables. In addition, Nagelkerke R
2
 suggested that 57.5% of the variability 
was explained by this set of variables.  
 
Table 9.  Model Summary for RQ 2 
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R
2
 Nagelkerke R
2
 
1 276.849
a
 .430 .575 
a
Estimation terminated at iteration 5 since parameter estimates changed by  < .001. 
 
155 
 
Table 10 represents an output classification for dichotomous DVs. As shown, the 
columns reveal the two predicted DVs while the rows indicate the two observed DV 
values. The model had an 83.8% correct rate (76.1%, institutional structures; 90.2%, 
social networks.  
 
Table 10.  Classification Table
a 
for RQ 2 
 
Observed 
             Predicted 
 Institutional Structure or Social 
Network 
Percentage 
Correct 
 Institutional 
Structure  
Social 
Network  
Step 1 Institutional 
Structure (IS) or 
Social Network 
(SN) 
IS 118 37 76.1 
SN 18 166 90.2 
Overall Percentage   83.8 
a
Cut value = .500. 
 
4.2.1.2 Interpreting the meaning of each coefficients (associated with IVs) and              
comments on the statistical significance of each coefficient 
Logistic regression coefficients simply illustrate the change in the predicted 
logged odds of experiencing an event or having a characteristic for a one unit change in 
the IVs. The coefficients had the exact same interpretation as the coefficients in 
regression other than the DV units of represented logged odds (Garson, 2010).  This 
model‟s output is presented in Table 11 in which each coefficient‟s power and 
hypotheses were interpreted as follows. 
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Hypothesis 3 
H3: Having Hezbollah militants within one‟s social structure increases the 
likelihood of being recruited through social networks when compared to institutional 
structures. 
The logistic regression coefficient revealed that a one unit increase for having 
militants within social networks (any_milt_wth_SN) increased the logged odds of being 
recruited through social networks by 2.857 while holding others constant. This 
coefficient was both significant and different than 0 (p = .000). Due to the one unit 
change in having militants within social networks, the Exp(B) was 17.415 signifying that 
a positive value (e
any_milt_wth_SN
 – 1 = 16.415) increased nearly 16 times for the 
likelihood of college students being recruited through social networks. 
The model indicated that rejecting the null hypothesis was true at the p = .05 level 
of significance. Parallel to the literature review, most recruited college students are 
statistically and significantly affected by their social networks. My study also supported 
the assumption that family relations and peer groups may lead an individual to join 
terrorist organizations, specifically the Hezbollah. Considering the strong social familial 
ties in the eastern part of Turkey, college educated individuals were more likely to be 
recruited through social networks if they had or have militant relatives involved in the 
Hezbollah. Compared to other independent variables in the equation, having militants 
within social networks had a greater effect that increased the likelihood of being recruited 
into the terrorist organization through social networks.  
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Hypothesis 4  
H4:  Pursuing a college education while away from one‟s family increases the 
likelihood of being recruited through institutional structures when compared to social 
networks. 
The logistic regression coefficient for being with or away from one‟s family while 
pursuing a college education (wth_or_Awy_frm_fmly) revealed that a one unit increase 
for this variable increased the logged odds of being recruited through social networks by 
.882 while holding others constant. The coefficient for being with or away from one‟s 
family was both significant and different than 0 (p = .016). Due to a one unit change in 
being with or away from one‟s family, Exp(B) indicated that a negative value 
(e
wth_or_awy_frm_fmly
 – 1 = .586) decreased the likelihood of being recruited through social 
networks by 41.4%. 
In addition, whether with or away from one‟s family while pursuing a college 
education was another variable that had a significant effect upon the likelihood of being 
recruited by the Hezbollah through either institutional structures or social networks. Even 
if college students had no militants within their social networks, they were recruited when 
they were away from their families. Parallel to the literature review, strong social control 
is a general crime deterrence in which the Turkish Hezbollah‟s institutional structures 
take advantage of college students who are distanced from their families.  
 
Hypothesis 5 
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H5: Being reared in families who have religious ideologies increases the 
likelihood of being recruited through social networks when compared to institutional 
structures. 
The logistic regression coefficient revealed that a one unit increase for family 
ideology (famly_ideolgy) increased the logged odds of being recruited through social 
networks by .107 while holding others constant. The coefficient for family ideology was 
not significant or different than 0 (p = .753). Due to a one unit change in family ideology, 
the Exp(B) positive value (e
famly_ideolgy
 – 1= .113) was 1.113 indicating that there was an 
11.3% increase in the likelihood of being recruited through social networks.   
 A review of the literature suggested that there was no link between religious 
ideology and terrorism. For example, Pape (2005) researched suicide bombings from 
1980 to 2003 and concluded that media news coverage regarding suicide bombings were 
profoundly misleading. Contrary to the public‟s general perception, suicide terrorism 
stems from political rather than religious conflicts according to Pape. Sheehan (2000) 
also claimed that terrorists portray their causes in religion and cultural terms; however, 
this is only a tactic to conceal their political goals.  
The family ideology variable revealed that both institutional structures and social 
network methods had no significant difference in the Hezbollah‟s recruitment of college 
students. In other words, being reared in a religious family did not significantly 
contribute to either types of recruitment.   
 
Hypothesis 6 
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H6: College students who obtain a campus education are more likely to be 
recruited through institutional structures when compared to social networks. 
The logistic regression coefficient for online or campus education (online_camp) 
revealed that a one unit increase decreased the logged odds of being recruited through 
social networks by -.797 while holding others constant. The coefficient for online or 
campus education was significant as well as different than 0 (p = .037).  Due to the one 
unit change in online or campus education, the Exp(B) of having campus education had a 
negative value of  .451 (e
online_camp
 – 1 = -.549) or a 54.9% decrease in the likelihood of 
being recruited through social networks.  
Consistent with the literature, a significantly higher number of campus educated 
college students were recruited through institutional structures rather than social 
networks. This also confirmed two important issues: (a) College students who pursue an 
online education are recruited through social networks significantly more frequently 
when family militants participate in terrorist organizations; and (b) college students who 
are with their families and have no militants within their social network are less likely to 
be recruited through social networks. This variable is another indicator that strong social 
bonds decrease the likelihood of recruitment and also confirm that college students who 
are away from their families are more likely to be recruited through institutional 
structures. Running a cross tabulation between recruitment type and online or campus 
education might help to develop a clear picture regarding this relationship for H6 and 
identify the most effective recruitment methods.  Table 11 presents a summary of the 
variables in the equation. 
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Table 11. Variables in the Equation for RQ 2 
 B SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step
a
 Having Hezbollah militants 
within Social Networks 
 
2.857 
 
.373 
 
58.768 
 
1 
.000 17.415 
Being away from family 
during college education 
 
-.882 
 
.366 
 
5.800 
 
1 
.016 .414 
Family Ideology .107 .339 .099 1 .753 1.113 
Online or Campus Education -.797 .382 4.352 1 .037 .451 
Family Size   4.522 2 .104  
Family Size (1) .665 .601 1.224 1 .269 1.944 
Family Size (2) .677 .333 4.147 1 .042 1.969 
Income Level   2.479 2 .289  
Income Level (1) -.961 .645 2.220 1 .136 .383 
Income l=Level (2) -.702 .663 1.120 1 .290 .496 
Militant‟s Ideology -.201 .343 .341 1 .559 .818 
Political Motivation -.716 1.039 .474 1 .491 .489 
Constant .557 1.238 .202 1 .653 1.745 
a
Variable(s) entered in step 1: Any_milt_wth_SN, Wth_or_Awy_frm_Fmly, Famly_ideolgy, Online_camp, Family_Size_grp, 
Income_level, Militants_ideology, Pol_motiv. 
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As illustrated in Table 12, Pearson‟s chi-square value was rather high with a 
significant relationship (p = .000). Among the 96 militant students who pursued online 
educations, 84.4% were recruited through SN and 90.3% who had campus educations 
were recruited through IS as shown in Table 13. This result was parallel to my 
expectation that college students who pursued online educations were more likely to be 
recruited through social networks. Because they were with their families, the likelihood 
of being recruited through institutional structure was extremely low that may be 
explained through the assumptions of social learning and social control theories. For 
example, if an individual has a militant within his or her social networks and stays with 
his or her family, he or she is more likely to be recruited through social networks rather 
than institutional structures. Likewise, if an individual is away from his or her family, he 
or she is more likely to be recruited through institutional structures unless there is a 
militant within his or her social network. 
 
Table 12. Chi-square Tests for Hypothesis 6 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson‟s chi-square 48.886 1 .000   
Continuity correction 47.208 1 .000   
Likelihood ratio 53.044 1 .000   
Fisher‟s Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-linear 
Association 
48.741 1 .000 
  
N of valid cases 339     
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Table 13. Recruitment Type and Campus Education for Hypothesis 6 
Institutional Structure (IS) or Social Network (SN) * Online or Campus Education Crosstabulation 
 
Online or Campus Education 
Total 
Online 
Education 
Campus 
Education 
Institutional Structure (IS) or 
Social Network (SN) 
Institutional 
Structure (IS) 
Count 15 140 155 
% within Institutional Structure (IS) or 
Social Network (SN) 
9.7% 90.3% 100.0% 
% within Online or Campus Education 15.6% 57.6% 45.7% 
% of Total 4.4% 41.3% 45.7% 
Social Network 
(SN) 
Count 81 103 184 
% within Institutional Structure (IS) or 
Social Network (SN) 
44.0% 56.0% 100.0% 
% within Online or Campus Education 84.4% 42.4% 54.3% 
% of Total 23.9% 30.4% 54.3% 
Total Count 96 243 339 
% within Institutional Structure (IS) or 
Social Network (SN) 
28.3% 71.7% 100.0% 
% within Online or Campus Education 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 28.3% 71.7% 100.0% 
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Hypothesis 7  
H7: The larger the family size, the more likely are college students to be recruited 
through institutional structures. 
Family size (Family_size) represented a categorical variable comprised of three 
categories: (a) small, (b) average, and (c) large. A large family size was coded as “3” in 
which logistic regression kept the higher valued category reference by default. According 
to the .05 significance level, family size did not overall affect the DV and was therefore 
not significant (p =.104).  
Hence, the large size family reference variable was possible to compare with the 
small and average size family. Accordingly, the odds of being reared in an average family 
compared to a large one was increased by a factor of 1.96 when controlling for other 
variables in the model. Likewise, the odds of being reared in a small family when 
compared to a large family was increased by a factor of 1.94 when controlling for other 
variables in the model.  
In relation to the significance level, family size did not have any significant 
influence that increased the likelihood of being recruited for either institutional structures 
or social networks. However, in order to determine which group was highly recruited by 
each structure, cross tabulation must be applied to develop a clear picture of the 
recruitment type according to family size.  
As shown in Table 14, cross tabulation revealed that 51% of the recruited college 
educated militants came from large families, 41.6% came from average size families, and 
only 7.4% were reared in small size families. 
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Table 14. Crosstabulation for Hypothesis 7 
Institutional Structure (IS) or Social Network (SN) * Family Size Group Crosstabulation 
 
Family Size Groups 
Total Small Family Size 
Average Family 
Size Large Family Size 
Institutional Structure (IS) or 
Social Network (SN) 
Institutional Structure (IS) Count 12 58 85 155 
% within Institutional Structure 
(IS) or Social Network (SN) 
7.7% 37.4% 54.8% 100.0% 
% within Family Size Groups 48.0% 41.1% 49.1% 45.7% 
% of Total 3.5% 17.1% 25.1% 45.7% 
Social Network (SN) Count 13 83 88 184 
% within Institutional Structure 
(IS) or Social Network (SN) 
7.1% 45.1% 47.8% 100.0% 
% within Family Size Groups 52.0% 58.9% 50.9% 54.3% 
% of Total 3.8% 24.5% 26.0% 54.3% 
Total Count 25 141 173 339 
% within Institutional Structure 
(IS) or Social Network (SN) 
7.4% 41.6% 51.0% 100.0% 
% within Family Size Groups 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 7.4% 41.6% 51.0% 100.0% 
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In terms of each recruitment method, family dispersion according to the 
institutional structure included the following: 54.8% of the recruited militants were from 
large families, 37.4% were from average size families, and a mere 7.7% were from small 
size families. 
The social network‟s family dispersion revealed that 47.8% of the recruited 
militants were from large families, 45.1% were from average size families, and only 
7.1% were from small size families. 
In sum, within small size families, approximately 48% of the college educated 
militants were recruited through institutional structures whereas approximately 52% were 
recruited through social networks. Within average size families, the Hezbollah recruited 
41.1% of the college educated militants through their institutional structures and 58.9% 
through social networks. Finally, within large size families, while 49.1% of the college 
educated militants were recruited through Hezbollah‟s institutional structures, 50.9% 
were recruited through social networks. 
According to the Turkish Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategies, these statistics reveal 
that there is no significant difference between family size and being recruited by either 
social networks or the institutional structures.  
 
Hypothesis 8 
H8: Students who come from higher family income levels are less likely to be 
recruited by institutional structures when compared to social networks. 
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Income level (Income_level) was another categorical variable that consisted of 
three categories: (a) poor, (b) average, and (c) rich. Garson (2010) inferred that 
categorical variables should be interpreted according to the omitted reference category 
similar to OLS regression. Because logistic regression keeps the higher valued category 
as a default reference, rich was used as the reference variable to make a comparison 
between poor and average income families. In comparison to rich families, the odds of 
being from a family with average economic power was decreased by a factor of .496 
when controlling other variables in the model. Likewise, the odds of being from a family 
with poor economic power when compared to rich families was decreased by a factor of 
.383 when controlling other variables in the model.  
Parallel to the literature, there was no significant difference between institutional 
structure and social networks in terms of recruitment strategies used by terrorists. 
Krueger and Maleckova (2003) claimed that any connection between education, poverty, 
and terrorism is complicated, indirect, and quite weak. According to Kruger and 
Maleckova, political conditions play a significant role for terrorism when compared to 
economic conditions. 
 Given that income level was a categorical variable, a cross tabulation table was 
required to reveal the relationship between recruitment methods and each income 
category. Accordingly, Table 15 shows that Pearson‟s chi-square value was quite low and 
had no significant relationship (p = .138) between each variable.
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Table 15. Chi-Square for Hypothesis 8
 
 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson‟s chi-square 3.959
a
 2 .138 
Likelihood ratio 3.981 2 .137 
Linear-by-linear association 3.788 1 .052 
N of valid cases 339   
a
No cells (.0%) have an expected count < 5. The minimum expected count = 11.43. 
 
 As shown in Table 16, cross tabulation revealed that among college educated 
militants who came from poor families, 50.3% were recruited through institutional 
structures and 49.7% were recruited through social networks. According to this finding, 
there was no large difference between both recruitment types.  
Within average income family militants, 40.3% were recruited through 
institutional structures and 59.7% were recruited through social networks. As revealed by 
the statistics, most militants who came from average income families were recruited 
through social networks.  
 On the other hand, among college educated militants who came from rich 
families, 36% were recruited through institutional structures and 64% were recruited 
through social networks. According to these statistics, militants who came from wealthy 
families were most likely to be recruited through social networks which were comparable 
to my expectations. I believe that individuals who have enough resources to support their 
needs while away from their families are less likely to make contact with institutional 
structures. Thus, the more likelihood scenario for them would be recruitment through 
social networks and having militants within their social networks. 
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Table 16.  Crosstabulation for Hypothesis 8 
Institutional Structure (IS) or Social Network (SN) * Income Level Crosstabulation 
   Income Level 
Total    Poor Normal Rich 
Institutional Structure (IS) 
or Social Network (SN) 
IS Count     98    48    9    155 
% within IS or SN 63.2% 31.0% 5.8% 100.0% 
% within Income Level 50.3% 40.3% 36.0% 45.7% 
% of Total 28.9% 14.2% 2.7% 45.7% 
SN Count 97 71 16 184 
% within IS) or SN 52.7% 38.6% 8.7% 100.0% 
% within Income Level 49.7% 59.7% 64.0% 54.3% 
% of Total 28.6% 20.9% 4.7% 54.3% 
Total Count 195 119 25 339 
% within IS or SN 57.5% 35.1% 7.4% 100.0% 
% within Income Level 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 57.5% 35.1% 7.4% 100.0% 
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Hypothesis 9  
H9: College student‟s religiosity level is more likely to increase the likelihood of 
being recruited through institutional structures when compared to social networks. 
The logistic regression coefficient of -.201 for militant‟s ideology 
(militants_ideology) revealed that a one unit increase for this variable decreased the 
logged odds of being recruited through social networks by .201 while holding others 
constant. The coefficient for militant‟s ideology was not significant and was not 
significantly different than 0 (p = .559). The Exp(B) militant‟s ideology was .818 
(e
militants_ideology
 – 1 = -182) (negative value) indicating that there was an 18.2% decrease 
in the likelihood of being recruited through social networks due to the one unit change in 
militants‟ ideology.   
As earlier discussed in Hypothesis 3, the literature suggested that there is no link 
between religious ideology and terrorism. Parallel to this argument and from the 
perspective of either type of recruitment, Hypothesis 9 revealed that there was no 
significant difference in terms of militant college students‟ ideology. Parallel to my 
expectancy, having religious ideology decrease the likelihood of being recruited through 
social networks.  
 
Hypothesis 10  
H10: Religious reasons increase the likelihood of being recruited through social 
networks. 
The logistic regression coefficient of -.716 for political motivation (Pol_motiv) 
showed that a one unit increase decreased the logged odds of being recruited through 
170 
 
social networks by .716 while holding others constant. The coefficient for political 
motivation was neither significant nor significantly different than 0 (p = .491). The 
Exp(B) was .489 meaning that (e
pol_motiv
 – 1 =  -511) (negative value) there was a 51.1% 
decrease in the likelihood of being recruited through social networks due to the one unit 
change in political motivation. 
Political motivation was also another IV that did not have a significant effect on 
the DV. In other words, there was no difference between institutional structure and social 
networks in terms of college students being motivated to participate in terrorist groups.  
The hypotheses and findings for RQ 2 are identified in Table 17.   
 
4.3 Research Question Three 
Does social control theory or social learning theory better explain the Turkish 
Hezbollah‟s most successful method of recruiting? 
Research question three was designed to provide a better theory in explaining the 
various recruitment strategies used by the Turkish Hezbollah.  As stated in RQ 3, the 
Turkish Hezbollah uses two structures to effectively recruit college educated students, 
institutional structures and social networks. Recruitment through institutional structures 
meets the assumptions of social control theory. In other words, being away from one‟s 
family often results in weak social bonds that may lead to the commission of crime(s). On 
the other hand, recruitment through social networks meets the assumptions of social 
learning theory or behavior is learned through direct experiences as well as through 
observation of one‟s environment.  
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Table 17.  Hypotheses and Findings for Research Question 2 (SN = Social Networks, IS = Institutional Structures) 
Hypotheses Key findings Sig. Level 
H3: Having militants within SN increases the likelihood of being 
recruited by SN 
Increases the likelihood nearly 16 times of being recruited 
through SN compared to IS 
p = .000 
H4: Pursuing a college education while away from one‟s family 
increases the likelihood of being recruited through IS when 
compared to SN 
41.4% decrease in the likelihood of being recruited by SN 
compared to IS 
p = .016 
H5: Being reared in families who have religious ideologies 
increases the likelihood of being recruited through social 
networks when compared to institutional structures. 
11.3% increase in the likelihood of being recruited through SN  p = .753 
H6: College students who obtain a campus education are more 
likely to be recruited through IS when compared to SN 
54.9% decrease in the likelihood of being recruited through SN  p = .037 
H7: Having a large family size increases the likelihood of being 
recruited by IS 
Small family militants recruited by SN (48% versus 52%), 
Average family militants recruited by SN (41.1% versus 58.9%), 
Large family militants recruited by SN (49.1% versus 50.9%) 
p = .104 
H8: Having more family income increases the likelihood of being 
recruited by SN 
Poor family militants recruited by IS (49.7% versus 50.3%), 
Average family militants recruited by SN (40.3% versus 59.3%), 
Rich family militants recruited by SN (36% versus 64%) 
p = .289 
H9: College student‟s religiosity level is more likely to increase 
the likelihood of being recruited through IS when compared to 
SN. 
 
18.2% decrease in the likelihood of being recruited through SN p = .559 
H10: Religious reasons increase the likelihood of being recruited 
through SN 
51.1% decrease in the likelihood of being recruited through SN p =.491 
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Because RQ 3 provided a better theory for explaining the Turkish Hezbollah‟s 
recruitment strategies, the data structure had to be compatible with the assumptions of 
social control and social learning, two important criminological theories. As explained in 
the methods section, two groups of college educated Hezbollah militants who met were 
excluded from my study if they met the following specifications: 
Group 1 (N = 4): While pursuing a college education, these students included 
those who were with their families, were recruited when in college, and had militants 
within their social networks (i.e., institutional structure efficiency). This group was 
excluded because it was not clear whether the student was recruited purely through 
institutional structures. Having militants within the family made these groups easy targets 
for recruitment by the Turkish Hezbollah. From the social learning theory perspective, if 
there were militants or criminals who existed within a student‟s social network, the 
recruited militant most probably would sympathize with the organization. Because this 
group did not provide ample information regarding their psychological reasons for 
joining the terrorist organization, by including them may have lead to false results from a 
theoretical perspective.  
Group 2 (N = 8): College students who were away from their family while 
pursuing a college education, were recruited when in college, and had militants within 
their social networks (i.e., institutional structure efficiency). Similar to the first group, I 
difficulty in identifying the exact reasons that lead these militants to take participate in 
the Hezbollah‟s organization. 
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4.3.1 Frequency Table for Research Question Three  
Hypothesis 11 
H11:  Social learning theory provides a better explanation regarding the Turkish 
Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategies when compared to social control theory. 
After excluding two groups, my sample size was N = 327. Initially, a frequency 
table was used to reveal the best theory that fit in explaining the Turkish Hezbollah‟s 
recruitment strategies. As shown in Table 18, social learning theory was more helpful in 
understanding how militants were recruited through the terrorist organization. While 
social control theory explained Hezbollah‟s recruitment pattern for 146 out of 327 college 
educated militants (44.6%), social learning theory provides a wider explanation.  Figure 4 
provides a bar chart that shows the statistical results when a comparison was made 
between the two theories. 
 
Table 18. Social Control Theory versus Social Learning Theory 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Social Control Theory 
(SC) 
146 44.6 44.6 44.6 
Social Learning Theory 
(SL) 
181 55.4 55.4 100.0 
Total 327 100.0 100.0  
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Figure 4.  A comparison between social control and social learning theories. 
 
4.3.2 Logistic regression for RQ 3 
Table 19 provides a model that includes 327 college students who were recruited 
by the Turkish Hezbollah. As shown, there are no missing cases. Table 20 consists of 
recruited college militants whose behaviors were best explained through social control 
theory and social learning theory.  
Table 21 reveals two categorical variables that were encoded into the equation. As 
shown, family income level was grouped into three categories that included poor (N = 
190), average (N = 114), and rich families (N = 23). Family size was also grouped into 
three categories that included small (N = 25), average (N = 134), and large (N = 168).   
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Table 19.  Case Processing Summary for Research Question Three
a
 
Unweighted Cases
a
 N Percent 
Selected Cases Included in Analysis 327 100.0 
Missing Cases 0 .0 
Total 327 100.0 
Unselected Cases 0 .0 
Total 327 100.0 
a
If weight is in effect, refer to Table 22 for the total number of cases. 
 
 
 
Table 20. Encoding of Dependent Variable for Research Question Three 
Original Value Internal Value 
Social Control Theory (SC) 0 
Social Learning Theory (SL) 1 
 
 
 
Table 21. Coding of Income Level and Family Size Categorical Variables 
 
Frequency 
Parameter coding 
(1) (2) 
Income Level Poor 190 1.000 .000 
Average 114 .000 1.000 
Rich 23 .000 .000 
Family Size  Small Family Size 25 1.000 .000 
Average Family Size 134 .000 1.000 
Large Family Size 168 .000 .000 
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As depicted in Table 22, 181 (55.4%) out of 339 college students were classified 
as being recruited through social learning theory assumptions. Further, Table 23 
identifies the variables in the equation in which .053 was the significance level. This 
revealed that the model was not statistically significant according to the .05 significance 
level. Because there were no IVs in the model, it is not explained any further.  
 
Table 22. Classification Table
a,b
 for RQ 3  
 
Observed 
Predicted 
 Social Control Theory (SCT) or 
Social Learning Theory (SLT) Percentage 
Correct  SCT SLT 
Step 0 Social Control 
Theory or Social 
Learning Theory 
SCT 0 146 .0 
SLT 0 181 100.0 
Overall Percentage   55.4 
a
Constant is included in the model;
 b
Cut value = .500 
 
 
Table 23. Variables Contained in the Equation for Research Question Three 
 B SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 0 Constant .215 .111 3.732 1 .053 1.240 
 
 
As presented in Table 24, the Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients revealed that 
the step, model, and block statistics were the same because stepwise logistic regression or 
blocking had not been used. The value shown in the Sig. column represents the 
probability of obtaining the chi-square statistic to determine whether or not the null 
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hypothesis was true. In the model, a high chi-square 200.930 was reached and was 
significant for 10 degrees of freedom (df) at the .000 significance level.  
 
Table 24.  Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients for Research Question Three 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
 
Step 1 
Step 200.930 10 .000 
Block 200.930 10 .000 
Model 200.930 10 .000 
 
 
In the model summary shown in Table 25, Cox and Snell R
2
 had a value of .459, 
while Nagelkerke R
2
 had a value of .614. According to Cox and Snell‟s R
2
 value, 45.9% 
of the variability was explained by this set of variables. Nagelkerke R
2
 also suggested 
that 61.4of the variability was explained by this set of variables. Compared to the 
previous model that was described in RQ 1, the IVs explained the broader percentage of 
the DV (43% vs. 45.9%). Hence, it may be concluded that removing those groups helped 
to better explain the model.  
 
Table 25. Model Summary for Research Question Three 
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R
2
 Nagelkerke R
2
 
1 248.635
a
 .459 .614 
a
Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because parameter estimates changed by < 
.001. 
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Table 26 represents an output classification table for the dichotomous DVs. The 
columns illustrate the two predicted values whereas the rows include their two observed 
values. As shown, the model had an 85.9% correct rate with 80.1% for institutional 
structures and 90.6% for social networks. 
  
Table 26. Classification Table for RQ 3  
 
Observed 
Predicted 
 Social Control Theory 
(SCT) or Social Learning 
Theory (SLT) Percentage 
Correct  SCT SLT 
Step 1 Social Control 
Theory or Social 
Learning Theory  
SCT 117 29 80.1 
SLT 17 164 90.6 
Overall Percentage   85.9 
a
Cut value = .500 
 
 
4.3.3 Interpreting the Meaning of Each Coefficient Associated with IVs and Comments 
Regarding the Statistical Significance of Each Coefficient 
This model‟s output is presented in Table 27 that depicts each coefficient‟s power 
followed by discussion of the hypotheses. In RQ 3, because the same variables as RQ 1 
were used, and a broader explanation was made for the previous model, I tested the 
hypotheses and compared the results between these models.  
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Table 27.  Variables in the Equation for Research Question Three 
 B SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 Having Hezbollah militants 
within Social Networks 
3.298 .418 62.125 1 .000 27.067 
Being away from family during 
college education 
-.500 .419 1.421 1 .233 .607 
Family ideology .119 .363 .107 1 .744 1.126 
Online or campus education -.850 .417 4.162 1 .041 .427 
Family Size   4.204 2 .122  
Family Size (1) .580 .630 .848 1 .357 1.786 
Family Size (2) .720 .359 4.024 1 .045 2.055 
Income level   3.807 2 .149  
Income level (1) -1.248 .683 3.338 1 .068 .287 
Income level (2) -.879 .702 1.569 1 .210 .415 
Militant‟s ideology -.194 .368 .277 1 .599 .824 
Political motivation -.667 1.097 .369 1 .543 .513 
Constant .497 1.317 .142 1 .706 1.644 
a
 Variable(s) entered in step 1: Any_milt_wth_SN; Wth_or_Awy_frm_Fmly; Famly_ideolgy; Online_camp,; 
Family_Size_grp,;Income_level; Militants_ideology; Pol_motiv. 
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Hypothesis 12  
H12: Having Hezbollah militants within peer groups or relatives increases the 
likelihood of being recruited through social learning theory assumptions. 
The logistic regression coefficient for having militants within social networks 
(any_milt_wth_SN) showed that a one unit increase increased the logged odds of being 
recruited through social learning theory by 3.298 while holding others constant. The 
coefficient for having militants within social networks was both significant and 
significantly different than 0 (p = .000). The Exp(B) of having militants within social 
networks was 27.067 (e
any_milt_wth_SN
 – 1 = 26.067) (positive value) meaning that there 
was nearly a 26 times increase in the likelihood of being recruited through social learning 
theory assumptions due to the one unit change in having militants within social networks. 
Compared to the previous model, the odds ratio increased which was good for the 
purposes of my study (16.415 vs, 26.067). Removing group I and group II from the 
model increased the effect of having militants within social networks over the DV. 
 
Hypothesis 13 
H13: Pursuing a college education while away from one‟s family increases the 
likelihood of being recruited through social control theory assumptions when compared 
to social learning theory assumptions. 
The logistic regression coefficient of -.500 for being with or away from family 
while pursuing a college education (wth_or_Awy_frm_fmly) showed that a one unit 
increase decreased the logged odds of being recruited through social learning theory 
assumptions by .500 while holding others constant. The coefficient for being with or 
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away from family during college education was not significant and was not significantly 
different than 0 (p = .233). The Exp(B) of being with or away from family during college 
education was .607 (e
wth_or_awy_frm_fmly
 – 1 = -.393) (negative value) meaning that there 
was a 39.3% decrease in the likelihood of being recruited through social learning theory 
assumptions due to a one unit change in being with or away from family while pursuing a 
college education. 
Compared to the first model, the significance level changed to p = .233. 
Excluding the militant group that were away from their family, were recruited in college, 
and had militants in SN dropped the significance level of this variable. In other words, 
because it was not clear whether the excluded group was recruited by IS or SN, the 
current model provided a clearer picture regarding the most frequently used method of 
Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategies. Accordingly, the result of this variable revealed that 
students who were away from their families during college were not significantly 
different in terms of being recruited through either social control theory or social learning 
theory assumptions. Both methods were found to be effective in providing an explanation 
of recruited college student militants. 
From a theoretical perspective, social learning theory provided a better 
explanation for the entire model when compared to social control theory. Thus, it may be 
concluded that social learning theory offers a better explanation on the recruitment 
process of college students who are either with or away from their families. However, as 
discussed in Hypothesis 9, there was a significant difference between social learning and 
social control theories when providing an explanation for the recruitment process of 
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college students who had militants in their social networks. Parallel to my expectations, 
social learning theory provided a better explanation.      
 
Hypothesis 14 
H14: Being reared in families who have religious ideologies increases the 
likelihood of being recruited through social learning theory assumptions when compared 
to social control theory assumptions. 
The logistic regression coefficient for family ideology (famly_ideolgy) revealed 
that a one unit increase for family ideology increased the logged odds of being recruited 
through social learning theory assumptions by .119 while holding others constant. The 
coefficient for family ideology was not significant and or significantly different than 0 (p 
= .744). The Exp(B) of family ideology was 1.126 (e
famly_ideolgy
 – 1 = .126) (positive 
value) meaning that there was a 12.6% increase in the likelihood of being recruited 
through social learning theory assumptions due to the one unit change in family ideology.  
Similar to the first model, this model also confirmed that there was no significant 
difference between the assumptions of both theories that explain the Hezbollah‟s 
recruitment process of college students.  
 
Hypothesis 15 
H15: College students who obtain a campus education are more likely to be 
recruited through social control theory assumptions when compared to social learning 
theory assumptions. 
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The logistic regression coefficient of -.850 for online or campus education 
(online_camp) showed that a one unit increase for online or campus education decreased 
the logged odds of being recruited through social learning theory assumptions by .850 
while holding others constant. The coefficient for online or campus education was 
significant as well as significantly different than 0 (p = .041). The Exp(B) of campus 
education was .427 (e
online_camp
 – 1 = -.573) (negative value) indicating that there was a 
57.3% decrease in the likelihood of being recruited through social learning theory 
assumptions due to the one unit change in the online or campus education. 
Obtaining a campus education had a significant effect on explaining the 
recruitment process through social control theory assumptions compared to social 
learning theory assumptions. Compared to the first model, the second model had less 
effect on the likelihood of being recruited through the social control theory assumptions. 
Recall that research question two included college students who had militants in their SN 
were predominantly recruited through social control theory assumptions. By eliminating 
those groups from this model caused the social learning theory to increase in providing a 
better explanation for recruitment of college students.  
 
Hypothesis 16 
H16: The larger the family, the more likely are college students to be recruited 
through social control theory assumptions. 
As discussed in the methods section of my study, family size (Family_size) was a 
categorical variable consisting of three categories: (a) small (a) average, and (c) large. 
Hence, the reference variable was the large family size that made it possible to compare 
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small and average size families to large families. Accordingly, the odds of recruited 
students who are being reared in an average size family when compared to a large size 
family were increased by a factor of 1.786 when controlling other variables in the model. 
Likewise, the odds of being reared in a small size family when compared to a large size 
family was increased by a factor of 2.055 when controlling other variables in the model.  
According to the p =.122 significance level, family size had no significant effects 
as to whether being recruited through the assumptions of social control theory or social 
learning theory. The cross tabulation table as depicted in Table 28 revealed the following 
three results: (a) Within small size families, institutional structures recruited 48% of the 
college educated militants and social networks recruited 52% of the militants; (b) within 
average size families, institutional structures recruited 40.3% of the college educated 
militants and social networks recruited 59.7% of the militants; and (c) within large size 
families, institutional structures recruited 47.6% of the college educated militants and 
social networks recruited 52.4% of the militants. 
 
Hypothesis 17 
H17: Students who come from higher family income levels are less likely to be 
recruited through social control theory assumptions. 
Income level (Income_level) was also a categorical variable consisting of 
categories: (a) poor, (b) average, and (c) Rich. Garson (2010) inferred that categorical 
variables should be interpreted according to the omitted reference category similar to 
OLS regression. Since logistic regression keeps the higher valued category as a default  
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Table 28. Crosstabulation for Hypothesis 16 
Social Control Theory (SC) or Social Learning Theory (SL) * Family Size Groups Crosstabulation 
   Family Size Groups 
Total 
   Small Family 
Size 
Average 
Family Size 
Large Family 
Size 
Social Control Theory 
(SCT) or Social Learning 
Theory (SL) 
Social Control Theory 
(SCT) 
Count 12 54 80 146 
% within SCT or SLT 8.2% 37.0% 54.8% 100.0% 
% within Family Size 
Groups 
48.0% 40.3% 47.6% 44.6% 
% of Total 3.7% 16.5% 24.5% 44.6% 
Social Learning Theory 
(SLT) 
Count 13 80 88 181 
% within SCT or SLT 7.2% 44.2% 48.6%   100.0% 
% within Family Size 
Groups 
52.0% 59.7% 52.4%     55.4% 
% of Total 4.0% 24.5% 26.9% 55.4% 
Total Count 25 134 168 327 
% within SCT or SLT 7.6% 41.0%   51.4% 100.0% 
% within Family Size 
Groups 
100.0%   100.0%   100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total    7.6%    41.0%      51.4% 100.0% 
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reference, rich represented the reference variable used to make a comparison between 
poor and average families. In comparison to rich families, the odds of being from a 
family with poor economic power were decreased by a factor of .287 when controlling 
other variables in the model. Likewise, the odds of being from a family with average 
economic power when compared to rich families were decreased by a factor of .415 when 
controlling other variables in the model. Similar to family size, income level had no 
significant effect on the likelihood of being recruited according to the assumptions of 
both social control and social learning theories as illustrated by the cross tabulations in 
Table 29. 
 Among the college educated militants who came from poor family backgrounds, 
50.5% were recruited through social learning theory assumptions and 49.5% were 
recruited through social control theory assumptions. The average income family 
represented 61.4% versus 38.6% and the rich families represented 65.2% versus 34.8%.  
 
Hypothesis 18 
H18: The religiosity level of college students is more likely to increase the 
likelihood of being recruited through social control theory assumptions. 
The logistic regression coefficient of -.194 for militant‟s ideology 
(militants_ideology) revealed that a one unit increase for this variable decreased the 
logged odds of being recruited through social networks by .194 while holding others 
constant. The coefficient for militant‟s ideology was not significant and was not 
significantly different than 0 (p = .559). The Exp(B) militant‟s ideology was .824  
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Table 29.  Crosstabulation for Hypothesis 17 
Social Control Theory (SC) or Social Learning Theory (SL) * Income Level Crosstabulation 
   Income Level 
Total    Poor Average Rich 
Social Control Theory (SCT) 
or Social Learning Theory 
(SLT) 
Social Control Theory (SCT) Count 94 44 8 146 
% within SCT or SLT 64.4% 30.1% 5.5% 100.0% 
% within Income Level 49.5% 38.6% 34.8% 44.6% 
% of Total 28.7% 13.5% 2.4% 44.6% 
Social Learning Theory 
(SLT) 
Count 96 70 15 181 
% within SCT or SLT 53.0% 38.7% 8.3% 100.0% 
% within Income Level 50.5% 61.4% 65.2% 55.4% 
% of Total 29.4% 21.4% 4.6% 55.4% 
Total Count 190 114 23 327 
% within SCT or SLT 58.1% 34.9% 7.0% 100.0% 
% within Income Level 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 58.1% 34.9% 7.0% 100.0% 
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(e
militants_ideology
 – 1 = -176 (negative value) meaning that there was a 17.6% decrease in 
the likelihood of being recruited through the social learning theory assumptions due to 
the one unit change in ideology of the militants.   
 According to the results, there was no change in providing a better explanation for 
recruitment of college students through the assumptions of either social control or social 
learning theories.  When compared to the first model, there was a difference in the odds 
ratio power (.513 versus .489).  
 
Hypothesis 19 
H19: Religious reasons increase the likelihood of being recruited through social 
learning theory assumptions. 
The logistic regression coefficient of -.667 for political motivation (Pol_motiv) 
showed that a one unit increase for political motivation decreased the logged odds of 
recruitment into the Hezbollah through social learning theory assumptions by .667 while 
holding others constant. The coefficient for political motivation was neither significant 
nor significantly different than 0 (p = .543). The Exp(B) of political motivation was .513 
(e
pol_motiv
 – 1= -487) (negative value) meaning that there was a 48.7% decrease in the 
likelihood of being recruited through social networks due to the one unit change in the 
political motivation.  Political motivation also had no significant difference in explaining 
Hezbollah‟s recruitment process of college students through either social control theory 
or social learning theory.  
The findings of Hypotheses 12 through 19 are summarized in Table 30. 
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Table 30.  Hypotheses and Findings for RQ 3 (SLT = Social Learning Theory, SCT = Social Control Theory) 
Hypotheses Key findings Sig. Level 
H12: Having Hezbollah militants within peer groups or relatives 
increases the likelihood of being recruited through SLT 
assumptions 
Nearly 26 times increase in the likelihood of being recruited 
through SLT perspectives comparing to SCT assumptions 
p =.000 
H13: Pursuing a college education away from one‟s family 
increases the likelihood of being recruited through SCT 
assumptions when compared to SLT assumptions 
39.3% decrease in the likelihood of being recruited through SLT 
assumptions 
p =.233 
H14: Being reared in families who have religious ideologies 
increases the likelihood of being recruited through SLT 
assumptions when compared to SCT assumptions 
12.6% increase in the likelihood of being recruited through SLT 
assumptions 
p =.744 
H15: College students who obtain a campus education are more 
likely to be recruited through SCT assumptions when compared 
to SLT assumptions. 
57.3% decrease in the likelihood of being recruited through SLT 
assumptions 
p = .041 
H16: The larger the family, the more likely are college students to 
be recruited through SCT assumptions 
Small Family militants recruited through SLT assumptions (48% 
versus 52%), Average family militants recruited through SLT 
assumptions (41.1% versus 58.9%), Large family militants 
recruited through SLT assumptions (49.1% versus 50.9%) 
p = .122 
H17: Students who come from higher family income levels are 
less likely to be recruited through SLT assumptions 
Poor Family militants recruited through SLT assumptions (49.7% 
versus 50.3%), Average family militants recruited through SLT 
assumptions (40.3% versus 59.3%), Rich family militants 
recruited through SLT assumptions (36% versus 64%) 
p = .149 
H18: The religiosity level of college students  is more likely to 
increase the likelihood of being recruited through SCT 
assumptions 
17.6% decrease in the likelihood of being recruited through SLT 
assumptions 
   p = .599 
H19: Religious reasons increase the likelihood of being recruited 
through SLT assumption 
48.7% decrease in the likelihood of being recruited through SLT 
assumptions 
 p = .543 
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4.4 Conclusions 
My study revealed that social networks and institutional structures are two 
important methods that are used by the Turkish Hezbollah to recruit college students. In a 
comparison between the two structures, social networks were found to be more 
effectively used by the terrorist organization, a finding that was parallel to my 
expectations given that families who reside in Turkey‟s southeastern part have quite 
strong social bonds. Accordingly, RQ 3 provided a clearer picture regarding the 
effectiveness of social networks. After excluding college student militants whose 
recruitment styles were not apparent, social networks became more effective in the 
Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategies. Especially, students who had militants within their 
family or relatives increased the likelihood of being recruited through social networks. In 
addition to this variable and others, being reared in a large religious family with an 
average or greater income increased the likelihood of recruitment through social 
networks. 
 On the other hand, my study revealed that besides social networks, institutional 
structures are effective tools used by the Turkish Hezbollah to recruit more college 
students into their organization. For example, social and cultural activities provide 
opportunities for members to meet new targets. This applies especially to college 
newcomers who to can be contacted by offering free food and shelter. As revealed by my 
study, being away from one‟s family had a significant effect on the likelihood of being 
recruited through institutional structures. In addition, obtaining an online education, 
being religious, and having political motivations were other variables that increased the 
 191 
likelihood of a college student‟s recruitment into the organization through institutional 
structures.     
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5 CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION 
5.1 Introduction 
In my study, I focused on three main issues. First, I explored the institutional 
structures and social networks that were most frequently used by the Turkish Hezbollah 
to recruit college students and concluded that social networks were the preferred method.  
Second, my study was designed to reveal the best theories that explain the behavioral 
patterns of recruited militants in choosing to participate in the Hezbollah terrorist 
organization. Considering the target population for institutional structures, students who 
were away from their families while attending college were generally found to be 
favored. Because social control theory predicts that weak social bonds lead to 
delinquency, its assumptions provided a better explanation regarding the behaviors of 
recruited college students. On the other hand, another finding revealed that the Turkish 
Hezbollah uses social networks very effectively in their attempt to recruit new militants. 
Because social learning theory assumes that crime is learned through observing other 
people‟s behaviors, outcomes, and attitudes; this was the best fit theory that explained the 
behavior of college educated students who were recruited through social networks. 
Finally, I examined demographic details to determine whether a recruited student was 
influenced through institutional structures or social networks by including eight 
independent variables in the equation.  
 In this chapter, research findings are linked to the literature review, related 
theories, and policies. Implications gathered from terrorism literature are discussed 
through the findings of my dissertation.  
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Because recruited militants‟ personnel reports were seized that provided factual 
details in their own words concerning how they were recruited as well as an account of 
their personal demographics, the findings of my research were expected to provide 
valuable information that would serve to create innovative counterterrorism policies and 
policy implications for future studies. 
 
5.2 Discussion of Findings 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 
H1: Social networks and institutional structures are two general methods used 
extensively by the Turkish Hezbollah for recruiting new college student militants 
within universities.  
H2:  Using social networks is a more effective method in recruiting college educated 
militants when compared to institutional structures.   
 Both hypotheses focused on institutional structures and social networks that were 
proposed to reveal the most effective tactics used by the Turkish Hezbollah to recruit 
college students.  Considering the social structure of Turkey‟s southeastern part, there are 
strong social ties among family members that greatly influence an individual‟s behavior. 
In my study, I found that college students who had militants among their relatives or peer 
groups increased the likelihood of being recruited through social networks. On the other 
hand, institutional structures proved to be more effective within the group that had no 
militants within their social network and were educated away from their families as will 
be further discussed in related hypotheses.  
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 Oguz (2007) claimed that an individual can be affected through criminals who 
exist within the family circle. For example, family members or relatives who commit 
criminal and terrorist activities not only set a bad example but also misguide other family 
members who are around them.  My findings supported Oguz‟s assumption that most 
college educated militants were recruited through social networks.  
On the other hand, Oguz (2007) argued that individuals who suffer from weak 
family ties and social networks often results in a lack of self-confidence. In this case, 
their participation in social life activities and sharing common societal values may be 
difficult. Thus, these individuals become easy recruitment targets for terrorist groups 
even if there are no militants within their social networks.  Although institutional 
structures are quite effective recruitment tools, they were found to be less likely preferred 
by the Turkish Hezbollah when compared to social networks. 
 
Hypothesis 3 
 H3: Having Hezbollah militants within one‟s social structure increases the 
likelihood of being recruited through social networks when compared to institutional 
structures.  
According to my findings, students having militants within their families and/or 
peer groups had a significant effect on being recruited through social networks rather 
than institutional structures. As discussed, social networks that are comprised of relatives 
as well as peers have a great influence over an individual because social and 
psychological needs are met through these groups. Alkan and Citak (2007) suggested that 
when compared to relatives, peer group pressure is often so strong that it has a greater 
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effect on influencing an individual. According to Alkan and Citak, terrorist organizations 
take advantage of these types of relationships.  
On the other hand, the relationship between relatives was another factor that had a 
tremendous influence over recruited student militants.  Like peer group relations, terrorist 
organizations manipulate potential targets through family member associations. In terms 
of assessing the influence of Turkish relatives on other family members, the following 
quote expressed by a left terror group militant is worthy of note:  
My uncle was arrested after he was injured in the fight against the security forces 
in 1992 and sentenced to the life-long imprisonment. Inspired by my uncle, I 
started to feel sympathy to this organization at the very small age. (Alkan & 
Citak, 2007, p. 292) 
Parallel to the above discussions, my research confirms the strength that social 
networks had over college students in my study who were recruited by the Turkish 
Hezbollah. As observed in the odds ratio of having Hezbollah militants within social 
networks (Exp(B) = 17.415), there was nearly a 16 times increase in the likelihood of 
being recruited through social networks rather than institutional structures if there were 
militants included among peer groups and relatives. 
 
Hypothesis 4 
H4: Pursuing a college education while away from one‟s family increases the 
likelihood of being recruited through institutional structures when compared to social 
networks. 
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Being away from one‟s social networks often results in weak social bonds that 
increase the likelihood of being recruited into the Turkish Hezbollah through institutional 
structures. Although college students may not have any militants within their social 
networks, this group may provide easy targets for terrorists when they are away from 
their families. When compared to social networks, my study‟s findings supported the 
theory that Turkish Hezbollah uses institutional structures quite effectively to recruit new 
militants. For example, college students who were away from their families while 
pursuing a college education were found to be recruited through institutional structures 
statistically more than through social networks.  
Quite different from the United States, college social life in Turkey is more 
active. In other words, ideologies are represented through legal structures wherein social 
and cultural gatherings are arranged in order for students to meet one another through 
sporting events, tea parties, interviews, youth camps, meetings with friends, concerts, 
picnics, et cetera. Even in smaller college cities, each evening is planned around these 
types of student organizational events. In addition, most of these institutional structures 
provide complimentary shelter and food for newcomers who typically come from poor 
families; thus, these students may easily be manipulated and recruited by the Turkish 
Hezbollah.  
 
Hypothesis 5 
H5: Being reared in families who have religious ideologies increases the 
likelihood of being recruited through social networks when compared to institutional 
structures. 
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According to Ozeren (2004), literature regarding the religious effect over terror 
suggests that there is no direct link between terrorism and religion. Irbec (2005) further 
claimed that religion is generally used to justify terrorism by religiously motivated 
organizations. According to Irbec, a misunderstanding and misinterpretation of religion 
helps terror groups to widen their targets and promote their cause. Parallel to the 
literature, findings of my study revealed that there was no significant difference between 
being recruited either through institutional structures or through social networks. In 
general, if there were any links between religion and terrorism, social networks would 
supposedly have a significant effect on the recruitment of college students. According to 
the results of my study, the null hypothesis should therefore be accepted:  In terms of 
recruitment methods, there is no difference between college students who were reared in 
religious families when compared to those who were reared in nonreligious families. 
 
Hypothesis 6 
H6: College students who obtain a campus education are more likely to be 
recruited through institutional structures when compared to social networks. 
In my study, if college students were with their families while pursuing a college 
education and had no militants within their social networks, they were less likely to be 
recruited by the Hezbollah‟s institutional structures. On the other hand, if they were with 
their families and had militants within their social networks, they were more likely to be 
recruited through social networks. Considering that these two hypothetical options are 
true, there should be a significant difference in terms of being recruited through either 
institutional structures or through social networks according to the type of education 
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pursued. Parallel to this argument, the model provided significant differences according 
to type of recruitment.  
Referring to Table 16, cross tabulation results run between recruitment and 
education types revealed that out of 96 online-educated college students, 81 were 
recruited through social networks. This finding also supported the idea that social 
networks are important tools used by the Turkish Hezbollah to recruit college students. 
Placing emphasis on types of education, institutional structures were found to be more 
effective for on-campus versus online college students.  
These two principal findings revealed that while institutional structures generally 
focus on college students who are away from their families, social networks are more 
often used to recruit new militants from within their respective peer groups and relatives. 
As described in the Turkish Hezbollah‟s recruitment patterns, the net model best explains 
the organization‟s institutional structures that are generally used to recruit new militants 
through social activities.   
 
Hypothesis 7 
H7: The larger the family size, the more likely are college students to be recruited 
through institutional structures.  
For the overall model, my study revealed that family size had no significant 
influence on the likelihood of college students being recruited through either institutional 
structures or social networks.  However, students who came from average size families 
were significantly recruited through social networks when compared to small and large 
family sizes. Except for this group, there was no significant difference for small family 
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size and large family size in terms of recruitment methods.  As clearly shown by cross 
tabulation (c.f., Table 17), 58.9% of the students from average size families were 
recruited through social networks and 41.1% were recruited through institutional 
structures.  
As previously discussed, social networks were more likely used by the Turkish 
Hezbollah to recruit college students who had militants among their peer groups and 
relatives. Having no significant difference within the smaller size families indicated that 
institutional structures were as effective as social network recruitment methods. Because 
this was related more to social control theory, further discussion is provided in 
Hypothesis 16. 
 
Hypothesis 8 
H8: Students who come from higher family income levels are less likely to be 
recruited by institutional structures when compared to social networks. 
For the overall model and contrary to family size, there was no significant 
difference between militants who came from families who had poor, average, or rich 
income levels.  According to Krueger and Maleckova (2003), the relationship between 
education, poverty, and terrorism is complicated, indirect and quite weak.  In other 
words, students who come from poor families should be dominantly recruited through 
social networks if there is a relationship between poverty and terrorism. Due to the 
strength of institutional structures, however, my study showed no significant difference 
between institutional structures and social networks.  
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Hypothesis 9 
H9: College student‟s religiosity level is more likely to increase the likelihood of 
being recruited through institutional structures when compared to social networks. 
As discussed in Hypothesis 5, the religiosity level of a college educated militant‟s 
family did not provide statistical significant difference in terms of whether students were 
recruited through institutional structures or social networks. If, however, a family‟s 
religiosity level had played a significant role, college students would have generally been 
recruited through institutional structures given that they would be more open to 
manipulation. The significance level of this variable also supported that religious as well 
as nonreligious students were recruited through both IS and SN methods with no 
significant difference.  
 
Hypothesis 10 
H10: Religious reasons increase the likelihood of being recruited through social 
networks. 
Political motivation had no significant difference between college students who 
were recruited through either institutional structures or social networks. According to the 
majority of militants‟ statements, they all chose to join the Turkish Hezbollah for 
religious reasons. From their viewpoints, Islam‟s teachings were in danger either across 
the world or in Turkey, and therefore Turkey should be an Islamic state ruled according 
to Sharia (Islamic law). According to the findings of my study, the Turkish Hezbollah 
used religion through both institutional structures and social networks to effectively 
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recruit college students thus indicating that the militants were manipulated through 
religious ideology. In addition, religious groups have also used terror to obtain their ends.  
 
Hypothesis 11 
H11: Social learning theory provides a better explanation regarding the Turkish 
Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategies when compared to social control theory.  
As discussed in the methods section, two groups (N = 12) were excluded from my 
study in order to meet the assumptions of social control and social learning theories. 
Because there was no precise information as to which assumptions the militants were 
recruited under, skewness in the model‟s data could have possibly resulted. Other than 
the excluded groups, if institutional structures were used as a recruitment method, college 
students were considered to be enlisted through social control theory given that having 
weak bonds may be explained through reasons such as being away from one‟s family or 
being reared larger families, for example.   
According to the equation, types of methods used to recruit college students were 
best explained through social learning theory. For example, out of 327 students 181 
(55.4%) were recruited through the assumptions of social learning theory and 146 
(44.6%) were recruited through social control theory assumptions.  
A comparison between the first and second model revealed that the effectiveness 
of social networks and social learning theory in explaining the Turkish Hezbollah 
militants resulted in a 1.1% increase when two groups were disqualified, an indicator that 
the excluded students (N = 12) who also had Hezbollah militants within their social 
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networks were most likely recruited through institutional structures even though they did 
not provide any details as to how they were initially motivated.  
 
Hypothesis 12 
H12: Having Hezbollah militants within peer groups or relatives increases the 
likelihood of being recruited through social networks comparing to social learning 
assumption. 
Excluding the two groups (N = 12) from the equation increased the likelihood of 
college students being recruited through social learning theory assumptions according to 
having militants within their social networks. Similar to the first model, the second model 
also provided significant differences between both models. While Exp(B) for having 
Hezbollah militants within social networks in the first model was 17.415, Exp(B) for the 
second model was 27.067 indicating that there was a 26 times increase in the likelihood 
of being recruited through social learning theory assumptions if militants were within the 
student‟ social networks. When compared to social control theory, this variable revealed 
that social learning theory provided the best explanation for the Turkish Hezbollah‟s 
recruitment strategy. 
 
Hypothesis 13 
H13: Pursuing a college education while away from one‟s family increases the 
likelihood of being recruited through social control theory assumptions when compared 
to social learning theory assumptions. 
 203 
Like Hypothesis 12, excluding college students (N = 12) from the model 
increased the likelihood of being recruited through social networks. While the first model 
revealed that being either away from or with one‟s family decreased the likelihood by 
58.6% of recruitment through social networks, the second model increased the likelihood 
by 17.3%, a percentage increase that dropped the significance level. Although this 
variable had a significant effect on the first model, the effect was nonsignificant in the 
second model.  
 
Hypothesis 14 
H14: Being reared in families who have religious ideologies increases the 
likelihood of being recruited through social learning theory assumptions when compared 
to social control theory assumptions. 
Again, this model had no significant effect on the type of recruitment method 
used, and there was no difference in terms of providing a theoretical explanation to 
Hezbollah‟s strategies. There was, however, a slight difference in the effectiveness of this 
variable on both models. For example, the odds ratio was 1.113 for the first model and 
1.126 for the second model which revealed a 1.3% increase in the likelihood of being 
recruited into the Turkish Hezbollah through social learning theory assumptions. 
 
Hypothesis 15 
H15: College students who obtain a campus education are more likely to be 
recruited through social control theory assumptions when compared to social learning 
theory assumptions. 
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After excluding above mentioned college students from the equation, obtaining an 
online education decreased the significance level of this model. A decrease in the number 
of college students who were with their families and were recruited through institutional 
structures was the main reason for this change.  
 
Hypothesis 16 
 H16: The larger the family, the more likely are college students to be recruited 
through social control theory assumptions. 
Hirschi and Gottfredson (1990) claimed that the greater the family size, the less 
time parents tend to direct supervision over their children. Thus, the major reason for a 
person‟s low self control appears to be ineffective child rearing.  
 According to social learning theory assumptions, the likelihood of college 
students being recruited in this second model when compared to the first model increased 
for those reared in small or average size families. On the other hand, college students 
who came from a large family were more likely to be recruited through social control 
theory assumptions.  These results supported that being reared in larger families increases 
the chance of forming weak social bonds that could be a reason for recruitment into the 
Hezbollah through social control theory assumptions.   
 
Hypothesis 17  
H17: Students who come from higher family income levels are less likely to be 
recruited through social control theory assumptions. 
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 According to each family‟s income level, this model revealed that having more 
income decreased the likelihood of a college student being recruited by the Hezbollah 
through social learning theory assumptions. While in the first model, there was a 61.7% 
decrease in the likelihood of being recruited through social networks, the second model 
revealed that the likelihood of being recruited through social networks decreased to 
71.3%. There was a similar decrease for students who came from families having average 
incomes. These percentages showed that the second model provided a better explanation 
through social control theory assumptions in terms of income level or an indicator that 
low income families have less control over their children. Even though an individual has 
no militants within social networks and has low income level, he or she is more likely to 
be recruited through social control theory assumptions, since they are more prone to be 
manipulated.   
 
Hypothesis 18 and 19 
H18: The religiosity level of college students is more likely to increase the 
likelihood of being recruited through social control theory assumptions. 
H19: Religious reasons increase the likelihood of being recruited through social 
learning theory assumptions. 
Similar to other variables in my study, religiosity level and religious reasons 
provided a better explanation for this model through social learning theory when 
compared to the previous model. However, the equation revealed that there was no 
significant difference between recruitment through IS or SN theories‟ assumptions when 
considering the religiosity level of college students. In other words, religiosity level did 
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not show any significant difference between the theories in terms of providing an 
explanation for the behavior of recruited student militants. Therefore, both religious and 
nonreligious college educated militants may be recruited through social networks as well 
as institutional structures.  Differences between the findings of RQ 2 and RQ 3 in terms 
of Beta level (B), significance level (p) and odds ratio (Exp (B) values are illustrated in 
Table 31. 
5.3 Theoretical Implications 
Although terrorism is a significant threat to societies and governments 
(Mendelson, 2007), the literature lacks theoretical guidance, and most applied theories 
are adapted from other academic disciplines (Yilmaz, 2009). Such as, as discussed by 
O‟Connor, economics is used to understand terrorism from the point of supply and 
demand. In this section, I connected the findings of my study to the theoretical 
explanations related to the Turkish Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategies. 
 
5.3.1 Social Learning Theory 
Findings in my study revealed that when college educated students have militants 
among their peers or relatives, the likelihood of being recruited through social networks 
increased significantly. By using eight IVs to test the type of recruitment most frequently 
used by the Turkish Hezbollah, this variable had the strongest effect. Parallel to social 
learning theory assumptions, strong social networks that are prevalent in the southeastern 
part of Turkey had a significant effect on the recruited college educated militants.  
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Table 31. Comparison between the Findings of Research Questions Two and Three 
 RQ 2–Exp(B) RQ 3–Exp(B) Comparison Between the Findings of RQ 2 and RQ 3 
Having Hezbollah militants within 
social networks 17.415 27.067 
Compared to Model 1, there is a 55% increase in the 
likelihood of being recruited through SN 
Being away from family while 
pursuing a college education .414 .607 
Likelihood of being recruited through social network 
is increased by 19.3% 
Family Ideology 1.113 1.126 
Likelihood of being recruited through social network 
is increased by 1.3% 
Having Online or Campus 
Education .451 .427 
Likelihood of being recruited through social network 
is decreased by 2.4% 
Small Family Size  1.944 1.786 
Likelihood of being recruited through social network 
is decreased by 15.8% 
Average Family Size 1.969 2.055 
Likelihood of being recruited through social network 
is increased by 8.6% 
Low Income Level .383 .287 
Likelihood of being recruited through social network 
is decreased by 9.6% 
Average Income Level .496 .415 
Likelihood of being recruited through social network 
is decreased by 8.1% 
Militant‟s Ideology .818 .824 
Likelihood of being recruited through social network 
is increased by 0.6% 
Political Motivation .489 .513 
Likelihood of being recruited through social network 
is increased by 2.4% 
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The second variable that increased the likelihood of recruitment through social 
learning theory assumptions was being reared in religious families. Although this variable 
did not significantly affect the likelihood of being recruited through social learning 
theory, it did, however, increase the likelihood of being recruited through the 
assumptions of social learning theory. Given that the Turkish Hezbollah is a religiously 
motivated terror organization, this finding supported social learning from a theoretical 
perspective. 
Cross tabulation tables for family size illustrated that college student militants 
who were reared in an average size family were most likely to be recruited through social 
learning theory assumptions. On the other hand, social learning and social control 
theories had a similar effect on the students who came from either small or large size 
families.  
Another variable that increased the likelihood of being recruited by the Turkish 
Hezbollah through social networks was income level. For example, college students who 
came from rich families were more likely to be recruited through social learning theory 
assumptions in comparison to college students who came from poor or average family 
incomes. This finding supported the assumptions of both social learning and social 
control theories. Because college students who come from wealthy rich families are 
typically more likely to meet their own personal expenses and needs, they were less 
likely to be connected to the terrorist organization through institutional structures. Hence, 
the most effective way for the Hezbollah to recruit this group is through the use of social 
networks as indicated in my study.  
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In sum, findings revealed that the four IVs─militants within peer groups or 
among relatives, religious families, family size, and family income─supported the social 
learning theory consistent with Burgess and Akers‟ (1966) differential association theory. 
Accordingly, Jessor et al. (1968) considered peer and parental influence to be two 
important variables related to either positive or negative behaviors among teenagers. 
Akers (2004) further stated that an individual learns behavior through both nonsocial 
situations and social interactions by observing the behavioral consequences common to 
others. The data related to the recruited Turkish Hezbollah college educated militants 
supported the perspectives held by these scholars; thus, it can be concluded that most of 
the college educated Hezbollah militants in my study were recruited through interaction 
with peers and relatives. 
 
5.3.2 Social Control Theory 
Although the majority of recruitment styles were best explained through the 
assumptions of social learning theory, social control was another important theory that 
provided a good explanation regarding Turkish Hezbollah‟s recruitment tactics. Booth et 
al. (2008) inferred that social control theory emphasizes the role of control in terms of 
counteracting delinquency through strong social bonds that hinder delinquency.  Contrary 
to other criminology theories, social control theory states that if individuals are left to 
their own devices, they are more prone to commit crime (Vold et al., 2002).   
Accordingly, acquiring a college education while away from social networks was 
an independent variable that increased the likelihood of being recruited by the Hezbollah 
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through institutional structures. This finding provided the strongest support for the 
strength of social control theory assumptions given that being away from social networks 
weakens social bonds that significantly affect the chances of recruitment.  
Obtaining a campus college education was the second variable that supported the 
assumptions of social control theory. Because campus educated students are more likely 
to interact through the institutional structures of terror groups, they are also possible 
targets for the Turkish Hezbollah. Accordingly, the likelihood of recruiting college 
students through institutional structures was another significant effect that indicated the 
strength of social control.  
Having religious ideologies was another variable that increased the likelihood of 
college students being recruited through social control theory assumptions. Because these 
groups were more vulnerable to religious propaganda, recruiting more students into the 
Turkish Hezbollah through institutional structures showed the strength of social control 
theory.  
Finally, political motivation also increased the likelihood of being recruited 
through social control theory assumptions. As previously discussed, the Turkish 
Hezbollah is a religiously motivated terror organization in which institutional structures 
focus on individuals who may be more prone to religious propaganda.  
 
5.4 Policy Implications 
According to the findings of my study, the following policy suggestions for 
security forces, scholars, and policy makers are recommended. In addition to policy 
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implications, personal demographic data related to my sample of recruited college 
educated militants are provided. 
 
5.4.1 Policy makers should consider religious citizens to be represented in the system, 
and tension between laicism and religion should be eliminated 
Influenced by the positivist argument, founders of Turkey were under the 
impression that religion in general prevented modernization and sustained backwardness. 
They assessed that religion was the basic reason behind the Ottoman Empire‟s 
disintegration and was the main threat to the stability and longevity of the new regime. 
Thus, they followed the example of the Ottomans in controlling religion under 
government hierarchy by instituting the Directory of Religious Affairs (Kologlu, 1999). 
According to Casanova (1994), modernization was intended to drive away religion or at 
least repel its social and political role. He further claimed that religion was thought to 
become a private matter between God and the individual believer. However, this never 
actually happened, at least not uniformly, anywhere in the world including across Europe. 
Unlike other religions, Islam does not encourage secularization (Gellner, 1981). 
Consequently, Gellner argued that the Islamic religion has always occupied a central 
place in the lives of Muslim societies to the point that, interestingly, its influence over 
society is apparently independent from other aspects of society.  Toprak (1981) further 
claimed that while secularization in the normative model is thought to be associated with 
enlightenment and freedom of thought, it is imposed from above and protected in an 
authoritarian manner in Turkey by state institutions that include the military. 
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To religious people, state policy is based on this misguided assumption which is 
under the assumption that a „„secular‟‟ regime is beset with intolerance. More especially, 
the state‟s headscarf policy that is forbidden in schools and workplaces is broadly 
criticized; therefore religious people claim that there is discrimination against religious 
individuals (Gulalp, 2003). As previously discussed, religion has a powerful influence 
over Turkey‟s Kurdish originated citizens. Therefore, this controversy between religious 
and laic people created an opportunity for the Turkish Hezbollah to produce effective 
propaganda against the state.  
Demographic details provided by the recruited college educated Hezbollah 
militants also revealed the importance of religion. For example, my study revealed that 
165 (48.6%) out of 339 families and 162 (47.7%) out of 339 militants were identified as 
being religious. In addition, 328 (96.6%) out of 339 militants stated that religious reasons 
were the driving forces behind joining the Hezbollah‟s terrorist organization. This 
statistics reveals that religion is widely used propaganda tool for the Turkish Hezbollah. 
As mentioned above, weakness of the laicism is effectively used by the religiously 
motivated terror groups. Government policies over the religion should be well balanced 
that laic system should not be used as a tool to limit religious independence. Instead, laic 
system may be used to provide religious independence to the society that nobody can be 
classified according to their religion. On the other hand, religious rules should not be 
used as a tool to create pressure on the society. Religion should be lived in the individual 
level and everybody should be respected on his/her religious chooses.  
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Therefore, to halt this process, I recommend that Turkey should develop a new 
approach to current policies. Unfortunately, I believe that the problem with Turkish 
laicism stems from the policy implementation. In other words, the traditional background 
practices of Turkey‟s governmental system created this problem. Clearly, laicism is one 
of the most important policies in Turkey and implementation of this policy is therefore 
vital. Through implementing this policy, public policy makers should eliminate the 
harmful side of this policy by distinguishing between the religious and fundamentalists. 
In addition, teaching religion through private organizations should be supported and 
controlled through the state. As Ozeren (2004) argued, not only do all religions denounce 
terrorist attacks, they also condemn terrorist behaviors. In other words, teaching the basic 
principles of religions offers fundamental importance in dealing with terrorism.  
 
5.4.2 Response to terrorist activities should be well balanced 
As discussed by Mehdiyev (2007), ideological terrorism stems from political, 
social, and economic problems. Religious intolerance and political oppression are only a 
few of the arguments widely used by militants to justify terrorist activities. In case of 
adjusting the political system to these arguments, namely providing an environment to 
discuss these ideas, responding to terrorist groups in an unstable manner creates a worse 
scenario. As previously discussed, an unbalanced response from the state represents one 
strong argument that terrorist groups effectively use. Because people sometimes believe 
that the state strives to oppress its citizens, unbalanced responses generally create 
sympathy toward terrorist organizations. Therefore, the state should only attempt to 
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prevent illegal terrorist activities while fighting against terrorism. Although militants may 
die during the clash in order to protect citizens, the state should not purposefully kill them 
in an effort to fight the militants‟ ideologies.  
As revealed in my study, most of the college students were recruited through 
social networks. It is clear that having militants within social networks has great impact 
on the likelihood of being recruited by the social networks. Unbalanced response to terror 
groups not only weakens State‟s position on fighting against terrorism, but also creates 
powerful propaganda tools for the terror groups. Accordingly, my study‟s findings 
support this argument that having Hezbollah militants within social networks increases 
the likelihood of being recruited through social learning theory assumptions by 26 times 
comparing to being recruited through social learning theory assumptions.   
In other words, this was an indicator suggesting that the state may kill one 
terrorist but in the process the Hezbollah terrorist organization may target ten 
sympathizers who are possible candidates for recruitment. In this respect, a balanced 
response to terrorism was found to be the core element in the fight against terrorism.  
By offering a more democratic atmosphere rather than forbidding each ideology 
may provide a free discussion environment that can result in a more effective way to fight 
against terrorism. As discussed by Mehdiyev (2007), if an individual believes that it is 
impossible to reach his or her goals through the legal system, he or she may search for 
other ways to achieve these goals. In my opinion, the speakers‟ corner located in 
London‟s Hyde Park is an excellent example for people to freely convey their messages 
and ideologies. For example, provided that speeches do not tend to provoke violence 
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(Wikipedia, 2010), everyone is given the opportunity to voice their diverse ideologies 
through this method. Thus, this kind of environment has the power to eliminate one of the 
strongest arguments of terror groups. 
 
5.4.3 More effective policies should be implemented to fight against poverty and 
decrease unemployment  
According to the economic power of family income level, my study revealed that 
195 (57.5%) out of 339 militants identified themselves as coming from poor households, 
119 (35.1%) came from families with normal income levels, and only 25 (7.3%) militants 
came from wealthy family backgrounds. These statistics showed that there was a 
tremendous gap between the percentage of rich militant families to normal and poor 
families. As Koseli (2007) pointed out, socioeconomic conditions, namely inequalities 
and poverty, are important variables that lead individuals to join terror groups. His study 
revealed that there is a significant relationship between the poverty, inequality, and 
violent crime.  
For example, the southeastern region of Turkey where the Hezbollah is more 
active is one of the most underprivileged parts of the country (Karaca, 2004). According 
to the State Institute of Statistics (2001), while the southeastern cities have the gross 
domestic product per capita as between 568 and 918, western cities have between 2500 
and 6168.  In addition, unemployment in the southeastern region of Turkey has the 
highest rate (11.5 to 17.5) comparing to western part of the Turkey (3.6 to 9.4).  
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Considering the recruited college students who have campus or online education, 
there is a significant difference between these groups in terms of their recruitment 
method. College students who have online education are most likely to be recruited by 
the institutional structures while college students who have campus education are more 
likely to be recruited the institutional structures. I believe that providing free shelter and 
free foods helps the Turkish Hezbollah to get more sympathizers. Decreasing the poverty 
level will help to decrease the number of possible new targets.  
Thus, statistics concerning poverty and unemployment rates reveal that the state 
should take proactive measures in an effort to lessen inequalities and poverty.  
 
5.5 Suggestions for Future Research 
5.5.1 More quantitative research is required to examine the recruitment process of 
militants in order to explore the factors that increase one‟s likelihood of being 
recruited into the Turkish Hezbollah 
Although terrorism has received spectacular international attention over the past 
decade, unfortunately there remains sparse quantitative research in relation to the 
recruitment strategies used by terror groups. In other words, most researchers have 
focused on profiling the terrorist from psychological or sociological perspectives. 
According to Hudson (1999), studies have revealed that terrorists‟ personalities are so 
diverse that they can be observed in any legal profession. Contrary to the general 
perception of literature related to terrorism, terrorists are typically normal people who are 
generally misled through religious or ideological ways of viewing the world. Therefore, 
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until terrorists are assigned to execute their missions, it is impossible to differentiate them 
from normal people. Hudson therefore inferred that it is useless to describe the terrorist in 
terms of physical and behavioral characteristics.  
Comparable to the above argument, I believe that researchers should identify the 
required circumstances that lead individuals to join terrorist organizations rather than 
simply profiling terrorists. From this perspective and through the self reports of recruited 
college educated militants, I believe that my study has contributed greatly to the literature 
pertaining to recruitment tactics used by the Turkish Hezbollah. Through my sample of 
self reports, it was possible for me to provide a quantitative explanation concerning how 
militants were recruited and what factors lead to their recruitment.  
In addition, I believe that counterterrorism is not an easy task. For example, any 
state should not only fight against terrorists in the field but should identify and fight 
against their justifications for committing terrorist activities. Through my study, I 
examined and determined the recruitment factors that were effective in the Turkish 
Hezbollah‟s practices. Despite these significant contributions, additional quantitative 
research should be conducted in order to confirm my findings and produce scientific 
results. Although my data were unique in terms of reflecting the pure ideology of college 
educated militants recruited by the Turkish Hezbollah, future researchers may find it 
difficult to obtain these sources of information.  Therefore, I recommend that scholars 
focus more attention on newspapers, magazines, and other periodical documents 
produced by terrorists that may reveal details concerning effective tactics used to recruit 
members. In Turkey, for example, most terrorist publications are written in an attempt to 
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motivate sympathizers by providing anonymous details related to why militants choose to 
participate in their organization and what behavioral factors influenced them to join.    
 
5.5.2 Future researchers may consider conducting studies related to the leaders‟ 
perspectives on selecting new recruitment targets   
Not only from the perspectives of terrorist militants but also from those of their 
leaders, researchers should make an effort to understand explicit recruitment tactics used 
by terrorist organizations, specifically the Turkish Hezbollah. Clearly, terror groups apply 
certain recruitment strategies that are commonly produced by their group leaders. Thus, it 
is possible for scholars to obtain recruitment strategies through periodicals or through 
militant statements that have been seized by security forces. Fortunately, I was given the 
opportunity to read and examine numerous self reported statements submitted by arrested 
militants in which detailed information was outlined pertaining to how the Hezbollah 
motivated and manipulated sympathizers into joining their organization. Thus, similar 
types of academic research may also provide excellent information related to recruitment 
tactics used by the terrorist groups.  In addition, the significance of my findings can be 
validated through future research.  
 
5.5.3 More studies are required to reveal how all religions strictly condemn terrorism 
Given that most terror activities in this decade claim to be related to religious 
ideologies, scholars should be required to reveal how terrorism and religion are two terms 
that cannot be interrelated. As mentioned, religion is one of the most important mediators 
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used in the Turkish Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategies. As Sageman (2004) observed, 
religion represents one of the basic tools used to recruit new militants. The findings of my 
study also supported the assumption that religion is a tool that is effectively used by the 
Turkish Hezbollah through either institutional structures or social networks to enlist new 
militants. Therefore, the content analysis between religion and terrorism is required to 
explain how groups use religious terminology to manipulate and entice potential militants 
into joining their organization. I believe that such research can provide innovative policy 
implications that may bring to an end to the recruitment process of terrorist groups.  
 
5.6 Conclusions 
In my study, two main objectives were achieved. First, I identified the tactics used 
by the Turkish Hezbollah to recruit college students into becoming members of their 
terrorist organization, and second, I provided detailed demographics related to recruited 
college educated militants. For example, I determined how Hezbollah militants were 
recruited, their economic profiles, if they had militants within their social networks, 
whether they were educated while being with or away from their families, their family‟s  
ideology as well as their own, justification for joining the Hezbollah, and their family size 
and income. 
To achieve these objectives, I developed 19 hypotheses that were dependent upon 
eight IVs entered twice into the equation in order to weigh their influence over the DVs. 
The IVs were initially tested to reveal how the effectiveness of institutional structures and 
social networks increased or decreased depending upon the IVs. Finally, the IVs were 
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tested to determine which theories provided a better explanation for the Turkish 
Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategies.  
My study revealed that recruited college educated militants who had Hezbollah 
militants within their social networks, pursued their college education away from their 
families, and obtained an online education had a significant effect on the likelihood of 
being recruited through either institutional structures or social networks. These findings 
supported the assumptions of social control theory and social learning theory. According 
to the results of my study, the following important points were made: 
•  Weak social bonds increase the likelihood committing crimes (social control 
theory assumption) 
• Crime is a behavior learned through observing the activities of others (social 
learning theory assumption) 
In addition to these findings, my study revealed that being reared in a religious 
family, having religious ideologies, family‟s income level, and family size did not 
significantly differ in terms of the Hezbollah‟s recruitment tactics and the theory that 
provides a better explanation. Accordingly, it can be concluded that college educated 
students who displayed these specifications were not recruited by any specific Hezbollah 
structure.  
Considering the results of my research, the following suggestions are 
recommended:  
First, although findings of my study supported the assumptions of social control 
and social learning theories, social learning was the most useful theory in explaining the 
 221 
recruitment methods used by the Turkish Hezbollah. As explained in the literature 
review, social control and social learning theories were applicable to conduct further 
research in relation to terrorism.  Through these theories, it is possible to provide an 
explanation concerning recruitment strategies frequently used by terrorist groups.   
Second, my findings suggested that social networks and institutional structures 
are two important tools used effectively by the Turkish Hezbollah to recruit college 
educated students. As discussed in the policy implication section, Turkey‟s political 
system should therefore include as many ideologies as possible in an effort to maintain 
individuals within its system. In addition, responding to terrorist activities in a well 
balanced manner should be considered by policy makers.  
Finally, I suggest that literature related to terrorism should be supported through 
more quantitative studies in terms of identifying the extrinsic factors that result in college 
educated students to become recruited by terrorist organizations, namely the Turkish 
Hezbollah.  
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